Internet use and psychological wellbeing among 10 and 11 year old children

This paper uses data from the 2009 Kids’ Life and Times Survey, involving 3657 children aged 10 or 11 years old in Northern Ireland. The survey indicated high levels of use of Internet applications, including social-networking sites and online games. Using the KIDSCREEN-27 instrument, the data indicate that the use of social-networking sites and online games is related to poorer psychological well-being among girls, but not boys. Boys and girls who experience “cyberbullying” have poorer psychological well-being. This association between psychological well-being and some Internet applications merits more attention in future research and policy development.

Internet Use and Psychological Well-being among 10-year-old and 11-year-old Children

This paper uses data from the 2009 Kids’ Life and Times Survey, involving 3657 children aged 10 or 11 years old in Northern Ireland. The survey indicated high levels of use of Internet applications, including social-networking sites and online games. Using the KIDSCREEN-27 instrument, the data indicate that the use of social-networking sites and online games is related to poorer psychological well-being among girls, but not boys. Boys and girls who experience “cyberbullying” have poorer psychological well-being. This association between psychological well-being and some Internet applications merits more attention in future research and policy development.

The Diffusion of Risks in Public Private Partnership Contracts

Purpose The UK government argues that the benefits of public private partnership (PPP) in delivering public infrastructure stem from: transferring risks to the private sector within a structure in which financiers put their own capital at risk; and, the performance based payment mechanism, reinforced by the due diligence requirements imposed by the lenders financing the projects (HM Treasury, 2010). Prior studies of risk in PPPs have investigated ‘what’ risks are allocated and to ‘whom’, that is to the public or the private sector. The purpose of this study is to examine ‘how’ and ‘why’ PPP risks are diffused by their financiers. Design/methodology/approach This study focuses on the financial structure of PPPs and on their financiers. Empirical evidence comes from interviews conducted with equity and debt financiers. Findings The findings show that the financial structure of the deals generates risk aversion in both debt and equity financiers and that the need to attract affordable finance leads to risk diffusion through a network of companies using various means that include contractual mitigation through insurance, performance support guarantees, interest rate swaps and inflation hedges. Because of the complexity this process generates, both procurers and suppliers need expensive expert advice. The risk aversion and diffusion and the consequent need for advice add cost to the projects impacting on the government’s economic argument for risk transfer. Limitations and implications The empirical work covers the private finance initiative (PFI) type of PPP arrangements and therefore the risk diffusion mechanisms may not be generalisable to other forms of PPP, especially those that do not involve the use of high leverage or private finance. Moreover, the scope of this research is limited to exploring the diffusion of risk in the private sector. Further research is needed on how risk is diffused in other settings and on the value for money implication of risk diffusion in PPP contracts. Originality/value The expectation inherent in PPP is that the private sector will better manage those risks allocated to it and because private capital is at risk, financiers will perform due diligence with the ultimate outcome that only viable projects will proceed. This paper presents empirical evidence that raises questions about these expectations. Key words: public private partnership, risk management, diffusion, private finance initiative, financiers

Ulysses contracts in medicine

Ulysses contracts are a method by which one person binds himself by agreeing to be bound by others. In medicine such contracts have primarily been discussed as ways of treating people with episodic mental illnesses, where the features of the illness are such that they now judge that they will refuse treatment at the time it is needed. Enforcing Ulysses contracts in these circumstances would require medical professionals to override the express refusal of the patient at the time treatment is required, something that is generally problematic both ethically and legally. In this paper I will argue that despite appearances Ulysses contracts can make it the case that treating a patient in such circumstances is an instance of treating him with his consent, although safeguards are needed to ensure that this is the case. Given the potential benefits to patients I further argue that modified Ulysses contracts should be made legally enforceable.

A retrospective study of the behavioural and psychological symptoms of mid and late phase Alzheimer's disease

To document the behavioural and psychological symptoms in patients with a diagnosis of established Alzheimer's disease (AD) for at least 3 years.