Moral distress experienced by health care professionals who provide home-based palliative care

Health care providers regularly encounter situations of moral conflict and distress in their practice. Moral distress may result in unfavorable outcomes for both health care providers and those in their care. The purpose of this study was to examine the experience of moral distress from a broad range of health care occupations that provide home-based palliative care as the initial step of addressing the issue. A critical incident approach was used in qualitative interviews to elicit the experiences on moral distress from 18 health care providers drawn from five home visiting organizations in south central Ontario, Canada. Most participants described at least two critical incidents in their interview generating a total of 47 critical incidents. Analyses of the critical incidents revealed 11 issues that triggered moral distress which clustered into three themes, (a) the role of informal caregivers, b) challenging clinical situations and (c) service delivery issues. The findings suggest that the training and practice environments for health care providers need to be designed to recognize the moral challenges related to day-to-day practice.

Moral emotions and the envisioning of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing

Anger may be more responsive than disgust to mitigating circumstances in judgments of wrongdoing. We tested this hypothesis in two studies where we had participants envision circumstances that could serve to mitigate an otherwise wrongful act. In Study 1, participants provided moral judgments, and ratings of anger and disgust, to a number of transgressions involving either harm or bodily purity. They were then asked to imagine and report whether there might be any circumstances that would make it all right to perform the act. Across transgression type, and controlling for covariance between anger and disgust, levels of anger were found to negatively predict the envisioning of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing, while disgust was unrelated. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings to less serious transgressions, using a continuous measure of mitigating circumstances, and demonstrated the impact of
anger independent of deontological commitments. These findings highlight the differential relationship that anger and disgust have with the ability to envision mitigating factors.

Eve and evolution: Christian responses to the first woman question, 1860-1900

Historians of encounters between evolutionary science and Christianity have long been aware of the significance placed upon debates about the applicability of evolution to Adam. It has not been widely noticed, however, that in more conservative circles the creation of Eve was frequently thought to be a more difficult problem to solve. This essay examines how, in distinctive ways, the creation of Eve became a point of contention among three communities of conservative Christian thinkers grappling with the implications of evolutionary theory in the period 1860-1900.

Religiosity, Political Orientation, and Consequentialist Moral Thinking

Three studies demonstrated that the moral judgments of religious individuals and political conservatives are highly insensitive to consequentialist (i.e., outcome-based) considerations. In Study 1, both religiosity and political conservatism predicted a resistance toward consequentialist thinking concerning a range of transgressive acts, independent of other relevant dispositional factors (e.g., disgust sensitivity). Study 2 ruled out differences in welfare sensitivity as an explanation for these findings. In Study 3, religiosity and political conservatism predicted a commitment to judging “harmless” taboo violations morally impermissible, rather than discretionary, despite the lack of negative consequences rising from the act. Furthermore, non-consequentialist thinking style was shown to mediate the relationship religiosity/conservatism had with impermissibility judgments, while intuitive thinking style did not. These data provide further evidence for the influence of religious and political commitments in motivating divergent moral judgments, while highlighting a new dispositional factor, non-consequentialist thinking style, as a mediator of these effects.