828 resultados para Non-state actors
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"Based on the SERIES 'E' projected national population, Bureau of the Census, 1972."
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Issued April, July 1977.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06
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We propose a model for non-ideal monitoring of the state of a coupled quantum dot qubit by a quantum tunnelling device. The non-ideality is modelled using an equivalent measurement circuit. This allows realistically available measurement results to be related to the state of the quantum system (qubit). We present a quantum trajectory that describes the stochastic evolution of the qubit state conditioned by tunnelling events (i.e. current) through the device. We calculate and compare the noise power spectra of the current in an ideal and a non-ideal measurement. The results show that when the two qubit dots are strongly coupled the non-ideal measurement cannot detect the qubit state precisely. The limitation of the ideal model for describing a realistic system maybe estimated from the noise spectra.
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Summary: Prevalence studies indicate that transmission of drug-resistant HIV has been rising in the adult population, but data from the perinatally infected pediatric population are limited. In this retrospective study, we sequenced the pol region of HIV from perinatally infected infants diagnosed in New York State in 2001-2002. Analyses of drug resistance, subtype diversity, and perinatal antiretroviral exposure were conducted, and the results were compared with those from a previous study of HIV-infected infants identified in 1998-1999. Eight of 42 infants (19.1%) had provirus carrying at least 1 drug-resistance mutation, an increase of 58% over the 1998-1999 results. Mutations conferring resistance to nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors, nonnucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors, and protease inhibitors were detected in 7.1%, 11.9%, and 2.4% of specimens, respectively. Consistent with previous results, perinatal antiretroviral exposure was not associated with drug resistance (P = 0.70). Phylogenetic analysis indicated that 16.7% of infants were infected with a non-subtype B strain of HIV. It seems that drug-resistant and non-subtype B strains of HIV are becoming increasingly common in the perinatally infected population. Our results highlight the value of resistance testing for all HIV-infected infants upon diagnosis and the need to consider subtype diversity in diagnostic and treatment strategies.
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The way in which employed senior elites in English local government exercise their agency in the practice of local democracy and local governance is considered in this thesis. The research posits the notion that elite Officers act as Local Democracy Makers as they draw on their own traditions and ideologies in responding to the dilemmas of changing policy and politics in the public realm. The study is located in the latter part of New Labour?s term of office and applies an interpretive and reflexive approach to three studies of the exercise of well being powers. The approach is one of applied ethnography through the examination of literature reviews, interviews and observations of decisions taken in the exercise of the powers of economic, environmental and social well-being are used to examine how and why the Local Democracy Makers make sense of their world in the way that they do. The research suggests that, despite prevailing narratives, local governance arrangements depend on a system of hierarchy, employed elites and local politics. The challenges of re-configuring local democracy and attempts at "hollowing out" the state have secured an influential role for the non-elected official. How officials interpret, advise, mediate and manage the exercise of local governance and local democracy presents a challenge to assumptions that public services are governed beyond or without local government. New narratives and reflections on the role of the local government Officer and the marginalisation of the elected Councillor are presented in the research. In particular, how the senior elite occupy managerial, strategic and political roles as Local Democracy Makers, offers an insight into the agency of strategic actors in localities. Consequently, the success of changes in public policy is materially influenced by how the practitioner responds to such dilemmas. The thesis concludes by suggesting that integral to the design and success of public policy implementation is the role of the Officer, and especially those practitioners that advise governing arrangements and democratic practice.
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A hidden Markov state model has been applied to classical molecular dynamics simulated small peptide in explicit water. The methodology allows increasing the time resolution of the model and describe the dynamics with the precision of 0.3 ps (comparing to 6 ps for the standard methodology). It also permits the investigation of the mechanisms of transitions between the conformational states of the peptide. The detailed description of one of such transitions for the studied molecule is presented. © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 60J80, Secondary 60G99.
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Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
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Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.
The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.
The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.
The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.