Territorial Cohesion through Spatial Policies: An Analysis with Cultural Theory and Clumsy Solutions

The European Territorial Cohesion Policy has been the subject of numerous debates in recent years. Most contributions focus on understanding the term itself and figuring out what is behind it, or arguing for or against a stronger formal competence of the European Union in this field. This article will leave out these aspects and pay attention to (undefined and legally non-binding) conceptual elements of territorial cohesion, focusing on the challenge of linking it within spatial policies and organising the relations. Therefore, the theoretical approach of Cultural Theory and its concept of clumsy solution are applied to overcome the dilemma of typical dichotomies by adding a third and a fourth (but not a fifth) perspective. In doing so, normative contradictions between different rational approaches can be revealed, explained and approached with the concept of ‘clumsy solutions’. This contribution aims at discussing how this theoretical approach helps us explain and frame a coalition between the Territorial Cohesion Policy and spatial policies. This approach contributes to finding the best way of linking and organising policies, although the solution might be clumsy according to the different rationalities involved.

Choosing the Path of Austerity: How Policy Coalitions Shape Welfare-policy Choices in Periods of Fiscal Consolidation

In general, fiscal adjustments are associated with significant reductions in social spending. Hence, the welfare state is not spared from austerity. Because the welfare state is still central to party competition, this is electorally risky. The paper addresses the following questions: Do left parties differ from their centrist and rightist competitors in the design of austerity measures? And does government type has an impact on the extent to which austerity policies rely on social spending cuts? By comparing 17 OECD countries between 1982 and 2009 we show that if governments embark on a path to austerity, their ideology does not have a significant effect on the magnitude of welfare state retrenchment. However, if major opposition parties and interest groups rally against social spending cuts, a broad pro-reform coalition is a crucial precondition for large fiscal consolidation programs to rely on substantial cuts to social security.

The ARCH Projects: design and rationale (IAASSG 001).

OBJECTIVE A number of factors limit the effectiveness of current aortic arch studies in assessing optimal neuroprotection strategies, including insufficient patient numbers, heterogenous definitions of clinical variables, multiple technical strategies, inadequate reporting of surgical outcomes and a lack of collaborative effort. We have formed an international coalition of centres to provide more robust investigations into this topic. METHODS High-volume aortic arch centres were identified from the literature and contacted for recruitment. A Research Steering Committee of expert arch surgeons was convened to oversee the direction of the research. RESULTS The International Aortic Arch Surgery Study Group has been formed by 41 arch surgeons from 10 countries to better evaluate patient outcomes after aortic arch surgery. Several projects, including the establishment of a multi-institutional retrospective database, randomized controlled trials and a prospectively collected database, are currently underway. CONCLUSIONS Such a collaborative effort will herald a turning point in the surgical management of aortic arch pathologies and will provide better powered analyses to assess the impact of varying surgical techniques on mortality and morbidity, identify predictors for neurological and operative risk, formulate and validate risk predictor models and review long-term survival outcomes and quality-of-life after arch surgery.

Institutions and coalitions in policy processes: a cross-sectoral comparison

Actors with joint beliefs in a decision-making process form coalitions in order to translate their goals into policy. Yet, coalitions are not formed in an institutional void, but rather institutions confer opportunities and constraints to actors. This paper studies the institutional conditions under which either coalition structures with a dominant coalition or with competing coalitions emerge. It takes into account three conditions, i.e. the degree of federalism of a project, its degree of Europeanisation and the openness of the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process. The cross-sectoral comparison includes the 11 most important decision-making processes in Switzerland between 2001 and 2006 with a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results suggest that Europeanisation or an open pre-parliamentary phase lead to a dominant coalition, whereas only a specific combination of all three conditions is able to explain a structure with competing coalitions.

An initiative for participatory monitoring of large scale acquisitions: Opportunities and results thus far

Increasing commercial pressures on land are provoking fundamental and far-reaching changes in the relationships between people and land. Much knowledge on land-oriented investments projects currently comes from the media. Although this provides a good starting point, lack of transparency and rapidly changing contexts mean that this is often unreliable. The International Land Coalition, in partnership with Oxfam Novib, Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement (CIRAD), University of Pretoria, Centre for Development and Environment of the University of Bern (CDE), and GIZ, started to compile an inventory of land-related investments. This project aims to better understand the extent, trends and impacts of land-related investments by supporting an ongoing and systematic stocktaking exercise of the various investment projects currently taking place worldwide. It involves a large number of organizations and individuals working in areas where land transactions are being made, and able to provide details of such investments. The project monitors land transactions in rural areas that imply a transformation of land use rights from communities and smallholders to commercial use, and are made both by domestic and foreign investors (private actors, governments, government-back private investors). The focus is on investments for food or agrofuel production, timber extraction, carbon trading, mineral extraction, conservation and tourism. A novel way of using ITC to document land acquisitions in a spatially explicit way and by using an approach called “crowdsourcing” is being developed. This approach will allow actors to share information and knowledge directly and at any time on a public platform, where it will be scrutinized in terms of reliability and cross checked with other sources. Up to now, over 1200 deals have been recorded across 96 countries. Details of such transactions have been classified in a matrix and distributed to over 350 contacts worldwide for verification. The verified information has been geo-referenced and represented in two global maps. This is an open database enabling a continued monitoring exercise and the improvement of data accuracy. More information will be released over time. The opportunities arise from overcoming constraints by incomplete information by proposing a new way of collecting, enhancing and sharing information and knowledge in a more democratic and transparent manner. The intention is to develop interactive knowledge platform where any interested person can share and access information on land deals, their link to involved stakeholders, and their embedding into a geographical context. By making use of new ICT technologies that are more and more in the reach of local stakeholders, as well as open access and web-based spatial information systems, it will become possible to create a dynamic database containing spatial explicit data. Feeding in data by a large number of stakeholders, increasingly also by means of new mobile ITC technologies, will open up new opportunities to analyse, monitor and assess highly dynamic trends of land acquisition and rural transformation.

