767 resultados para corporate governance mechanisms
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Theoretical background: The construct of resilience is now used in many fields, such as in sports, corporate governance and in health care system. Against the backdrop of the unique system of rehabilitation in Germany, that empowers people to participate in a social and pro-fessional way, the concept of resilience is becoming increasingly important. Accordingly this cross-sectional study should explore the resilience of orthopedic and psychosomatic patients in more detail.Questions: Are there differences in the sample that lead to different sub-samples based on the RS-13? Are there differences between the sub-samples in terms of socio-demographic data, psychosocial problems, psychological stress, stress in the workplace and the experi-ence of stress? Do socio-demografic, employment, psycho-social and psychological varia-bles influence resilience?Method: For this investigation the data of n = 131 patients was used. The data was collected in an orthopedic clinic of rehabilitation and in a psychosomatic clinic of rehabilitation. On the basis of the results of the short Resiliencescale RS-13 the sample was split into two sub-samples of N1 = 51 patients with low resilience and N2 = 80 patients with higher resilience. The questions were examined by regarding the Brief Symptom Checklist (BSCL), the Ultra-Kurz-Screening (UKS), the Stressscale (from the DASS-Questionnaire) and the Employee Attitude Survey (BAuA). Additionally a literature research was done in databases like Psy-Content, Psyndex and Springerlink to acquire the theoretical background.Results: Within the sample, there were two sub-samples, one which included patients with low resilience while the other was characterized by high resilience. Patients with low resili-ence did not differ by considering the variables of age, sex, marital status, children, educa-tion, occupational status, industry and job stress. Patients with high resilience are older and rarer incap
Resumo:
We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other's agendas.
Resumo:
We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.
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In line with global changes, the UK regulatory regime for audit and corporate governance has changed significantly since the Enron scandal, with an increased role for audit committees and independent inspection of audit firms. UK listed company chief financial officers (CFOs), audit committee chairs (ACCs) and audit partners (APs) were surveyed in 2007 to obtain views on the impact of 36 economic and regulatory factors on audit quality. 498 usable responses were received, representing a response rate of 36%. All groups rated various audit committee interactions with auditors among the factors most enhancing audit quality. Exploratory factor analysis reduces the 36 factors to nine uncorrelated dimensions. In order of extraction, these are: economic risk; audit committee activities; risk of regulatory action; audit firm ethics; economic independence of auditor; audit partner rotation; risk of client loss; audit firm size; and, lastly, International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) and audit inspection. In addition to the activities of the audit committee, risk factors for the auditor (both economic and certain regulatory risks) are believed to most enhance audit quality. However, ISAs and the audit inspection regime, aspects of the ‘standards-surveillance compliance’ regulatory system, are viewed as less effective. Respondents commented that aspects of the changed regime are largely process and compliance driven, with high costs for limited benefits, supporting psychological bias regulation theory that claims there is overconfidence that a useful regulatory intervention exists.
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In this paper, we investigate the agency costs of government ownership and their impact on corporate governance and firm value. China is used as a laboratory because of the prevalent state shareholdings in exchange-listed firms. In this context, we specifically consider the trade-offs involved in the voluntary formation of an audit committee when the controlling shareholder is the state. The decision to improve corporate governance (in this case, introduce an audit committee) is shown to be value relevant and a function of existing agency relationships and non-trivial implementation costs. Our findings are robust to the level of pyramid groups, the ownership-control wedge, and financial leverage. The research adds to the debate regarding the effect of government shareholdings on corporate culture and performance - a topic that hastaken on renewed importance in recent times.
