947 resultados para Political theory
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The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.
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The aim of this research paper is to analyse the key political posters made for the campaigns of Irish political party Fianna Fáil framed in the Celtic Tiger (1997-2008) and post-Celtic Tiger years (2009-2012). I will then focus on the four posters of the candidate in the elections that took place in 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2011 with the intention of observing first how the leader is represented, and later on pinpointing the similarities and possible differences between each. This is important in order to observe the main linguistic and visual strategies used to persuade the audience to vote that party and to highlight the power of the politician. Critical discourse analysis tools will be helpful to identify the main discursive strategies employed to persuade the Irish population to vote in a certain direction. Van Leeuwen’s (2008) social actor theory will facilitate the understanding of how participants are represented in the corpus under analysis. Finally, the main tools of Kress and van Leeuwen’s visual grammar (2006) will be applied for the analysis of the images. The study reveals that politicians are represented in a consistently positive way, with status and formal appearance so that people are persuaded to vote for the party they represent because they trust them as political leaders. The study, thus, points out that the poster is a powerful tool used in election campaigns to highlight the power of political parties.
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The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, social scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration during de Gaulle's presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Foucher Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence-speeches, memoirs, or government documents-suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interesred in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations--even in the "least likely" case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader's geopolitical ideology--even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary-source research.
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As seen by the launching of trade negotiations with Japan and the United States, the European Union has shifted gears in order to achieve amplified benefits in bilateral trade agreements. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty brought the European Parliament and the European External Action Service into the picture as new actors in trade negotiations. The question arises if the new framework of trade negotiations is better off than the pre-Lisbon era. By applying Veto Players theory to the Central American Association Agreement and Principal-Agent theory to the Ukrainian Association Agreement, two results were concluded. First, the participation of the European Parliament as a veto player has decreased the effectiveness of trade negotiation. Second, the participation of the European External Action Service has shown the contrary, namely an increase of effectiveness in trade negotiations.
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The crisis has forced the Euro area to establish an emergency fund that supports member states experiencing a sovereign debt crisis. The difficulties of coming up with such a fund for Greece and other Euro area members stands in marked contrast to the balance of payments support that non-Euro members like Hungary received, swiftly and quietly. In order to solve this puzzle, we first establish the difference between EU interventions and IMF programs and, second, trace the evolution of crisis management with France and Germany in the lead. The lens of hegemonic stability theory suggests that the Franco-German leadership is too weak to provide stability and the extensive use of conditionality is one symptom of this weakness. Providing incentives for cooperation "after hegemony" (Keohane) is the unresolved issues troubling the monetary union. Its dominant powers must acknowledge that markets perceive monetary union to be already politically more integrated than its lack of fiscal integration suggests.
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Voters try to avoid wasting their votes even in PR systems. In this paper we make a case that this type of strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems. Contrary to the literature we do not see weak institutional incentive structures as indicative of a hopeless endeavor for studying strategic voting. The crucial question for strategic voting is how institutional incentives constrain an individual’s decision-making process. Based on expected utility maximization we put forward a micro-logic of an individual’s expectation formation process driven by institutional and dispositional incentives. All well-known institutional incentives to vote strategically that get channelled through the district magnitude are moderated by dispositional factors in order to become relevant for voting decisions. Employing data from Finland – because of its electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we find considerable evidence for observable implications of our theory.
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Quel rôle l’organisation du travail parlementaire a-t-elle joué dans la montée en puissance du Parlement européen (PE)? Cet article vise à examiner cette question en s’appuyant sur la governing theory développée dans le cadre des études sur le Congrès nord-américain. Sur cette base, nous faisons l’hypothèse que les réformes de la structure institutionnelle du PE résultent des efforts des députés visant à renforcer la place de l’institution dans le système politique de l'Union européenne, à travers un accroissement de son «efficacité législative». Afin de tester cette hypothèse, cet article analyse l’impact de la rationalisation du fonctionnement du PE sur trois éléments clés: les organes de direction et les groupes politiques, la délibération en séance plénière et le comportement des députés. On montre ainsi que l'argument de «l'efficacité» générale du travail parlementaire est devenu un objectif en soi qui s’est imposé sur celui de liberté des parlementaires.
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The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, political scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by the four major decisions toward European integration taken under de Gaulle's Presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in Luxembourg Compromise. In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence speeches, memoirs, or government documents suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interested in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations even in the least likely case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leaders geopolitical ideology even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary source research.
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From the Introduction. Having simultaneously evolved theoretically and in political practice over centuries, the concept of citizenship is one of the most complex in political and social sciences. It correlates and intersects with another set of concepts and values, especially the rule of the law and democracy. Its historical evolution, thanks to individuals and citizens’ movements’ struggle to gain equal rights in their political communities, needs to be captured by theory.
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From the Introduction. Having simultaneously evolved theoretically and in political practice over centuries, the concept of citizenship is one of the most complex in political and social sciences. It correlates and intersects with another set of concepts and values, especially the rule of the law and democracy. Its historical evolution, thanks to individuals and citizens’ movements’ struggle to gain equal rights in their political communities, needs to be captured by theory.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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[division 1] Psychological patterns. 3 v.--[division 2] Political patterns. 3 v.--[division 3] Cultural patterns. 3 v.
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Published also as Studies in history, economics and public law, edited by the Faculty of political science of Columbia university, no. 374.
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Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06