Sutureless Aortic Valve Replacement International Registry (SU-AVR-IR): design and rationale from the International Valvular Surgery Study Group (IVSSG).

BACKGROUND Sutureless aortic valve replacement (SU-AVR) is an innovative approach which shortens cardiopulmonary bypass and cross-clamp durations and may facilitate minimally invasive approach. Evidence outlining its safety, efficacy, hemodynamic profile and potential complications is replete with small-volume observational studies and few comparative publications. METHODS Minimally invasive aortic valve surgery and high-volume SU-AVR replacement centers were contacted for recruitment into a global collaborative coalition dedicated to sutureless valve research. A Research Steering Committee was formulated to direct research and support the mission of providing registry evidence warranted for SU-AVR. RESULTS The International Valvular Surgery Study Group (IVSSG) was formed under the auspices of the Research Steering Committee, comprised of 36 expert valvular surgeons from 27 major centers across the globe. IVSSG Sutureless Projects currently proceeding include the Retrospective and Prospective Phases of the SU-AVR International Registry (SU-AVR-IR). CONCLUSIONS The global pooling of data by the IVSSG Sutureless Projects will provide required robust clinical evidence on the safety, efficacy and hemodynamic outcomes of SU-AVR.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation

What are the conditions under which some austerity programmes rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? This article demonstrates that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state retrenchment. The findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under left-wing governments; (ii) since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition government. Therefore, the article shows that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run multipliers from autoregressive distributed lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982–2009 period, substantial support is found for these expectations.

The Demand for Power Diffusion: A Case Study of the 2005 Constitutional Referendum Voting in Kenya

Recent studies on the history of economic development demonstrate that concentration of power on a monarch or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and that institutional changes that diffuse power, though beneficial to the society in general, are opposed by some social groups. In November 2005, Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution primarily because it did not reduce the powers of the executive to any significant degree. Using data of voting patterns in the constitutional referendum and following the rational choice framework, I estimate a model of the demand for power diffusion and demonstrate that groups voting decisions depend on expected gains and likelihood of monopolizing power. The results also reveal the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power diffusion process, and therefore the study establishes a channel through which ethnic fragmentation impacts on economic development.

The Political Economy of Constitutional Choice: A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum

Recent studies of the linkages between the wealth of nations and the institutions of governance suggest that concentrating political power in a monarchy or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and, moreover, that while power-diffusing reforms can enhance the wellbeing of society in general, opposition by groups benefitting from the status quo is predictable. In November 2005, Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution that, despite promises made by their new chief executive, would not have lessened the powers of the presidency. Using a unique, constituency-level dataset on the referendum vote, we estimate a model of the demand for power diffusion and find that ethnic groups' voting decisions are influenced by their expected gains and losses from constitutional change. The results also highlights the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power-diffusion process, and thus establish a channel through which ethnic fragmentation adversely impacts economic development.

A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics

We analyze a model of 'postelection politics', in which (unlike in the more common Downsian models of 'preelection politics') politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type by introducing heterogeneity in voters' ideological preferences, and analyze how voters' reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a 'median voter theorem': the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcome.

Homeless mortality in Harris County in 2008

Little research has been on homeless mortality, but what has been done indicates that homeless people have higher mortality rates than the general population. Homeless decedents in Harris County in 2008 who were referred to the Harris County Medical Examiner's Office (HCMEO) were described by age, race/ethnicity, sex, and marital status and compared to the homeless population as enumerated by the Coalition of the Homeless (COH) in 2007. Of the 47 decedents, eight (17%) were female and 39 (83%) were male, 24 (51.1%) were non-Hispanic white, 11 (23.4%) were black, and 12 (25.5%) were Hispanic, none of the decedents were listed as married, however, a large number (29, 61.5%) were listed as “unknown,” and the average age of decedents was 50 years, six years older than the average of 44 years in the general homeless population. Most common causes of death were injuries, which included motor vehicle accidents, homicides and suicides and poisonings, (acute overdose and chronic substance use). Homeless decedents were representative to the larger Harris County homeless population. ^

