On the impact of leverage constraints on asset prices and trading volume

Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volumein stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion of asset returnsand the correlations between trading volume, price changes and pricelevels) to support theories where agents are not rational expected utilitymaximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in factconsistent with a standard infite horizon perfect information expectedutility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar tothose found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharpcontrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differencesthat are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futuresmarkets. We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize theintegral of their discounted utility from consumption under both budgetand leverage con-straints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou(1997), we find a closed form solution, up to a negative constant, for theequilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where theconstraint is non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdingsvolatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are increasingfunctions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of theprice-volume relation.

Insider Trading and Real Investment

In this paper I analyze the effects of insider trading on real investmentand the insurance role of financial markets. There is a single entrepreneurwho, at a first stage, chooses the level of investment in a risky business.At the second stage, an asset with random payoff is issued and then the entrepreneurreceives some privileged information on the likely realization of productionreturn. At the third stage, trading occurs on the asset market, where theentrepreneur faces the aggregate demand coming from a continuum of rationaluniformed traders and some noise traders. I compare the equilibrium withinsider trading (when the entrepreneur trades on her inside information in theasset market) with the equilibrium in the same market without insider trading. Ifind that permitting insider trading tends to decrease the level of realinvestment. Moreover, the asset market is thinner and the entrepreneur's netsupply of the asset and the hedge ratio are lower, although the asset priceis more informative and volatile.

Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development

We use a dynamic monopolistic competition model to show that an economythat inherits a small range of specialized inputs can be trapped into alower stage of development. The limited availability of specialized inputsforces the final goods producers to use a labor intensive technology, whichin turn implies a small inducement to introduce new intermediate inputs. Thestart--up costs, which make the intermediate inputs producers subject todynamic increasing returns, and pecuniary externalities that result from thefactor substitution in the final goods sector, play essential roles in themodel.

Introducing systematic dispatcher-assisted cardiopulmonary resuscitation (telephone-CPR) in a non-Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System (AMPDS): implementation process and costs.

OBJECTIVE: In order to improve the quality of our Emergency Medical Services (EMS), to raise bystander cardiopulmonary resuscitation rates and thereby meet what is becoming a universal standard in terms of quality of emergency services, we decided to implement systematic dispatcher-assisted or telephone-CPR (T-CPR) in our medical dispatch center, a non-Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System. The aim of this article is to describe the implementation process, costs and results following the introduction of this new "quality" procedure. METHODS: This was a prospective study. Over an 8-week period, our EMS dispatchers were given new procedures to provide T-CPR. We then collected data on all non-traumatic cardiac arrests within our state (Vaud, Switzerland) for the following 12months. For each event, the dispatchers had to record in writing the reason they either ruled out cardiac arrest (CA) or did not propose T-CPR in the event they did suspect CA. All emergency call recordings were reviewed by the medical director of the EMS. The analysis of the recordings and the dispatchers' written explanations were then compared. RESULTS: During the 12-month study period, a total of 497 patients (both adults and children) were identified as having a non-traumatic cardiac arrest. Out of this total, 203 cases were excluded and 294 cases were eligible for T-CPR. Out of these eligible cases, dispatchers proposed T-CPR on 202 occasions (or 69% of eligible cases). They also erroneously proposed T-CPR on 17 occasions when a CA was wrongly identified (false positive). This represents 7.8% of all T-CPR. No costs were incurred to implement our study protocol and procedures. CONCLUSIONS: This study demonstrates it is possible, using a brief campaign of sensitization but without any specific training, to implement systematic dispatcher-assisted cardiopulmonary resuscitation in a non-Advanced Medical Priority Dispatch System such as our EMS that had no prior experience with systematic T-CPR. The results in terms of T-CPR delivery rate and false positive are similar to those found in previous studies. We found our results satisfying the given short time frame of this study. Our results demonstrate that it is possible to improve the quality of emergency services at moderate or even no additional costs and this should be of interest to all EMS that do not presently benefit from using T-CPR procedures. EMS that currently do not offer T-CPR should consider implementing this technique as soon as possible, and we expect our experience may provide answers to those planning to incorporate T-CPR in their daily practice.

Resolving identities: Successive crises in a trading room after 9/11

How do organizations cope with extreme uncertainty? The existing literatureis divided on this issue: some argue that organizations deal best withuncertainty in the environment by reproducing it in the organization, whereasothers contend that the orga nization should be protected from theenvironment. In this paper we study the case of a Wall Street investment bankthat lost its entire office and trading technology in the terrorist attack ofSeptember 11 th. The traders survived, but were forced to relocate to amakeshift trading room in New Jersey. During the six months the traders spentoutside New York City, they had to deal with fears and insecurities insidethe company as well as outside it: anxiety about additional attacks,questions of professional identity, doubts about the future of the firm, andambiguities about the future re-location of the trading room. The firmovercame these uncertainties by protecting the traders identities and theirability to engage in sensemaking. The organization held together through aleadership style that managed ambiguities and created the conditions for newsolutions to emerge.

Relative price riddles in international business cycle theory: Are transport costs the explanation?

We study relative price behavior in an international business cyclemodel with specialization in production, in which a goods marketfriction is introduced through transport costs. The transporttechnology allows for flexible transport costs. We analyze whetherthis extension can account for the striking differences betweentheory and data as far as the moments of terms of trade and realexchange rates are concerned. We find that transport costs increaseboth the volatility of the terms of trade and the volatility of thereal exchange rate. However, unless the transport technology isspecified by a Leontief technology, transport costs do not resolvethe quantitative discrepancies between theory and data. Asurprising result is that transport costs may actually lower thepersistence of the real exchange rate, a finding that is in contrastto much of the emphasis of the empirical literature.

Earnings management and audit adjustments: An empirical study of IBEX 35 constituents

Doubts about the reliability of a company's qualitative financial disclosure increase market participant expectations from the auditor's report. The auditing process is supposed to serve as a monitoring device that reduces management incentives to manipulate reported earnings. Empirical research confirms that it could be an efficient device under some circumstancesand recognizes that our estimates of the informativeness of audit reports are unavoidably biased (e.g., because of a client's anticipation of the auditing process). This empirical study supports the significant role of auditors in the financial market, in particular in the prevention of earnings management practice. We focus on earnings misstatements, which auditors correct with anadjustment, using a sample of past and current constituents of the benchmark market index in Spain, IBEX 35, and manually collected audit adjustments reported over the 1997-2004 period (42 companies, 336 annual reports, 75 earnings misstatements). Our findings confirm that companies more often overstate than understate their earnings. An investor may foresee earningsmisreporting, as manipulators have a similar profile (e.g., more leveraged and with lower sales). However, he may receive valuable information from the audit adjustment on the size of earnings misstatement, which can be significantly large (i.e., material in almost all cases). We suggest that the magnitude of an audit adjustment depends, other things constant, on annual revenues and free cash levels. We also examine how the audit adjustment relates to the observed market price, trading volume and stock returns. Our findings are that earnings manipulators have a lower price and larger trading volume compared to their rivals. Their returns are positively associated with the magnitude of earnings misreporting, which is not consistent with the possible pricing of audit information.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs, June 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: "Free" and "Low-Cost" Computers: Beware of Unexpected Costs