The differentiated effects of CSR actions in the service industry

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to attempt to explain why the impact of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives may be different and/or more important in service firms compared to manufacturing firms. CSR is becoming a common strategy, hence its extensive research. Central to it is the analysis of the effect of CSR on a firm’s performance, whose outcome depends on firm-specific and industry-related factors. Design/methodology/approach – The event study methodology is applied to all the 248 companies that have ever traded on the Spanish Stock Market between 1990 and 2007. A regression analysis examines potential different effects of CSR on service and goods firms. Findings – The results show that CSR activities have a positive impact on firm performance that is higher for service firms than for manufacturing firms. Actions related to the environment, responsible labor relationships and good corporate governance are especially important in the service context. Research limitations/implications – This research is focused on shareholders’ performance, but it does not consider other stakeholders, such as real consumer behavior or employees’ commitment and productivity. Practical implications – Service firms are likely to gain from focusing on some CSR activities (environment, employees and good corporate governance) and should use their responsible behavior as a valuable tool for public relations and differentiation in the market. Originality/value – This article is the first attempt to empirically test and explain why the relationship between CSR and firm performance may be different (more positive) for service vs manufacturing firms.

Industry-specific effect of CSR initiatives: hotels and airlines

Purpose – This study aims to examine the relationships between a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and its performance and risk. The authors hypothesize that industry-level effects are highly determinant of the sign and magnitude of these relationships to establish a ranking of industries to identify the position of the most prominent tourism-related industries: hotels and airlines. Based on the cybernetic model of decision making and the heuristics thereof, shareholders base their investment decisions derived from CSR announcements on the idea that the industries behave differently; their fixed costs being a relevant factor. Design/methodology/approach – The authors estimate the industry-specific effects of CSR initiatives on firms' performance and risk using a sample of 583 announcements from the Spanish Stock Market. Findings – The results show that while CSR announcements have a positive effect on performance when the authors do not account for industry-specific factors, once the authors incorporate these factors into the analysis, the authors find that firm performance and risk vary quite substantially as a function of the industry to which the firm belongs. Interestingly, while the hotel industry presents an average behavior (standing at 9th position in returns, 15th in terms of risk, and 8th according to the ratio returns/volatility), the airline industry presents the worst situation of all industries: last in performance and last in risk. Practical implications – The results help managers assess their decisions and allocate CSR resources optimally. Originality/value – This article is the first attempt to empirically test and comprehensively detect the different relationships between CSR and firm performance across industries.

Essays on the Effects of Corporate Taxation

Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en macroéconomie et finances publiques. Elle développe des modèles d'Equilibre Général Dynamique et Stochastique pour analyser les implications macroéconomiques des politiques d'imposition des entreprises en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits. Le premier chapitre analyse les mécanismes de transmission à l'économie, des effets d'un ré-échelonnement de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises. Dans une économie constituée d'un gouvernement, d'une firme représentative et d'un ménage représentatif, j'élabore un théorème de l'équivalence ricardienne avec l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises. Plus particulièrement, j'établis que si les marchés financiers sont parfaits, un ré-échelonnement de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises qui ne change pas la valeur présente de l'impôt total auquel l'entreprise est assujettie sur toute sa durée de vie n'a aucun effet réel sur l'économie si l'état utilise un impôt forfaitaire. Ensuite, en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits, je montre qu'une une baisse temporaire de l'impôt forfaitaire sur le profit des entreprises stimule l'investissement parce qu'il réduit temporairement le coût marginal de l'investissement. Enfin, mes résultats indiquent que si l'impôt est proportionnel au profit des entreprises, l'anticipation de taxes élevées dans le futur réduit le rendement espéré de l'investissement et atténue la stimulation de l'investissement engendrée par la réduction d'impôt. Le deuxième chapitre est écrit en collaboration avec Rui Castro. Dans cet article, nous avons quantifié les effets sur les décisions individuelles d'investis-sement et de production des entreprises ainsi que sur les agrégats macroéconomiques, d'une baisse temporaire de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits. Dans un modèle où les entreprises sont sujettes à des chocs de productivité idiosyncratiques, nous avons d'abord établi que le rationnement de crédit affecte plus les petites (jeunes) entreprises que les grandes entreprises. Pour des entreprises de même taille, les entreprises les plus productives sont celles qui souffrent le plus du manque de liquidité résultant des imperfections du marché financier. Ensuite, nous montré que pour une baisse de 1 dollar du revenu de l'impôt, l'investissement et la production augmentent respectivement de 26 et 3,5 centimes. L'effet cumulatif indique une augmentation de l'investissement et de la production agrégés respectivement de 4,6 et 7,2 centimes. Au niveau individuel, nos résultats indiquent que la politique stimule l'investissement des petites entreprises, initialement en manque de liquidité, alors qu'elle réduit l'investissement des grandes entreprises, initialement non contraintes. Le troisième chapitre est consacré à l'analyse des effets de la réforme de l'imposition des revenus d'entreprise proposée par le Trésor américain en 1992. La proposition de réforme recommande l'élimination des impôts sur les dividendes et les gains en capital et l'imposition d'une seule taxe sur le revenu des entreprises. Pour ce faire, j'ai eu recours à un modèle dynamique stochastique d'équilibre général avec marchés financiers imparfaits dans lequel les entreprises sont sujettes à des chocs idiosyncratiques de productivité. Les résultats indiquent que l'abolition des impôts sur les dividendes et les gains en capital réduisent les distorsions dans les choix d'investissement des entreprises, stimule l'investissement et entraîne une meilleure allocation du capital. Mais pour être financièrement soutenable, la réforme nécessite un relèvement du taux de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises de 34\% à 42\%. Cette hausse du taux d'imposition décourage l'accumulation du capital. En somme, la réforme engendre une baisse de l'accumulation du capital et de la production respectivement de 8\% et 1\%. Néanmoins, elle améliore l'allocation du capital de 20\%, engendrant des gains de productivité de 1.41\% et une modeste augmentation du bien être des consommateurs.

