774 resultados para TU games
Resumo:
For the past few decades, researchers have increased our understanding of how sound functions within various audio–visual media formats. With a different focus in mind, this study aims to identify the roles and functions of sound in relation to the game form Audio Games, in order to explore the potential of sound when acting as an autonomous narrative form. Because this is still a relatively unexplored research field, the main purpose of this study is to help establish a theoretical ground and stimulate further research within the field of audio games. By adopting an interdisciplinary approach to the topic, this research relies on theoretical studies, examinations of audio games and contact with the audio game community. In order to reveal the roles of sound, the gathered data is analyzed according to both a contextual and a functional perspective. The research shows that a distinction between the terms ‘function’ and ‘role’ is important when analyzing sound in digital games. The analysis therefore results in the identification of two analytical levels that help define the functions and roles of an entity within a social context, named the Functional and the Interfunctional levels. In addition to successfully identifying three main roles of sound within audio games—each describing the relationship between sound and the entities game system, player and virtual environment—many other issues are also addressed. Consequently, and in accordance with its purpose, this study provides a broad foundation for further research of sound in both audio games and video games.
Resumo:
Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.
Resumo:
We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the pr iors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors and so on.We provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successfulIy eliminate strategies which are not best responses. This paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively unàominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984». Moreover, sufficient condi tions are also found for Nash equilibrium behavior. We also provide Aumann's (1985) results on correlated equilibria .
Resumo:
Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.
Resumo:
We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.
Resumo:
My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.
Resumo:
Current policies on education to visually impaired point for a growing trend of including students with special educational needs in regular schools. However, most often this inclusion is not accompanied by an appropriate professional trained or infrastructure, which has been presented as a big problem for regular school teachers who have students with visual impairments in their classroom. Based on this situation, the Group of Extension in Tactile Cartography from UNESP - University of the State of São Paulo - Campus de Rio Claro - SP - Brazil has been developing educational material of geography and cartography to blind students at a special school. Among the materials developed in this study highlight the development of graphics and board games provided with sound capabilities through MAPAVOX, software developed in partnership with UFRJ - Federal University from Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil. Through this software, sound capabilities can be inserted into built materials, giving them a multi-sensory character. In most cases the necessary conditions for building specific materials to students with visual impairments is expensive and beyond the reach of features from a regular school, so the survey sought to use easy access and low cost materials like Cork, leaf aluminum, material for fixing and others. The development of these materials was supported by preparation in laboratory and its subsequent test through practices involving blind students. The methodology used on the survey is based on qualitative research and non comparative analysis of the results. In other words, the material is built based on the special students perception and reality construction, not being mere adaptations of visual materials, but a construction focused on the reality of the visually impaired. The results proved were quite successful as the materials prepared were effective on mediating the learning process of students with disabilities. Geographical and cartographic concepts were seized by the students through the technology used, associated with the use of materials that took into account in its building process the perception of the students.
Resumo:
This study aims to demonstrate that data from business games can be an important resource for improving efficiency and effectiveness of learning. The proposal presented here was developed from preliminary studies of data from Virtual Market games that pointed the possibility of identifying gaps in learning by analyzing the decisions of students. This proposal helps students to refine their learning processes and equips tutors with strategies for teaching and student assessment. The proposal also complements the group discussion and/or debriefing, which are widely used to enhance learning mediated by games. However, from a management perspective the model has the potential to be erroneous and miss opportunities, which cannot be detected because of the dependence on the characteristics of the individual, such as ability to communicate and work together. To illustrate the proposed technique, data sets from two business games were analyzed with the focus on managing working capital and it was found that students had difficulties managing this task. Similar trends were observed in all categories of students in the study-undergraduate, postgraduate and specialization. This discovery led us to the analysis of data for decisions made in the performance of the games, and it was determined that indicators could be developed that were capable of indentifying inconsistencies in the decisions. It was decided to apply some basic concepts of the finance management, such as management of the operational and non-operational expenditures, as well as production management concepts, such as the use of the production capacity. By analyzing the data from the Virtual Market games using the indicator concept, it was possible to detect the lack of domain knowledge of the students. Therefore, these indicators can be used to analyze the decisions of the players and guide them during the game, increasing their effectiveness and efficiency. As these indicators were developed from specific content, they can also be used to develop teaching materials to support learning. Viewed in this light, the proposal adds new possibilities for using business games in learning. In addition to the intrinsic learning that is achieved through playing the games, they also assist in driving the learning process. This study considers the applications and the methodology used.
Resumo:
Introduction: Studies on education in health are important for the concretion of action of promotion of the health. Objective: To verify the changes of theoretical knowledge on sitting posture, evaluated at two moments (initial and final,) considering two programs of education (expositive lesson and operative groups). Methods: 75 pupils had been citizens, of both the sexes, three 4as series of a public school, evaluated previously (A1) on seated position; group 1 was submitted to a procedure of expositive education, the 2 educative games in the 2 and, the 3 to no intervention. After one week they had been reevaluated (A2). For the moments the test of Wilcoxon was applied and between the Kruskal groups Wallis. Results: In the comparison inside of the groups, of 2 and 3 they had presented increase in the number of rightness on position seated in the after-test, with statistical significant difference, whereas in the group has controlled, such fact did not occur. In the comparison between groups, at the first moment (A1), 2 groups e 3 had not presented significant difference statistical (p > 0,05), however, in as moment notices that it had difference statistics between the three groups (p < 0,01), being that the G3 presented minor frequency of errors (md = 5) in relation to the g2 (md = 8) and g1 (md = 10). Conclusions: It can be affirmed that educative techniques that supply information and promote debates and exchanges of experiences between the participants increase the possibilities of incorporation of the contents related to the sitting posture.