961 resultados para PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
Resumo:
A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - April 2007
Resumo:
A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - May 2007
Resumo:
We study the quantitative properties of a dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate income risk, state-dependent borrowing constraints that bind in some but not all periods and markets are incomplete. Optimal individual consumption-savings plans and equilibrium asset prices are computed under various assumptions about income uncertainty. Then we investigate whether our general equilibrium model with incomplete markets replicates two empirical observations: the high correlation between individual consumption and individual income, and the equity premium puzzle. We find that, when the driving processes are calibrated according to the data from wage income in different sectors of the US economy, the results move in the direction of explaining these observations, but the model falls short of explaining the observed correlations quantitatively. If the incomes of agents are assumed independent of each other, the observations can be explained quantitatively.
Resumo:
This paper shows how to introduce liquidity into the well known mean-variance framework of portfolio selection. Either by estimating mean-variance liquidity constrained frontiers or directly estimating optimal portfolios for alternative levels of risk aversion and preference for liquidity, we obtain strong effects of liquidity on optimal portfolio selection. In particular, portfolio performance, measured by the Sharpe ratio relative to the tangency portfolio, varies significantly with liquidity. Moreover, although mean-variance performance becomes clearly worse, the levels of liquidity onoptimal portfolios obtained when there is a positive preference for liquidity are much lower than on those optimal portfolios where investors show no sign of preference for liquidity.
Resumo:
A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - June 2007
Resumo:
A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - July 2007
Resumo:
A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - August 2007
Resumo:
We present a new model of money management, in which investors delegate portfolio management to professionals based not only on performance, but also on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge higher fees to investors who trust them more. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting their fees, but because of trust the fees do not fall to costs. In the model, 1) managers consistently underperform the market net of fees but investors still prefer to delegate money management to taking risk on their own, 2) fees involve sharing of expected returns between managers and investors, with higher fees in riskier products, 3) managers pander to investors when investors exhibit biases in their beliefs, and do not correct misperceptions, and 4) despite long run benefits from better performance, the profits from pandering to trusting investors discourage managers from pursuing contrarian strategies relative to the case with no trust. We show how trust-mediated money management renders arbitrage less effective, and may help destabilize financial markets.
Resumo:
Throughout the 19th century and until the mid-20th century, in terms of long-terminvestment in human capital and, above all, in education, Spain lagged far behind theinternational standards and, more specifically, the levels attained by its neighbours inEurope. In 1900, only 55% of the population could read; in 1950, the figure was 93%.This no doubt contributed to a pattern of slower economic growth in which thephysical strength required for agricultural work, measured here through height, had alarger impact than education on economic growth. It was not until the 1970s, with thearrival of democracy, that the Spanish education system was modernized and theinfluence of education on economic growth increased.
Resumo:
In this paper I analyze the effects of insider trading on real investmentand the insurance role of financial markets. There is a single entrepreneurwho, at a first stage, chooses the level of investment in a risky business.At the second stage, an asset with random payoff is issued and then the entrepreneurreceives some privileged information on the likely realization of productionreturn. At the third stage, trading occurs on the asset market, where theentrepreneur faces the aggregate demand coming from a continuum of rationaluniformed traders and some noise traders. I compare the equilibrium withinsider trading (when the entrepreneur trades on her inside information in theasset market) with the equilibrium in the same market without insider trading. Ifind that permitting insider trading tends to decrease the level of realinvestment. Moreover, the asset market is thinner and the entrepreneur's netsupply of the asset and the hedge ratio are lower, although the asset priceis more informative and volatile.
Resumo:
A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - September 2007
Resumo:
A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - October 2007
Resumo:
The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!
Resumo:
A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - Nov 2007