A Legal and Economic Assessment of European Takeover Regulation. CEPS Paperbacks. December 2012

Takeovers are one-off events, altering control and strategy within an organisation. But the chances of becoming the target of a bid, even where remote, daily influence corporate decision-making. Takeover rules are therefore central to company law and the balance of power among managers, shareholders and stakeholders alike. This study analyses the corporate governance drivers underpinning takeover bid regulations and assesses the implementation of the EU Directive on takeover bids and compares it with the legal framework of nine other major jurisdictions, including the US. It finds that similar rules have different effects depending on company-level and country-level characteristics and considers the use of modular legislation and optional provisions to cater for them.

Time to Set Banking Regulation Right. CEPS Paperbacks. March 2012

Excessive leverage and risk-taking by large international banks were the main causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis and the ensuing sharp drop in economic activity and employment. World leaders and central bankers promised that it would not happen again and, to this end, undertook to overhaul banking regulation, first and foremost by rectifying Basel prudential rules. This study argues that the new Basel III Accord and the ensuing EU Capital Requirements Directive IV fail to correct the two main shortcomings of international prudential rules: 1) reliance on banks’ risk management models for the calculation of capital requirements and 2) the lack of accountability by supervisors. Accordingly, the authors propose the calculation of capital requirements without risk adjustment and creation of a system of mandated action by supervisors modelled on the US framework of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA). They also recommend that banks should be required to issue large amounts of debentures that are convertible into equity in order to strengthen market discipline on management and shareholders.

Natural resources on the Russian continental shelf: Foreign investors sought... on Russian terms. OSW Commentary No. 76, 2012-05-09

In recent weeks, Rosneft, a Russian state-owned oil company, has signed co-operation agreements with three Western corporations: America’s ExxonMobil, Italy’s Eni, and Norway’s Statoil. In exchange for access to Russian oil fields on the continental shelf as minority shareholders, these Western investors will finance and carry out exploration there. They will also offer to Rosnieft technology transfer, staff exchange and the purchase of shares in their assets outside Russia (for example in the North Sea or in South America). Rosneft’s deals with Western energy companies prove that the Russian government is resuming the policy of a controlled opening-up of the Russian energy sectors to foreign investors which it initiated in 2006. So far, investors have been given access to the Russian electric energy sector and some onshore gas fields. The agreements which have been signed so far also allow them to work on the Russian continental shelf. This process is being closely supervised by the Russian government, which has enabled the Kremlin to maintain full control of this sector. The primary goal of this policy is to attract modern technologies and capital to Russia and to gain access to foreign assets since this will help Russian corporations to reinforce their positions in international markets. The signing of the above agreements does not guarantee that production will commence. These are a high-risk projects. It remains uncertain whether crude can be extracted from those fields and whether its development will be cost-effective. According to estimates, the Russian Arctic shelf holds approximately 113 billion tonnes of hydrocarbons. The development of these fields, including building any necessary infrastructure, may consume over US$500 billion within 30 years. Furthermore, the legal regulations currently in force in Russia do not guarantee that foreign investors will have a share in the output from these fields. Without foreign support, Russian companies are unlikely to cope with such technologically complicated and extremely expensive investments. In the most optimistic scenario, the oil production in the Russian Arctic may commence in fifteen to twenty years at the earliest.

