The Dual Ownership Structure: a Model to Connect the Cooperative Model With Financial Markets

In business literature, the conflicts among workers, shareholders and the management have been studied mostly in the frame of stakeholder theory. The stakeholder theory recognizes this issue as an agency problem, and tries to solve the problem by establishing a contractual relationship between the agent and principals. However, as Marcoux pointed out, the appropriateness of the contract as a medium to reduce the agency problem should be questioned. As an alternative, the cooperative model minimizes the agency costs by integrating the concept of workers, owners and management. Mondragon Corporation is a successful example of the cooperative model which grew into the sixth largest corporation in Spain. However, the cooperative model has long been ignored in discussions of corporate governance, mainly because the success of the cooperative model is extremely difficult to duplicate in reality. This thesis hopes to revitalize the scholarly examination of cooperatives by developing a new model that overcomes the fundamental problem in the cooperative model: the limited access to capital markets. By dividing the ownership interest into financial and control interest, the dual ownership structure allows cooperatives to issue stock in the capital market by making a financial product out of financial interest.

Separation of Ownership from Control and Discretionary Managerial Behaviour in a Transition Economy

This study was the final stage of a four-year study of managerial behaviour and company performance in Bulgaria and examined the influence of changing ownership and control structures of companies on managerial behaviour and initiative. It provides a theoretical summary of the specific types of ownership, control, governance structures and managerial strategies in the Bulgarian transitional economy during 1992-1996. It combines two theoretical approaches, the property-rights approach to show concentrated property-rights structure and private and majority types of control as determinants of efficient enterprise risk bearing and constrained managerial discretion, and the agency theory approach to reveal the efficient role of direct non-market governance mechanisms over managers. Mr. Peev also used empirical information collected from the Central Statistical office in Bulgaria, three different enterprise investigations of corporatised state-owned enterprises between 1992 and 1994, and his own data base of privatised and private de novo industrial companies in 1996-1996. The project gives a detailed description of the main property-rights structures in Bulgaria at the present time and of the various control structures related to these. It found that there is a strong owner type of control in private and privatised firms, although, contrary to expectations, 100% state -owned enterprises tended to be characterised by a separation of ownership from control, leaving scope for managerial discretion. Mr. Peev predicts that after the forthcoming mass privatisation, many companies will acquire a dispersed ownership structure and there will be a greater separation of ownership from control and potential or inefficient managerial behaviour. The next aspect considered in detail was governance structures and the influence of the generally unstable macroeconomic environment in the country during the period in question. In examining managerial strategies, Mr. Peev divided the years since 1990 into 3 periods. Even in the first period (1990-1992) there were some signs of a more efficient role for managers and between 1992 and 1994 the picture of control structures and different managerial behaviour in state-owned companies became more diversified. Managerial strategies identified included managerial initiatives for privatisation, where managers took initiative in resolving problems of property rights and introducing restructuring measures and privatisation proposals, managerial initiatives for restructuring without privatisation, and passive adjustment and passive management, where managers seek outside services for marketing, finance management, etc. in order to adjust to the new environment. During 1995-1996 some similarities and differences between the managerial behaviour of privatised and state-owned firms emerged. Firstly, the former have undergone many changes in investment and technology, while managers of state-owned companies have changed little in this field, indicating that the private property-rights structure is more efficient for the long-term adaptation of enterprises. In the area of strategies relating to product quality, marketing, and pricing policy there was little difference between managers of private, privatised and state-owned firms. The most passive managerial behaviour was found in non-incorporated state-owned firms, although these have only an insignificant stake in the economy.

Angiopoietin-1 and angiopoietin-2 share the same binding domains in the Tie-2 receptor involving the first Ig-like loop and the epidermal growth factor-like repeats

Angiopoietin-1 (Ang-1) and angiopoietin-2 (Ang-2) have been identified as ligands with different effector functions of the vascular assembly and maturation-mediating receptor tyrosine kinase Tie-2. To understand the molecular interactions of the angiopoietins with their receptor, we have studied the binding of Ang-1 and Ang-2 to the Tie-2 receptor. Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay-based competition assays and co-immunoprecipitation experiments analyzing the binding of Ang-1 and Ang-2 to truncation mutants of the extracellular domain of Tie-2 showed that the first Ig-like loop of Tie-2 in combination with the epidermal growth factor (EGF)-like repeats (amino acids 1-360) is required for angiopoietin binding. The first Ig-like domain or the EGF-like repeats alone are not capable of binding Ang-1 and Ang-2. Concomitantly, we made the surprising finding that Tie-2 exon-2 knockout mice do express a mutated Tie-2 protein that lacks 104 amino acids of the first Ig-like domain. This mutant Tie-2 receptor is functionally inactive as shown by the lack of ligand binding and receptor phosphorylation. Collectively, the data show that the first 104 amino acids of the Tie-2 receptor are essential but not sufficient for angiopoietin binding. Conversely, the first 360 amino acids (Ig-like domain plus EGF-like repeats) of the Tie-2 receptor are necessary and sufficient to bind both Ang-1 and Ang-2, which suggests that differential receptor binding is not likely to be responsible for the different functions of Ang-1 and Ang-2.