A stakeholder analysis of the Texas Youth Commission issue for the Texas 80th Legislative Session

The following is a policy analysis based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework by Paul Sabatier. The study question was who were the stakeholders in the legislative process for the issue of the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) overhaul during the Texas 80th Legislative Session. This analysis included the stakeholders identifying characteristics including beliefs and interests, goals and resources, and finally, the winning legislative solutions as embodied in three bills that were passed. The study linked the stakeholders with three bills and expanded on the literature for the stakeholder group of Policy Brokers. The conclusions were that all stakeholders including Youth Advocates, the Policy People and Policy Brokers were effective in advancing legislative solutions to address the need for an agency overhaul of TYC and that the three new policies will be evaluated in the future as either short term change or long-term reforms based on their implementation. ^

Texas Health & Safety Code, Section 165.002 - Right to Breastfeed in Texas

The language used in Section 165.002 of the Texas Health and Safety Code renders breastfeeding women vulnerable and susceptible to harassment, discrimination, and persecution via the Texas Penal Code, Sec. 30.05 (Criminal Trespassing), Sec. 21.08 (Indecent Exposure), and Sec. 21.22 (Indecency with a Child). ^ The overall goal of this paper is to develop a solution to this problem via a proposed law or legislative action that offers protection and support for breastfeeding women who choose to nurse in public. Data to inform these recommendations were collected through a literature review and structured interviews with several breastfeeding stakeholders. A literature review of state and federal breastfeeding legislation was conducted to compare and contrast differences between existing legislation in the United States. Interviews were conducted with breastfeeding legislation stakeholders, which included state legislators who have been active in breastfeeding legislation, breastfeeding mothers, and representatives from the Central Texas Healthy Mothers Healthy Babies Coalition (Centex HMHB Coalition), Texas Breastfeeding Coalition (TXBF coalition), La Leche League International, and the Texas Business Association. Data from the literature and legislation reviews and interviews were transcribed and examined for common themes using qualitative data techniques. ^ Overall, most of the stakeholders came to a general consensus on three points, (1) breastfeeding women are supported by stakeholders within the community, (2) other legislation or penal codes should not override the right to breastfeed, and (3) the current breastfeeding legislation needs to be improved to adequately support breastfeeding women. The interviews with breastfeeding legislation stakeholders yielded two major recommendations for the improvement of Section 165.002 of the Texas Health and Safety Code: advocacy efforts to change the wording of the legislation and education to inform people about the legislation. ^ The right to breastfeed is an important public health issue in that it provides a host of health benefits for mothers and children, and is more economical and environmentally superior to alternative feeding methods. While breastfeeding in public is not illegal nor ever has been, adequate legislation is important to affirm this right for women so that they can confidently feed their children without embarrassment or harassment.^

Strange bedfellows: The ethics and politics of medical futility in Texas

Background: Futile medical treatments are interventions that are not associated with a benefit to the patient. The definition and concept of medical futility are controversial. The Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA) was passed in 1999 to address medically inappropriate interventions by allowing providers to withdraw inappropriate interventions against a surrogate decision maker's wishes following a review, attempt to transfer the patient, and 10-day waiting period. The original legislation was a negotiated compromise by players across the political spectrum. However, in recent years there has been increasing controversy regarding TADA and attempts to alter its applicability in Texas. ^ Purpose: The purpose of this project was to apply Paul Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework (ACF) to gain understanding into the historical, ethical, and political basis of the initial compromise, and determine the sources of conflict that have led to increased opposition to TADA. ^ Methods: Using the ACF model, key actors within the medical futility policy debate in Texas were aggregated into coalitions based on shared beliefs. A narrative summary based analysis identified the core elements of the policy subsystem, as well as the constraints and resources of the subsystem actors. Externalities that promoted adjustments to coalition beliefs and tactics used by coalition participants were analyzed. Data sources included review of the published literature regarding medical futility, as well as analysis of published newspaper accounts and editorials regarding the medical futility issue in Texas, legislative testimony, and review of weblogs and online commentaries dealing with the issue. ^ Results: Primary coalition participants in developing compromise legislation in 1999 were the Providers and Vitalists, with Autonomists gaining a prominent role starting in 2006. Internal factors associated with the breakdown of consensus included changes to the makeup of the governing coalition and changes in individual case information available to the Vitalist coalition. Externalities related to the intertwining of the Sun Hudson case and the Terri Schiavo case generated negative publicity for the TADA from progressive and conservative viewpoints. Dissemination of information in various venues regarding contentious cases was associated with more polarization of viewpoints, and realignment of coalition alliances. ^ Conclusions: The ACF provided an outline for the initial compromise over the creation of the Texas Advance Directives Act as well as the eventual loss of consensus. The debate between the Provider, Vitalist, and Autonomist coalitions has been affected by internal policy evolution, changes in the governing coalition, and important externalities. The debate over medical futility in Texas has had much broader implications in the dispute over Health Care Reform.^