Deception-detection and machine intelligence in practical Turing tests

Deception-detection is the crux of Turing’s experiment to examine machine thinking conveyed through a capacity to respond with sustained and satisfactory answers to unrestricted questions put by a human interrogator. However, in 60 years to the month since the publication of Computing Machinery and Intelligence little agreement exists for a canonical format for Turing’s textual game of imitation, deception and machine intelligence. This research raises from the trapped mine of philosophical claims, counter-claims and rebuttals Turing’s own distinct five minutes question-answer imitation game, which he envisioned practicalised in two different ways: a) A two-participant, interrogator-witness viva voce, b) A three-participant, comparison of a machine with a human both questioned simultaneously by a human interrogator. Using Loebner’s 18th Prize for Artificial Intelligence contest, and Colby et al.’s 1972 transcript analysis paradigm, this research practicalised Turing’s imitation game with over 400 human participants and 13 machines across three original experiments. Results show that, at the current state of technology, a deception rate of 8.33% was achieved by machines in 60 human-machine simultaneous comparison tests. Results also show more than 1 in 3 Reviewers succumbed to hidden interlocutor misidentification after reading transcripts from experiment 2. Deception-detection is essential to uncover the increasing number of malfeasant programmes, such as CyberLover, developed to steal identity and financially defraud users in chatrooms across the Internet. Practicalising Turing’s two tests can assist in understanding natural dialogue and mitigate the risk from cybercrime.

The British state and the Irish rebellion of 1916: an intelligence failure or an failure of response

The teleological narrative that has dominated the handling of intelligence by the British state in the events that led up to the 1916 Irish Rebellion in Dublin has been characterised as a cocktail of incompetence and mendacity. Using new and existing archive material this article argues that both the cabinet in London and key members of the Irish Executive in Dublin were supplied with accurate and timely intelligence by the Admiralty's signals intelligence unit, the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police with respect to this event. Far from being a failure of intelligence here is evidence to show that there occurred a failure of response on behalf of key decision-makers. The warnings that were given by intelligence organisations were filtered through the existing policy preferences and assumptions. As a result of these factors accurate evaluations and sound judgement were not exercised by key officials, such as Sir Matthew Nathan, in Dublin Castle.

Spooked: Britain, empire and intelligence since 1945

A collection of pieces on British intelligence including sources (Christopher R. Moran), methodology (Richard Aldrich), media (Philip H.J. Davies), historiography (Calder Walton and Christopher Andrew), South Africa and the Wilson government (Philip Murphy), Pakistan and ISI (Rob Johnson), and UK security policy in the face of radical Islam (Anthony Glees).

Enterprise intelligence: searching for a single version of the truth

Multiple versions of information and associated problems are well documented in both academic research and industry best practices. Many solutions have proposed a single version of the truth, with Business intelligence being adopted by many organizations. Business Intelligence (BI), however, is largely based on the collection of data, processing and presentation of information to meet different stakeholders’ requirement. This paper reviews the promise of Enterprise Intelligence, which promises to support decision-making based on a defined strategic understanding of the organizations goals and a unified version of the truth.

The impact of Group Intelligence software on enquiry-based learning

Despite the increasing use of groupware technologies in education, there is little evidence of their impact, especially within an enquiry-based learning (EBL) context. In this paper, we examine the use of a commercial standard Group Intelligence software called GroupSystems®ThinkTank. To date, ThinkTank has been adopted mainly in the USA and supports teams in generating ideas, categorising, prioritising, voting and multi-criteria decision-making and automatically generates a report at the end of each session. The software was used by students carrying out an EBL project, set by employers, for a full academic year. The criteria for assessing the impact of ThinkTank on student learning were those of creativity, participation, productivity, engagement and understanding. Data was collected throughout the year using a combination of interviews and questionnaires, and written feedback from employers. The overall findings show an increase in levels of productivity and creativity, evidence of a deeper understanding of their work but some variation in attitudes towards participation in the early stages of the project.

Artificial Intelligence: the basics

Artificial Intelligence: The Basics is a concise and cutting-edge introduction to the fast moving world of AI. The author Kevin Warwick, a pioneer in the field, examines issues of what it means to be man or machine and looks at advances in robotics which have blurred the boundaries. Topics covered include: how intelligence can be defined, whether machines can 'think', sensory input in machine systems, the nature of consciousness, the controversial culturing of human neurons. Exploring issues at the heart of the subject, this book is suitable for anyone interested in AI, and provides an illuminating and accessible introduction to this fascinating subject.