Resumo:
BACKGROUND: The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is introducing enhancements to doping investigations in its 2015 Code, which include improved sharing of information between antidoping organisations (including sporting bodies) and enhanced accountability of athlete support staff. These additions will improve the control of links between sports doping and organised crime. In February 2013 the Australian Crime Commission released a report that linked several professional sporting codes, professional athletes with links to organised crime, performance enhancing drugs and illicit substances. Following this report the Australian Football League (AFL) partnered the Australian national antidoping organisation to investigate peptide use in Australian football. METHODS: This review compared the model proposed by Marclay, a hypothetical model for anti-doping investigations that proposed a forensic intelligence and analysis approach, to use the forensic capabilities of the AFL investigation to test the model's relevance to an actual case. RESULTS: The investigation uncovered the use of peptides used to enhance athlete performance. The AFL investigation found a high risk of doping where athlete support staff existed in teams with weak corporate governance controls. A further finding included the need for the investigation to provide a timely response in professional team sports that were sensitive to the competition timing. In the case of the AFL the team was sanctioned prior to the finals as an interim outcome for allowing the risk of use of performance-enhancing substances. Doping violation charges are still being considered. DISCUSSION: Antidoping strategies should include the investigation of corporate officers in team doping circumstances, the mandatory recording of all athlete substance use during competition and training phases, the wider sharing of forensic intelligence with non-sporting bodies particularly law enforcement and collaboration between antidoping and sporting organisations in doping investigations. CONCLUSIONS: The AFL investigation illustrated the importance of the 2015 WADA Code changes and highlighted the need for a systematic use of broad forensic intelligence activities in the investigation of doping violations.
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The aim of this contribution is to highlight the long-term evolution of family capitalism in Switzerland during the twentieth century. We focus on 22 large companies of the machine, electrotechnical and metallurgy (MEM) sector whose boards of directors and general managers have been identified in five benchmark years across the twentieth century, which allows us to distinguish between family-owned and family-controlled firms. Our results show that family firms prevailed until the 1980s and thus contradict the dominance of 'managerial capitalism'. Although we observe a decline of family capitalism during the last decade of the century, the significant remaining presence of family firms in 2000 allows us to relativise the advent of investor capitalism.
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In a competitive world, the way a firm establishes its organizational arrangements may determine the enhancement of its core competences and the possibility of reaching new markets. Firms that find their skills to be applicable in just one type of market encounter constraints in expanding their markets, and through alliances may find a competitive form of value capture. Hybrid forms of organization appear primarily as an alternative to capturing value and managing joint assets when the market and hierarchy modes do not present any yields for the firm's competitiveness. As a result, this form may present other challenging issues, such as the allocation of rights and principal-agent problems. The biofuel market has presented a strong pattern of changes over the last 10 years. New intra-firm arrangements have appeared as a path to participate or survive among global competition. Given the need for capital to achieve better results, there has been a consistent movement of mergers and acquisitions in the Biofuel sector, especially since the 2008 financial crisis. In 2011 there were five major groups in Brazil with a grinding capacity of more than 15 million tons per year: Raízen (joint venture formed by Cosan and Shell), Louis Dreyfus, Tereos Petrobras, ETH, and Bunge. Major oil companies have implemented the strategy of diversification as a hedge against the rising cost of oil. Using the alliance of Cosan and Shell in the Brazilian biofuel market as a case study, this paper analyses the governance mode and challenging issues raised by strategic alliances when firms aim to reach new markets through the sharing of core competences with local firms. The article is based on documentary research and interviews with Cosan's Investor Relations staff, and examines the main questions involving hybrid forms through the lens of the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), Agency Theory, Resource Based View (RBV), and dynamic capabilities theoretical approaches. One focal point is knowledge "appropriability" and the specific assets originated by the joint venture. Once the alliance is formed, it is expected that competences will be shared and new capabilities will expand the limits of the firm. In the case studied, Cosan and Shell shared a number of strategic assets related to their competences. Raízen was formed with economizing incentives, as well to continue marshalling internal resources to enhance the company's presence in the world energy sector. Therefore, some challenges might be related to the control and monitoring agents' behavior, considering the two-part organism formed by distinctive organizational culture, tacit knowledge, and long-term incentives. The case study analyzed illustrates the hybrid arrangement as a middle form for organizing the transaction: neither in the market nor in the hierarchy mode, but rather a more flexible commitment agreement with a strategic central authority. The corporate governance devices are also a challenge, since the alignment between the parent companies in the joint ventures is far more complex. These characteristics have led to an organism with bilateral dependence, offering favorable conditions for developing dynamic capabilities. However, these conditions might rely on the partners' long-term interest in the joint venture.
