School Leader Update, July 2007

Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

School Leader Update, August 2007

Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

School Leader Update, September 2007

Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

School Leader Update, October 2007

Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

School Leader Update, November 2007

Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).

Growth accounting in items of turbulence and death: efficiency, technology, capital accumulation and human capital 1929-1950

We employ a non-parametrical approach to growth accounting (Data Envelopment Analysis,DEA) to disentangle the proximate sources of labour productivity growth in 41 nationsbetween 1929 and 1950 by decomposing productivity growth into four components:technological change; efficiency catch-up (movements towards the production frontier),capital accumulation and human capital accumulation. We show that efficiency catch-upgenerally explains productivity growth, whereas technological change and factoraccumulation were limited and distorted by the effects of war. War clearly hamperedefficiency. Moreover, an unbalanced ratio of human capital to physical capital (a gap to thetechnological leader) was crucial for efficiency catching-up.

Risk dominance selects the leader. An experimental analysis

Coordination games arise very often in studies of industrial organization and international trade. This type of games has multiple strict equilibria, and therefore the identification of testable predictions isvery difficult. We study a vertical product differentiation model with two asymmetric players choosing first qualities and then prices. This game has two equilibria for some parameter values. However, we apply the risk dominance criterion suggested by Harsanyi and Selten and show that it always selects the equilibrium where the leader is the firm having some initial advantage. We then perform an experimental analysis totest whether the risk dominance prediction is supported by the behaviour oflaboratory agents. We show that the probability that the risk dominance prediction is right depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry of the game. The stronger the asymmetries the higher the predictive power of the risk dominance criterion.

Leadership and individual differences: at the cusp of a renaissance

In this introductory editorial, we provide a brief overview of the history of individual difference research in leadership. We explain the major challenges that trait research faced, and why it was revived primarily because of methodological advancements. Next, we argue that leadership individual difference research is at a cusp of a renaissance. We explain why we are at this cusp and what researchers should do reify the renaissance in terms of theoretical extensions of trait models, the application of robust methodological advancements, and the development of process models linking distal (i.e., traits) predictors to proximal predictors (e.g., behaviors, skills, attitudes), and the latter to leader outcomes. We then summarize the papers we accepted for the special issue, and conclude with an optimistic note for leadership individual difference research.

Predictors of leadership: The usual suspects and the suspect traits

In this chapter, I review literature on traits (i.e., individual differences) and their links to leader outcomes. I present an integrated model, the ascription-actuality trait theory, to explain two routes to leader outcomes that stem from traits: the route that objectively matters and the route that appears to matter but objectively may not. I discuss the history of trait research and provide criteria by which we should judge the validity of trait models. Finally, I review trait models that are the most predictive of leadership outcomes and identify those that are non-starters.

School Leader Update, February 2008

Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

School Leader Update, March 2008

Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

School Leader Update, April 2008

Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

School Leader Update, May 2008

Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education

School Leader Update, June 2008

Monthly newsletter produced by Iowa Department of Education