A police state? The Nyasaland emergency and colonial intelligence.

The Nyasaland Emergency in 1959 proved a decisive turning point in the history of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which from 1953 to 1963 brought together the territories of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) under a settler-dominated federal government. The British and Nyasaland governments defended the emergency by claiming to have gathered intelligence which showed that the Nyasaland African Congress was preparing a campaign of sabotage and murder. The Devlin Commission, appointed to investigate the emergency, dismissed the evidence of a ‘murder plot’, criticised the Nyasaland government's handling of the Emergency and, notoriously, described Nyasaland as a ‘police state’. This article has two principal aims. First, using the recently declassified papers of the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) of the Colonial Office, it seeks to provide the first detailed account of what the British government knew of the intelligence relating to the ‘murder plot’ and how they assessed it, prior to the outbreak of the emergency. It demonstrates that officials in the ISD and members of the Security Service adopted a far more cautious attitude towards the intelligence than did Conservative ministers, and had greater qualms about allowing it into the public domain to justify government policy. Second, the article examines the implications of Devlin's use of the phrase ‘police state’ for Nyasaland and for the late colonial state in general. It contrasts Devlin's use of the term with that of security experts in the ISD, who routinely applied it to policing systems that diverged from their own preferred model. Hence, whereas Devlin compared policing in Nyasaland unfavourably with that in Southern Rhodesia, implying, ironically, that Nyasaland was ‘under-policed’ (because there were fewer police per head of population in Nyasaland than in Southern Rhodesia), the ISD regarded the intensive system of policing operated by the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia as characteristic of a ‘police state’. The article suggests that the frequent use of the term ‘police state’ was indicative of broader anxieties about what Britain's legacy would be for the post-independence African state.

The intelligence paradox; will ET get the metabolic syndrome? Lessons from and for Earth

Mankind is facing an unprecedented health challenge in the current pandemic of obesity and diabetes. We propose that this is the inevitable (and predictable) consequence of the evolution of intelligence, which itself could be an expression of life being an information system driven by entropy. Because of its ability to make life more adaptable and robust, intelligence evolved as an efficient adaptive response to the stresses arising from an ever-changing environment. These adaptive responses are encapsulated by the epiphenomena of “hormesis”, a phenomenon we believe to be central to the evolution of intelligence and essential for the maintenance of optimal physiological function and health. Thus, as intelligence evolved, it would eventually reach a cognitive level with the ability to control its environment through technology and have the ability remove all stressors. In effect, it would act to remove the very hormetic factors that had driven its evolution. Mankind may have reached this point, creating an environmental utopia that has reduced the very stimuli necessary for optimal health and the evolution of intelligence – “the intelligence paradox”. One of the hallmarks of this paradox is of course the rising incidence in obesity, diabetes and the metabolic syndrome. This leads to the conclusion that wherever life evolves, here on earth or in another part of the galaxy, the “intelligence paradox’” would be the inevitable side-effect of the evolution of intelligence. ET may not need to just “phone home” but may also need to “phone the local gym”. This suggests another possible reason to explain Fermi’s paradox; Enrico Fermi, the famous physicist, suggested in the 1950s that if extra-terrestrial intelligence was so prevalent, which was a common belief at the time, then where was it? Our suggestion is that if advanced life has got going elsewhere in our galaxy, it can’t afford to explore the galaxy because it has to pay its healthcare costs.

Orientalism and intelligence analysis: deconstructing Anglo-American notions of the ‘Arab’

Despite revived notions of a ‘cultural divide’ between East and West, Edward's Said's ‘Orientalism’ has received little attention from scholars of intelligence and diplomacy. This article brings to light for the first time a number of recently declassified documents of a different nature to usual assessments produced by Anglo-American analytic bodies: those focussed primarily on the issue of ‘national character’. Using and critiquing Said's thesis of Western ‘Orientalism’ it reveals some critical and enduring conceptualizations articulated by the diplomatic and intelligence community about Arab culture such as the role of Islam, rhetoric, political motivation and notions of ‘honour’. Such a critical approach demonstrates how diplomatic and intelligence history can also be a history of culture, ideas and institutional mentalité.