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Our paper presents a pilot project (INTERNORM) funded by the University of Lausanne to support the involvement of not-for-profit organisations in international standard setting bodies such as the ISO. It analyses preliminary results on how a distinct participatory mechanism can influence the institutional environment of technical diplomacy in which ISO standards are developed. It reflects on the contribution of innovative deliberative mechanisms to democratise the field of international standardisation, largely dominated by expert knowledge and market players. It draws upon international relations literature on new institutional forms in global governance and social studies of science on participatory issues in science-society relations. The paper argues that there are significant limitations to the rise of civil society participation in such global governance mechanisms and examines several types of barriers to the involvement of not-for-profit organisations in ISO standard-setting processes. Notre communication porte sur un projet pilote (INTERNORM) financé par l'Université de Lausanne pour favoriser l'implication des acteurs associatifs dans l'élaboration des normes internationales de type ISO. Elle analyse les effets d'un dispositif participatif sur l'environnement institutionnel très particulier de la diplomatie technique ayant cours à l'ISO. Elle présente les résultats intermédiaires d'une réflexion sur l'apport de dispositifs délibératifs pour démocratiser le champ de la normalisation internationale, largement dominé par le savoir expert et les acteurs économiques. Elle situe cette réflexion au croisement des travaux de relations internationales sur les nouvelles formes institutionnelles de la gouvernance de la mondialisation et des études sociales des sciences et des techniques sur la participation dans les rapports science - société. En identifiant plusieurs registres dans lesquels situer les difficultés d'une plus grande implication des acteurs associatifs dans les procédures d'élaboration de spécifications techniques de type ISO, nous posons l'hypothèse qu'il existe d'importantes limites à l'accroissement de la dimension participative de la gouvernance globale.
Resumo:
Financial markets play an important role in an economy performing various functions like mobilizing and pooling savings, producing information about investment opportunities, screening and monitoring investments, implementation of corporate governance, diversification and management of risk. These functions influence saving rates, investment decisions, technological innovation and, therefore, have important implications for welfare. In my PhD dissertation I examine the interplay of financial and product markets by looking at different channels through which financial markets may influence an economy.My dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter is a co-authored work with Martin Strieborny, a PhD student from the University of Lausanne. The second chapter is a co-authored work with Melise Jaud, a PhD student from the Paris School of Economics. The third chapter is co-authored with both Melise Jaud and Martin Strieborny. The last chapter of my PhD dissertation is a single author paper.Chapter 1 of my PhD thesis analyzes the effect of financial development on growth of contract intensive industries. These industries intensively use intermediate inputs that neither can be sold on organized exchange, nor are reference-priced (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). A typical example of a contract intensive industry would be an industry where an upstream supplier has to make investments in order to customize a product for needs of a downstream buyer. After the investment is made and the product is adjusted, the buyer may refuse to meet a commitment and trigger ex post renegotiation. Since the product is customized to the buyer's needs, the supplier cannot sell the product to a different buyer at the original price. This is referred in the literature as the holdup problem. As a consequence, the individually rational suppliers will underinvest into relationship-specific assets, hurting the downstream firms with negative consequences for aggregate growth. The standard way to mitigate the hold up problem is to write a binding contract and to rely on the legal enforcement by the state. However, even the most effective contract enforcement might fail to protect the supplier in tough times when the buyer lacks a reliable source of external financing. This suggests the potential role of financial intermediaries, banks in particular, in mitigating the incomplete contract problem. First, financial products like letters of credit and letters of guarantee can substantially decrease a risk and transaction costs of parties. Second, a bank loan can serve as a signal about a buyer's true financial situation, an upstream firm will be more willing undertake relationship-specific investment knowing that the business partner is creditworthy and will abstain from myopic behavior (Fama, 1985; von Thadden, 1995). Therefore, a well-developed financial (especially banking) system should disproportionately benefit contract intensive