A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2006

The Ins and Outs of Unemployment: A Conditional Analysis

We analyze how unemployment, job finding and job separation rates react to neutral and investment-specific technology shocks. Neutral shocks increase unemployment and explain a substantial portion of unemployment volatility; investment-specific shocks expand employment and hours worked and mostly contribute to hours worked volatility. Movements in the job separation rates are responsible for the impact response of unemployment while job finding rates for movements along its adjustment path. Our evidence qualifies the conclusions by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2007) and warns against using search models with exogenous separation rates to analyze the effects of technology shocks.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

Report of the Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Workforce Development on a Review of Selected General and Application Controls Over the Unemployment Insurance System, May 1, 2006 to May 24, 2006

State Audit Reports

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2006

Business Cycles, Unemployment Insurance, and the Calibration of Matching Models

This paper points out an empirical puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, both sticky wages and match-specific productivity shocks help the model reproduce the stylized facts: both make the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, thus making hiring more procyclical too.

Parking System Revenue Bond Funds, Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplemental Information, June 30, 2006

State University Audit Report

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, September 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program produced by the Department of Human Services

Co-evolution between sociality and dispersal: The role of synergistic cooperative benefits.

Explaining the evolution of sociality is challenging because social individuals face disadvantages that must be balanced by intrinsic benefits of living in a group. One potential route towards the evolution of sociality may emerge from the avoidance of dispersal, which can be risky in some environments. Although early studies found that local competition may cancel the benefits of cooperation in viscous populations, subsequent studies have identified conditions, such as the presence of kin recognition or specific demographic conditions, under which altruism will still spread. Most of these studies assume that the costs of cooperating outweigh the direct benefits (strong altruism). In nature, however, many organisms gain synergistic benefits from group living, which may counterbalance even costly altruistic behaviours. Here, we use an individual based model to investigate how dispersal and social behaviour co-evolve when social behaviours result in synergistic benefits that counterbalance the relative cost of altruism to a greater extent than assumed in previous models. When the cost of cooperation is high, selection for sociality responds strongly to the cost of dispersal. In particular, cooperation can begin to spread in a population when higher cooperation levels become correlated with lower dispersal tendencies within individuals. In contrast, less costly social behaviours are less sensitive to the cost of dispersal. In line with previous studies, we find that mechanisms of global population control also affect this relationship: when whole patches (groups) go extinct each generation, selection favours a relatively high dispersal propensity, and social behaviours evolve only when they are not very costly. If random individuals within groups experience mortality each generation to maintain a global carrying capacity, on the other hand, social behaviours spread and dispersal is reduced, even when the latter is not costly.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, January 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.