Do political factors matter in explaining under- and overweight outcomes in developing countries?

We construct a rich dataset covering 47 developing countries over the years 1990-2007, combining several micro and macro level data sources to explore the link between political factors and body mass index (BMI). We implement a heteroskedastic generalized ordered logit model allowing for different covariate effects across the BMI distribution and accounting for the unequal BMI dispersion by geographical area. We find that systems with democratic qualities are more likely to reduce under-weight, but increase overweight/obesity, whereas effective political competition does entail double-benefits in the form of reducing both under-weight and obesity. Our results are robust to the introduction of country fixed effects.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

Ancrage de la légitimité économique dans les filières académiques: une approche représentationnelle de la socialisation et de l'autosélection

Cette recherche articule des processus de socialisation et d'auto-sélection à partir d'une perspective de représentations sociales (RS). Les deux études présentées montrent comment le passage dans une filière universitaire, par un phénomène de socialisation qui succède à un processus d'auto-sélection, permet d'ancrer les prises de position dans des groupes. L'Etude 1 (N = 177) montre que les étudiant-e-s interrogé-e-s choisissent leur filière en fonction des études menées avant l'entrée à l'université, et que les étudiant-e-s en commerce et en droit prennent plus fortement position en faveur de l'économie libérale que les étudiant-e-s des sciences sociales et politiques et des lettres. Les résultats de l'Etude 2 (N = 92) indiquent que ces prises de position normatives sont stables au fil des ans en commerce et qu'elles remettent de plus en plus en question l'économie libérale en sciences sociales et politiques. Enfin, les prises de position dépendent de l'orthodoxie des connaissances économiques, une mesure de la perception de la valeur explicative des connaissances économiques qui est propre aux filières.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.