industries.The empirical test confirms this hypothesis. Indeed, contract intensive industries seem to grow faster in countries with a well developed financial system. Furthermore, this effect comes from a more developed banking sector rather than from a deeper stock market. These results are reaffirmed examining the effect of US bank deregulation on the growth of contract intensive industries in different states. Beyond an overall pro-growth effect, the bank deregulation seems to disproportionately benefit the industries requiring relationship-specific investments from their suppliers.Chapter 2 of my PhD focuses on the role of the financial sector in promoting exports of developing countries. In particular, it investigates how credit constraints affect the ability of firms operating in agri-food sectors of developing countries to keep exporting to foreign markets.Trade in high-value agri-food products from developing countries has expanded enormously over the last two decades offering opportunities for development. However, trade in agri-food is governed by a growing array of standards. Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (SPS) and technical regulations impose additional sunk, fixed and operating costs along the firms' export life. Such costs may be detrimental to firms' survival, "pricing out" producers that cannot comply. The existence of these costs suggests a potential role of credit constraints in shaping the duration of trade relationships on foreign markets. A well-developed financial system provides the funds to exporters necessary to adjust production processes in order to meet quality and quantity requirements in foreign markets and to maintain long-standing trade relationships. The products with higher needs for financing should benefit the most from a well functioning financial system. This differential effect calls for a difference-in-difference approach initially proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). As a proxy for demand for financing of agri-food products, the sanitary risk index developed by Jaud et al. (2009) is used. The empirical literature on standards and norms show high costs of compliance, both variable and fixed, for high-value food products (Garcia-Martinez and Poole, 2004; Maskus et al., 2005). The sanitary risk index reflects the propensity of products to fail health and safety controls on the European Union (EU) market. Given the high costs of compliance, the sanitary risk index captures the demand for external financing to comply with such regulations.The prediction is empirically tested examining the export survival of different agri-food products from firms operating in Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Senegal and Tanzania. The results suggest that agri-food products that require more financing to keep up with food safety regulation of the destination market, indeed sustain longer in foreign market, when they are exported from countries with better developed financial markets.Chapter 3 analyzes the link between financial markets and efficiency of resource allocation in an economy. Producing and exporting products inconsistent with a country's factor endowments constitutes a serious misallocation of funds, which undermines competitiveness of the economy and inhibits its long term growth. In this chapter, inefficient exporting patterns are analyzed through the lens of the agency theories from the corporate finance literature. Managers may pursue projects with negative net present values because their perquisites or even their job might depend on them. Exporting activities are particularly prone to this problem. Business related to foreign markets involves both high levels of additional spending and strong incentives for managers to overinvest. Rational managers might have incentives to push for exports that use country's scarce factors which is suboptimal from a social point of view. Export subsidies might further skew the incentives towards inefficient exporting. Management can divert the export subsidies into investments promoting inefficient exporting.Corporate finance literature stresses the disciplining role of outside debt in counteracting the internal pressures to divert such "free cash flow" into unprofitable investments. Managers can lose both their reputation and the control of "their" firm if the unpaid external debt triggers a bankruptcy procedure. The threat of possible failure to satisfy debt service payments pushes the managers toward an efficient use of available resources (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995). The main sources of debt financing in the most countries are banks. The disciplining role of banks might be especially important in the countries suffering from insufficient judicial quality. Banks, in pursuing their rights, rely on comparatively simple legal interventions that can be implemented even by mediocre courts. In addition to their disciplining role, banks can promote efficient exporting patterns in a more direct way by relaxing credit constraints of producers, through screening, identifying and investing in the most profitable investment projects. Therefore, a well-developed domestic financial system, and particular banking