European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 03.1, 2003

This paper addresses the current discussion on links between party politics and production regimes. Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU although, in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms, one would expect the situation to be reversed? I divide my analysis into three stages. First, I use the European Parliament’s crucial vote on the European takeover directive in July 2001 as a test case to show that the left-right dimension does indeed matter in corporate governance reform, beside cross-class and cross-party nation-based interests. In a second step, by analyzing the party positions in the main German corporate governance reforms in the 1990s, I show that the SPD and the CDU behave “paradoxically” in the sense that the SPD favored more corporate governance liberalization than the CDU, which protected the institutions of “Rhenish,” “organized” capitalism. This constellation occurred in the discussions on company disclosure, management accountability, the power of banks, network dissolution, and takeover regulation. Third, I offer two explanations for this paradoxical party behavior. The first explanation concerns the historical conversion of ideas. I show that trade unions and Social Democrats favored a high degree of capital organization in the Weimar Republic, but this ideological position was driven in new directions at two watersheds: one in the late 1940s, the other in the late 1950s. My second explanation lies in the importance of conflicts over managerial control, in which both employees and minority shareholders oppose managers, and in which increased shareholder power strengthens the position of works councils.

Estrutura societária e controle minoritário no Brasil Telecom: análise do poder exercido pelo Opportunity de 2003 a 2005

Desde meados dos anos 1990 o ambiente de negócios brasileiro tem passado por um relevante incremento na sofisticação da modelagem de estruturas societárias para grandes empreendimentos, um tipo de conhecimento que, porém, fica na maior parte restrito aos participantes desses empreendimentos e seus assessores jurídicos e financeiros. No caso da estruturação societária da Brasil Telecom, entretanto, foi possível ter acesso a todos os documentos e informações necessários ao estudo dessa estrutura, devido à enorme quantidade de litígios judiciais em que essa companhia esteve envolvida por quase dez anos, nos quais se pode obter a maior parte dos documentos analisados neste trabalho. Esse material é precioso, pois o caso da Brasil Telecom, conhecido como um dos maiores do direito societário brasileiro, tem uma peculiaridade muito importante: o grupo era gerido por um acionista minoritário, o grupo Opportunity, que exerceu poder de controle durante esses dez anos, apesar de sua diminuta participação societária e da forte oposição que sofreu dos acionistas majoritários por quase todo o tempo em que exerceu esse poder. O objetivo desse trabalho é revelar as técnicas jurídicas que permitiram o exercício desse poder, bem como buscar entender por que, apesar de tanta oposição dos demais acionistas e da enorme litigiosidade, anos transcorreram até que o Opportunity fosse definitivamente afastado da administração e do exercício do poder de controle da Brasil Telecom.

Essays on the Effects of Corporate Taxation

Cette thèse est une collection de trois articles en macroéconomie et finances publiques. Elle développe des modèles d'Equilibre Général Dynamique et Stochastique pour analyser les implications macroéconomiques des politiques d'imposition des entreprises en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits. Le premier chapitre analyse les mécanismes de transmission à l'économie, des effets d'un ré-échelonnement de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises. Dans une économie constituée d'un gouvernement, d'une firme représentative et d'un ménage représentatif, j'élabore un théorème de l'équivalence ricardienne avec l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises. Plus particulièrement, j'établis que si les marchés financiers sont parfaits, un ré-échelonnement de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises qui ne change pas la valeur présente de l'impôt total auquel l'entreprise est assujettie sur toute sa durée de vie n'a aucun effet réel sur l'économie si l'état utilise un impôt forfaitaire. Ensuite, en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits, je montre qu'une une baisse temporaire de l'impôt forfaitaire sur le profit des entreprises stimule l'investissement parce qu'il réduit temporairement le coût marginal de l'investissement. Enfin, mes résultats indiquent que si l'impôt est proportionnel au profit des entreprises, l'anticipation de taxes élevées dans le futur réduit le rendement espéré de l'investissement et atténue la stimulation de l'investissement engendrée par la réduction d'impôt. Le deuxième chapitre est écrit en collaboration avec Rui Castro. Dans cet article, nous avons quantifié les effets sur les décisions individuelles d'investis-sement et de production des entreprises ainsi que sur les agrégats macroéconomiques, d'une baisse temporaire de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises en présence de marchés financiers imparfaits. Dans un modèle où les entreprises sont sujettes à des chocs de productivité idiosyncratiques, nous avons d'abord établi que le rationnement de crédit affecte plus les petites (jeunes) entreprises que les grandes entreprises. Pour des entreprises de même taille, les entreprises les plus productives sont celles qui souffrent le plus du manque de liquidité résultant des imperfections du marché financier. Ensuite, nous montré que pour une baisse de 1 dollar du revenu de l'impôt, l'investissement et la production augmentent respectivement de 26 et 3,5 centimes. L'effet cumulatif indique une augmentation de l'investissement et de la production agrégés respectivement de 4,6 et 7,2 centimes. Au niveau individuel, nos résultats indiquent que la politique stimule l'investissement des petites entreprises, initialement en manque de liquidité, alors qu'elle réduit l'investissement des grandes entreprises, initialement non contraintes. Le troisième chapitre est consacré à l'analyse des effets de la réforme de l'imposition des revenus d'entreprise proposée par le Trésor américain en 1992. La proposition de réforme recommande l'élimination des impôts sur les dividendes et les gains en capital et l'imposition d'une seule taxe sur le revenu des entreprises. Pour ce faire, j'ai eu recours à un modèle dynamique stochastique d'équilibre général avec marchés financiers imparfaits dans lequel les entreprises sont sujettes à des chocs idiosyncratiques de productivité. Les résultats indiquent que l'abolition des impôts sur les dividendes et les gains en capital réduisent les distorsions dans les choix d'investissement des entreprises, stimule l'investissement et entraîne une meilleure allocation du capital. Mais pour être financièrement soutenable, la réforme nécessite un relèvement du taux de l'impôt sur le profit des entreprises de 34\% à 42\%. Cette hausse du taux d'imposition décourage l'accumulation du capital. En somme, la réforme engendre une baisse de l'accumulation du capital et de la production respectivement de 8\% et 1\%. Néanmoins, elle améliore l'allocation du capital de 20\%, engendrant des gains de productivité de 1.41\% et une modeste augmentation du bien être des consommateurs.

