[Full Program] Interior Design Symposium 2013: Well + Being

The full program of the 2013 Interior Design Symposium. Includes schedule, invited speaker bios, and a list of invited presenters.

Monitoring of Tree Island Conditions in the Southern Everglades: The Effects of Hurricanes and Hydrology on the Status and Population Dynamics of Sixteen Tropical Hardwood Hammock Tree Islands

In 2005 we began a multi-year intensive monitoring and assessment study of tropical hardwood hammocks within two distinct hydrologic regions in Everglades National Park, under funding from the CERP Monitoring and Assessment Program. In serving as an Annual Report for 2010, this document, reports in detail on the population dynamics and status of tropical hardwood hammocks in Shark Slough and adjacent marl prairies during a 4-year period between 2005 and 2009. 2005-09 was a period that saw a marked drawdown in marsh water levels (July 2006 - July 2008), and an active hurricane season in 2005 with two hurricanes, Hurricane Katrina and Wilma, making landfall over south Florida. Thus much of our focus here is on the responses of these forests to annual variation in marsh water level, and on recovery from disturbance. Most of the data are from 16 rectangular permanent plots of 225-625 m2 , with all trees mapped and tagged, and bi-annual sampling of the tree, sapling, shrub, and herb layer in a nested design. At each visit, canopy photos were taken and later analyzed for determination of interannual variation in leaf area index and canopy openness. Three of the plots were sampled at 2-month intervals, in order to gain a better idea of seasonal dynamics in litterfall and litter turnover. Changes in canopy structure were monitored through a vertical line intercept method.

Design and analysis of a folded meander dipole antenna using the MININEC program

The Mini-Numerical Electromagnetic Code (MININEC) program, a PC-Compatible version of the powerful NEC program, is used to design a new type of reduced-size antenna. The validity of the program to model simple well-known antennas, such as dipoles and monopoles, is first shown. More complex geometries such as folded dipoles, and meander dipole antennas are also analysed using the program. The final design geometry of a meander folded dipole is characterized with MININEC, yielding results that serve as the basis for the practical construction of the antenna. Finally, the laboratory work with a prototype antenna is described, and practical results are presented.

On the Regulation of Small Actors: Three Experimental Essays about Policies based on Voluntary Compliance and Decentralized Monitoring

Monitoring and enforcement are perhaps the biggest challenges in the design and implementation of environmental policies in developing countries where the actions of many small informal actors cause significant impacts on the ecosystem services and where the transaction costs for the state to regulate them could be enormous. This dissertation studies the potential of innovative institutions based on decentralized coordination and enforcement to induce better environmental outcomes. Such policies have in common that the state plays the role of providing the incentives for organization but the process of compliance happens through decentralized agreements, trust building, signaling and monitoring. I draw from the literatures in collective action, common-pool resources, game-theory and non-point source pollution to develop the instruments proposed here. To test the different conditions in which such policies could be implemented I designed two field-experiments that I conducted with small-scale gold miners in the Colombian Pacific and with users and providers of ecosystem services in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan in Mexico. This dissertation is organized in three essays.

The first essay, “Collective Incentives for Cleaner Small-Scale Gold Mining on the Frontier: Experimental Tests of Compliance with Group Incentives given Limited State Monitoring”, examines whether collective incentives, i.e. incentives provided to a group conditional on collective compliance, could “outsource” the required local monitoring, i.e. induce group interactions that extend the reach of the state that can observe only aggregate consequences in the context of small-scale gold mining. I employed a framed field-lab experiment in which the miners make decisions regarding mining intensity. The state sets a collective target for an environmental outcome, verifies compliance and provides a group reward for compliance which is split equally among members. Since the target set by the state transforms the situation into a coordination game, outcomes depend on expectations of what others will do. I conducted this experiment with 640 participants in a mining region of the Colombian Pacific and I examine different levels of policy severity and their ordering. The findings of the experiment suggest that such instruments can induce compliance but this regulation involves tradeoffs. For most severe targets – with rewards just above costs – raise gains if successful but can collapse rapidly and completely. In terms of group interactions, better outcomes are found when severity initially is lower suggesting learning.

The second essay, “Collective Compliance can be Efficient and Inequitable: Impacts of Leaders among Small-Scale Gold Miners in Colombia”, explores the channels through which communication help groups to coordinate in presence of collective incentives and whether the reached solutions are equitable or not. Also in the context of small-scale gold mining in the Colombian Pacific, I test the effect of communication in compliance with a collective environmental target. The results suggest that communication, as expected, helps to solve coordination challenges but still some groups reach agreements involving unequal outcomes. By examining the agreements that took place in each group, I observe that the main coordination mechanism was the presence of leaders that help other group members to clarify the situation. Interestingly, leaders not only helped groups to reach efficiency but also played a key role in equity by defining how the costs of compliance would be distributed among group members.

The third essay, “Creating Local PES Institutions and Increasing Impacts of PES in Mexico: A real-Time Watershed-Level Framed Field Experiment on Coordination and Conditionality”, considers the creation of a local payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism as an assurance game that requires the coordination between two groups of participants: upstream and downstream. Based on this assurance interaction, I explore the effect of allowing peer-sanctions on upstream behavior in the functioning of the mechanism. This field-lab experiment was implemented in three real cases of the Mexican Fondos Concurrentes (matching funds) program in the states of Veracruz, Quintana Roo and Yucatan, where 240 real users and 240 real providers of hydrological services were recruited and interacted with each other in real time. The experimental results suggest that initial trust-game behaviors align with participants’ perceptions and predicts baseline giving in assurance game. For upstream providers, i.e. those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction – as if that option signal an uncooperative upstream – then the contributions rise in line with the complementarity in payments of the assurance game.

Design of maintenance structures for rural electrification with solar home systems. The case of the Moroccan program.

n decentralised rural electrification through solar home systems, private companies and promoting institutions are faced with the problem of deploying maintenance structures to operate and guarantee the service of the solar systems for long periods (ten years or more). The problems linked to decentralisation, such as the dispersion of dwellings, difficult access and maintenance needs, makes it an arduous task. This paper proposes an innovative design tool created ad hoc for photovoltaic rural electrification based on a real photovoltaic rural electrification program in Morocco as a special case study. The tool is developed from a mathematical model comprising a set of decision variables (location, transport, etc.) that must meet certain constraints and whose optimisation criterion is the minimum cost of the operation and maintenance activity assuming an established quality of service. The main output of the model is the overall cost of the maintenance structure. The best location for the local maintenance headquarters and warehouses in a given region is established, as are the number of maintenance technicians and vehicles required.