system, would help to push a country's exports towards products congruent with its comparative advantage.This prediction is tested looking at the survival of different product categories exported to US market. Products are identified according to the Euclidian distance between their revealed factor intensity and the country's factor endowments. The results suggest that products suffering from a comparative disadvantage (labour-intensive products from capital-abundant countries) survive less on the competitive US market. This pattern is stronger if the exporting country has a well-developed banking system. Thus, a strong banking sector promotes exports consistent with a country comparative advantage.Chapter 4 of my PhD thesis further examines the role of financial markets in fostering efficient resource allocation in an economy. In particular, the allocative efficiency hypothesis is investigated in the context of equity market liberalization.Many empirical studies document a positive and significant effect of financial liberalization on growth (Levchenko et al. 2009; Quinn and Toyoda 2009; Bekaert et al., 2005). However, the decrease in the cost of capital and the associated growth in investment appears rather modest in comparison to the large GDP growth effect (Bekaert and Harvey, 2005; Henry, 2000, 2003). Therefore, financial liberalization may have a positive impact on growth through its effect on the allocation of funds across firms and sectors.Free access to international capital markets allows the largest and most profitable domestic firms to borrow funds in foreign markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). As domestic banks loose some of their best clients, they reoptimize their lending practices seeking new clients among small and younger industrial firms. These firms are likely to be more risky than large and established companies. Screening of customers becomes prevalent as the return to screening rises. Banks, ceteris paribus, tend to focus on firms operating in comparative-advantage sectors because they are better risks. Firms in comparative-disadvantage sectors finding it harder to finance their entry into or survival in export markets either exit or refrain from entering export markets. On aggregate, one should therefore expect to see less entry, more exit, and shorter survival on export markets in those sectors after financial liberalization.The paper investigates the effect of financial liberalization on a country's export pattern by comparing the dynamics of entry and exit of different products in a country export portfolio before and after financial liberalization.The results suggest that products that lie far from the country's comparative advantage set tend to disappear relatively faster from the country's export portfolio following the liberalization of financial markets. In other words, financial liberalization tends to rebalance the composition of a country's export portfolio towards the products that intensively use the economy's abundant factors.
Resumo:
We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other s agendas.
Resumo:
Um dos grandes desafios que as organizações enfrentam actualmente é o da definição e aplicação de práticas de governabilidade empresarial que permitam atingir uma boa reputação e um crescimento sustentável e onde as expectativas dos diversos stakeholders possam ser harmonizadas. Cabo Verde é uma pequena economia aberta que foi recentemente considerado como país de rendimento médio. A sua adesão à Organização Mundial do Comércio, o estabelecimento da parceria especial com a União Europeia, o processo de privatização das empresas estatais e o interesse que tem despertado a investidores externos, justificam a implementação de padrões de governabilidade empresariais internacionais, ainda que adequados às características do país. Esta dissertação tem como objectivo caracterizar o governo das sociedades anónimas em Cabo Verde, contribuir para a compreensão e conhecimento do tema e servir de orientação para a melhoria do desempenho das empresas. Para o efeito colocámo-nos a seguinte questão: quais são as práticas de governo das sociedades anónimas em Cabo Verde? Para responder à nossa questão aplicámos um questionário a 77 empresas, o qual foi respondido por 35. As respostas obtidas permitem identificar as práticas de governo das sociedades anónimas em Cabo Verde durante o ano de 2008 e compará-las com as práticas europeias com base no relatório da Heidrick & Struggles (2007). Os resultados alcançados validam a nossa hipótese de partida de que sociedades anónimas em Cabo Verde ainda não utilizam as práticas normalmente aceites como Best Practices do Governo das Sociedades. Apesar de haver um Código das Sociedades Comerciais que procura modernizar e adequar a gestão das empresas aos desafios da globalização, a estrutura empresarial existente, constituída na sua grande maioria por pequenas e médias empresas familiares, a pequena percentagem de sociedades anónimas, o facto de não haver uma entidade com a responsabilidade de avaliar a gestão das empresas e, consequentemente, não existirem incentivos que promovam a adopção de boas práticas de „Corporate Governance podem justificar estes resultados.