Miscellany. Lane collections pamphlets.

Binder's title.

Report

Mode of access: Internet.

Governança corporativa e custo de agência: uma visão do mercado brasileiro

Esse trabalho investiga empiricamente a relação entre custo de agência e as medidas de monitoramento interno disponíveis aos investidores brasileiros nas empresas nacionais, utilizando amostras de companhias abertas entre os anos de 2010 e 2014, totalizando 134 empresas analisadas e 536 observações. Para medir tal relação, foram utilizadas, como variáveis de monitoramento interno, informações sobre a remuneração variável dos executivos, entre elas o uso de outorgas de opções de compra de ações, a composição do conselho de administração, dando ênfase à representatividade dos conselheiros independentes e à dualidade entre Chairman e CEO, e o percentual do capital social das companhias que está sob propriedade dos executivos. Como proxy para custo de agência, foram utilizados os indicadores Asset Turnover Ratio e General & Administrative Expenses (G&A) como percentual da Receita Líquida. Neste contexto, foram estabelecidas duas hipóteses de pesquisa e estimados modelos de regressão em painel controlados por efeitos fixos de tempo e empresa, empregando como variável dependente as variáveis proxy do custo de agência e utilizando as variáveis endividamento e tamanho das empresas como variáveis de controle. Os resultados dos modelos demonstram que, na amostra selecionada, há uma relação positiva e significativa entre o percentual da remuneração variável e as proxies de custo de agência, comportamento este contrário ao esperado originalmente. Conclui-se assim que as empresas que apresentam uma maior composição variável no total remunerado ao executivo, incorrem em um maior custo de agência, o que leva à conclusão de que tais ferramentas não são boas estratégias de alinhamento de interesses entre executivos e acionistas. As demais variáveis de monitoramento interno não apresentaram significância.

The value of dividend imputation tax credits in Australia

A dividend imputation tax system provides shareholders with a credit (for corporate tax paid) that can be used to offset personal tax on dividend income. This paper shows how to infer the value of imputation tax credits from the prices of derivative securities that are unique to Australian retail markets. We also test whether a tax law amendment that was designed to prevent the trading of imputation credits affected their economic value. Before the amendment, tax credits were worth up to 50% of face value in large, high-yielding companies, but Subsequently it is difficult to detect any value at all. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Disclosure of proxy voting information by Australian managed investment schemes

The US Securities and Exchange Commission requires registered management investment companies to disclose how they vote proxies relating to portfolio securities they hold. The primary purpose of this rule is to enable fund investors to monitor the role of institutional shareholders in the corporate governance practices of public companies. In Australia, despite reform proposals, there are no regulations requiring institutional investors to report proxy voting procedures and practices. There is little evidence of voluntary disclosure of proxy voting by Australian managed investment schemes in equities, indicating that there are costs involved in such disclosure.