Evaluation and Model of a Clinical Librarian Program

Clinical medical librarianship is entering its second decade, but little evaluative data has accrued in the literature. Variations from the original programs and novel new approaches have insured the survival of the program so far. The clinical librarian (CL) forms a vital link between the library and the health care professional, operating as an important information transfer agent. However, to further insure the survival of these vital programs, hard evaluative evidence is needed. The University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) at Galveston began a CL Program in 1978/79. An extensive three-year pre/post evaluation study was conducted using a specifically developed evaluation model, which, if adopted by others, will provide the needed comparative data. Both a pilot study, or formative evaluation, and a summative evaluation were conducted. The results of this evaluation confirmed many of the conclusions reported by other CL programs. Eight hypotheses were proposed at the beginning of this study. Data were collected and used to support acceptance or rejection of the null hypotheses, and conclusions were drawn according to the results. Implications relevant to the study conclusions and future trends in medical librarianship are also discussed in the closing chapter.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Data Management Policies and Issues with Life Science Data

Data management and sharing are relatively new concepts in the health and life sciences fields. This presentation will cover some basic policies as well as the impediments to data sharing unique to health and life sciences data.

Compliance: E-Science Mandates and Policies

Data collected under federally funded research is subject to compliance rules and regulations. Policies affecting what you can and cannot do with your data, who is responsible, and what role your institution plays can vary with funding agencies and the type of data collected. This talk will address many of the compliance issues associated with research data, as well as funder mandates that you need to be aware of to ensure compliance.

Hydrographic measurements from C.S.S. Hudson Cruise 82-002, Canadian Technical Report of Hydrography and Ocean Sciences No. 118, 112 pp (digital version)

This archive consists of the hydrographic data collected on Cruise 82-002 of C.S.S. Hudson, April 11 to May 2, 1982. 78 stations were occupied on a line running near 48°N from the mouth of the English Channel to the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. Pressure, temperature and salinity were measured by a Guildline digital CTP system. Salinity, dissolved oxygen, silicate, nitrate and phosphate were measured from water samples collected on the CTP upcasts. CTP and discrete bottle data and associated derived parameters are tabulated at standard levels. This is the digital version of the printed report (of 1989, see further details), published in 2006 with the information system Pangaea.

Linked Data at the Spanish National Library and the application of IFLA RDFS models

The Spanish National Library (Biblioteca Nacional de España1. BNE) and the Ontology Engineering Group2 of Universidad Politécnica de Madrid are working on the joint project ?Preliminary Study of Linked Data?, whose aim is to enrich the Web of Data with the BNE authority and bibliographic records. To this end, they are transforming the BNE information to RDF following the Linked Data principles3 proposed by Tim Berners Lee.

Non-librarian health professionals becoming librarians and information specialists: results of an Internet survey

Objectives: To obtain basic information about non-librarian health professionals who become librarians and information specialists.

A library-based bioinformatics services program*

Support for molecular biology researchers has been limited to traditional library resources and services in most academic health sciences libraries. The University of Washington Health Sciences Libraries have been providing specialized services to this user community since 1995. The library recruited a Ph.D. biologist to assess the molecular biological information needs of researchers and design strategies to enhance library resources and services. A survey of laboratory research groups identified areas of greatest need and led to the development of a three-pronged program: consultation, education, and resource development. Outcomes of this program include bioinformatics consultation services, library-based and graduate level courses, networking of sequence analysis tools, and a biological research Web site. Bioinformatics clients are drawn from diverse departments and include clinical researchers in need of tools that are not readily available outside of basic sciences laboratories. Evaluation and usage statistics indicate that researchers, regardless of departmental affiliation or position, require support to access molecular biology and genetics resources. Centralizing such services in the library is a natural synergy of interests and enhances the provision of traditional library resources. Successful implementation of a library-based bioinformatics program requires both subject-specific and library and information technology expertise.

Educating a New Cadre of Experts Specializing in Digital Collections and Digital Curation: Experiential Learning in Digital Library Curriculum

Integration of experiential learning into the library and information science (LIS) courses has been a theme in LIS education, but the topic deserves renewed attention with an increasing demand for professionals in the digital library field and in light of the new initiative announced by the Library of Congress (LC) and the Institution of Museum and Library Services (IMLS) for national residency program in digital curation. The balance between theory and practice in digital library curricula, the challenges of incorporating practical projects into LIS coursework, and the current practice of teaching with hands on activities represent the primary areas of this panel discussion.