Resumo:
Um dos grandes desafios que as organizações enfrentam actualmente é o da definição e aplicação de práticas de governabilidade empresarial que permitam atingir uma boa reputação e um crescimento sustentável e onde as expectativas dos diversos stakeholders possam ser harmonizadas. Cabo Verde é uma pequena economia aberta que foi recentemente considerado como país de rendimento médio. A sua adesão à Organização Mundial do Comércio, o estabelecimento da parceria especial com a União Europeia, o processo de privatização das empresas estatais e o interesse que tem despertado a investidores externos, justificam a implementação de padrões de governabilidade empresariais internacionais, ainda que adequados às características do país. Esta dissertação tem como objectivo caracterizar o governo das sociedades anónimas em Cabo Verde, contribuir para a compreensão e conhecimento do tema e servir de orientação para a melhoria do desempenho das empresas. Para o efeito colocámo-nos a seguinte questão: quais são as práticas de governo das sociedades anónimas em Cabo Verde? Para responder à nossa questão aplicámos um questionário a 77 empresas, o qual foi respondido por 35. As respostas obtidas permitem identificar as práticas de governo das sociedades anónimas em Cabo Verde durante o ano de 2008 e compará-las com as práticas europeias com base no relatório da Heidrick & Struggles (2007). Os resultados alcançados validam a nossa hipótese de partida de que sociedades anónimas em Cabo Verde ainda não utilizam as práticas normalmente aceites como Best Practices do Governo das Sociedades. Apesar de haver um Código das Sociedades Comerciais que procura modernizar e adequar a gestão das empresas aos desafios da globalização, a estrutura empresarial existente, constituída na sua grande maioria por pequenas e médias empresas familiares, a pequena percentagem de sociedades anónimas, o facto de não haver uma entidade com a responsabilidade de avaliar a gestão das empresas e, consequentemente, não existirem incentivos que promovam a adopção de boas práticas de „Corporate Governance podem justificar estes resultados.
Resumo:
O principal objectivo deste estudo foi verificar a importância do Controlo Interno e Gestão do Risco nas empresas. O Controlo Interno e a Gestão do Risco ganharam importância relevante sobretudo diante dos grandes escândalos empresariais que se tem vivido nesses últimos tempos, onde os diversos stakeholders (Accionistas, Governo, etc), vêm implementando soluções de modo a mitigar esses impactos desastrosos para a empresa e consequentemente para a economia do Mundo. Com a globalização da economia, as empresas estão cada vez mais voláteis, isto é, sujeitas a riscos/escândalos financeiros acarretados sobretudo pelas falhas nos sistemas do controlo e deficiente uso do instrumento de gestão do risco. O estudo terá o seu enfoque principalmente no Controlo Interno, Auditoria Interna e Gestão do Risco, focando a lei Sarbanes- Oxley que procurou melhorar a fiabilidade da prestação de contas, com especial destaque nas práticas de Corporate Governance e mediante o reforço das exigências do controlo interno sobre o reporte financeiro. O caso prático foi direccionado a uma empresa registada na Bolsa de Valores de Cabo Verde (Enacol, SA), onde foram elaborados questionários sobre a prática do seu controlo interno e a Gestão do Risco, que por seu turno mereceram uma análise e interpretação.
Resumo:
We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntaryinitiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressuregroups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs.Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporategovernance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. Weshow that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in thefirm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful socialactivists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value.These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known socialactivists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders likeCalPERS are showing a growing support for each other s agendas.