974 resultados para Z-R relation
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[Acte. 1789-07-28]
Resumo:
Recent research on the sources of cognitive competence in infancy and early childhood has highlighted the role of social and emotional factors (for example, Lewis, 1993b). Exploring the roots of competence requires a longitudinal and multivariate approach. To deal with the resulting complexity, potentially integrative theoretical constructs are required. One logical candidate is self-regulation. Three key developmental questions were the focus of this investigation. 1) Does infant self-regulation (attentional, emotional, and social) predict preschool cognitive competence? 2) Does infant self-regulation predict preschool self-regulation? 3) Does preschool self-regulation predict concurrent preschool cognitive competence? One hundred preschoolers (46 females, 54 males; mean age = 5 years, 11 months) who had participated at 9- and/ or 12-months of age in an object permanence task were recruited to participate in this longitudinal investigation. Each subject completed four scales of the WPPSI-R and two social cognitive tasks. Parents completed questionnaires about their preschoolers' regulatory behaviours (Achenbach's Child Behavior Checklist [1991] and selected items from Eisenberg et ale [1993] and Derryberry & Rothbart [1988]). Separate behavioural coding systems were developed to capture regulatory capabilities in infancy (from the object permanence task) and preschool (from the WPPSIR Block Design). Overall, correlational and multiple regression results offered strong affirmative answers to the three key questions (R's = .30 to .38), using the behavioural observations of self-regulation. Behavioural regulation at preschool substantially predicted parental reports of regulation, but the latter variables did not predict preschool competence. Infant selfregulation and preschool regulation made statistically independent contributions to competence, even though regulation at Time 1 and Time 2 ii were substantially related. The results are interpreted as supporting a developmental pathway in which well-regulated infants more readily acquire both expertise and more sophisticated regulatory skills. Future research should address the origins of these skills earlier in infancy, and the social contexts that generate them and support them during the intervening years.
Resumo:
Adam Seybet, Chairman.
Resumo:
This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied : no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.