Car ownership modeling and forecasts for China

A great increase of private car ownership took place in China from 1980 to 2009 with the development of the economy. To explain the relationship between car ownership and economic and social changes, an ordinary least squares linear regression model is developed using car ownership per capita as the dependent variable with GDP, savings deposits and highway mileages per capita as the independent variables. The model is tested and corrected for econometric problems such as spurious correlation and cointegration. Finally, the regression model is used to project oil consumption by the Chinese transportation sector through 2015. The result shows that about 2.0 million barrels of oil will be consumed by private cars in conservative scenario, and about 2.6 million barrels of oil per day in high case scenario in 2015. Both of them are much higher than the consumption level of 2009, which is 1.9 million barrels per day. It also shows that the annual growth rate of oil demand by transportation is 2.7% - 3.1% per year in the conservative scenario, and 6.9% - 7.3% per year in the high case forecast scenario from 2010 to 2015. As a result, actions like increasing oil efficiency need to be taken to deal with challenges of the increasing demand for oil.

The rate of outpatient cataract surgery in ten European countries: an analysis using data from the SHARE survey

BACKGROUND: The aim of this study was to determine the rates of outpatient cataract surgery (ROCS) in ten European countries and to find country-specific health indicators explaining the differences. METHODS: Using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), 251 eligible respondents were identified for which cataract surgery was the last surgical procedure. The ROCS of ten countries were compared using logistic regression. The influence of the public expenditure on health as per cent of the total expenditure on health, of the number of acute care beds per 1,000 population, and of the number of practicing physicians per 1,000 population, was studied by multiple logistic regression. Additional information was obtained from country-specific opinion leaders in the field of cataract surgery. RESULTS: The ROCS differed significantly between the ten analysed European countries where Denmark had the highest (100%) and Austria the lowest (0%) rate of day care surgery. A decrease in the density of acute care beds (p < 0.0000001) and in the density of practicing physicians (p < 0.05) and an increase in the public expenditure on health as per cent of the total health expenditure (p < 0.01) lead to an increase in the ROCS. According to the opinion leaders, regulations and financial incentives also have a strong influence on the ROCS. CONCLUSIONS: The outpatient rate of cataract surgery in the ten European countries was mainly influenced by the acute-care beds density, but also by the density of practicing physicians, and by the public expenditure on health.

Waiting times for cataract surgery in ten European countries: an analysis using data from the SHARE survey

AIMS: To assess waiting times for cataract surgery and their acceptance in European countries, and to find explanatory, country-specific health indicators. METHODS: Using data from the survey of health, ageing and retirement in Europe (SHARE), waiting times for cataract surgery of 245 respondents in ten countries were analysed with the help of linear regression. The influence of four country specific health indicators on waiting times was studied by multiple linear regression. The influence of waiting time and country on the wish to have surgery performed earlier was determined through logistic regression. Additional information was obtained for each country from opinion leaders in the field of cataract surgery. RESULTS: Waiting times differed significantly (p<0.001) between the ten analysed European countries. The length of wait was significantly influenced by the total expenditure on health (p<0.01) but not by the other country specific health indicators. The wish to have surgery performed earlier was determined by the length of wait (p<0.001) but not by the country where surgery was performed. CONCLUSION: The length of wait is influenced by the total expenditure on health, but not by the rate of public expenditure on health, by the physician density or by the acute bed density. The wish to have surgery performed earlier depends on the length of wait for surgery and is not influenced by the country.

Effects of Ownership on Hospital Efficiency in Germany

The objective of our study was to evaluate the efficiency of public, private for-profit, and private non-profit hospitals in Germany. First, bootstrapped data envelopment analysis (DEA) was used to evaluate the efficiency of a panel (n = 1,046) of public, private for-profit, and private non-profit hospitals between 2002 and 2006. This was followed by a second-step truncated linear regression model with bootstrapped DEA efficiency scores as dependent variable. The results show that public hospitals performed significantly better than their private for-profit and non-profit counterparts. In addition, we found a significant positive association between hospital size and efficiency, and that competitive pressure had a significant negative impact on hospital efficiency.

Board Overlap, Seat Accumulation and Share Prices

We examine the board overlap among firms listed in Switzerland. Collusion, managerial entrenchment, and financial participation cannot explain it. The overlap appears to be induced by banks and by the accumulation of seats by the most popular directors. We also document that seat accumulation is negatively related to firm value, possibly because of the conflicts of interest that multiple directorships induce and the time constraints directors face. Contrary to popular beliefs, however, the directors of traded firms do not generally hold more than one mandate in other traded firms. They do hold multiple seats in non-traded firms.