Bayesian nash equilibrium in ''linear'' cournot models with private information about costs

Calculating explicit closed form solutions of Cournot models where firms have private information about their costs is, in general, very cumbersome. Most authors consider therefore linear demands and constant marginal costs. However, within this framework, the nonnegativity constraint on prices (and quantities) has been ignored or not properly dealt with and the correct calculation of all Bayesian Nash equilibria is more complicated than expected. Moreover, multiple symmetric and interior Bayesianf equilibria may exist for an open set of parameters. The reason for this is that linear demand is not really linear, since there is a kink at zero price: the general ''linear'' inverse demand function is P (Q) = max{a - bQ, 0} rather than P (Q) = a - bQ.

The Security Blanket, September 2001, Vol.1, no.1

Newsletter for Information Technology Department

The Security Blanket, October 2001, Vol.1 , no.2

Newsletter for Information Technology Department

The Security Blanket, November 2001, Vol.1, no.3

Newsletter for Information Technology Department

The Security Blanket, May/June/July 2003, Issue 15

Newsletter for Information Technology Department

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, January 2004

Monthly report from the Iowa Department of Human Services on Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI).

Entrepreneur's Overconfidence, Private Benefits and the Market Performance of the Firm

Many firms around the world are managed and partially owned by entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs hold under diversified portfolios and, therefore, bear idiosyncratic risk in addition to systematic risk. To compensate the additional risk borne, they extract private benefits. In this paper, we analyse how an entrepreneur's overconfidence affects the market performance of the firm, through the channel of private benefits. We show that two dimensions of overconfidence, namely overestimation of future cash-flows and underestimation of idiosyncratic risk (called miscalibration), have opposite effects on the private benefits extracted by the entrepreneur. As a consequence, firms managed and partially owned by overconfident entrepreneurs can deliver overperformance or underperformance, depending on the prevalence of overestimation or miscalibration of the beliefs of the entrepreneur.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2004

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2004

Monthly report from the Iowa Department of Human Services on Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI).

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2004

Monthly report from the Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2004

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2004

Monthly report about supplemental income produced by the Iowa Department of Human Services.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2004

Monthly report about supplemental income produced by the Iowa Department of Human Services.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2004

Monthly report about supplemental income produced by the Iowa Department of Human Services.