Forecasting multivariate time series under present-value-model short- and long-run co-movement restrictions

It is well known that cointegration between the level of two variables (e.g. prices and dividends) is a necessary condition to assess the empirical validity of a present-value model (PVM) linking them. The work on cointegration,namelyon long-run co-movements, has been so prevalent that it is often over-looked that another necessary condition for the PVM to hold is that the forecast error entailed by the model is orthogonal to the past. This amounts to investigate whether short-run co-movememts steming from common cyclical feature restrictions are also present in such a system. In this paper we test for the presence of such co-movement on long- and short-term interest rates and on price and dividend for the U.S. economy. We focuss on the potential improvement in forecasting accuracies when imposing those two types of restrictions coming from economic theory.

Analysis of contagion from the constant conditional correlation model with Markov regime switching

Over the last decades, the analysis of the transmissions of international nancial events has become the subject of many academic studies focused on multivariate volatility models volatility. The goal of this study is to evaluate the nancial contagion between stock market returns. The econometric approach employed was originally presented by Pelletier (2006), named Regime Switching Dynamic Correlation (RSDC). This methodology involves the combination of Constant Conditional Correlation Model (CCC) proposed by Bollerslev (1990) with Markov Regime Switching Model suggested by Hamilton and Susmel (1994). A modi cation was made in the original RSDC model, the introduction of the GJR-GARCH model formulated in Glosten, Jagannathan e Runkle (1993), on the equation of the conditional univariate variances to allow asymmetric e ects in volatility be captured. The database was built with the series of daily closing stock market indices in the United States (SP500), United Kingdom (FTSE100), Brazil (IBOVESPA) and South Korea (KOSPI) for the period from 02/01/2003 to 09/20/2012. Throughout the work the methodology was compared with others most widespread in the literature, and the model RSDC with two regimes was de ned as the most appropriate for the selected sample. The set of results provide evidence for the existence of nancial contagion between markets of the four countries considering the de nition of nancial contagion from the World Bank called very restrictive. Such a conclusion should be evaluated carefully considering the wide diversity of de nitions of contagion in the literature.

A (semi-)parametric functional coefficient autoregressive conditional duration model

In this paper, we propose a class of ACD-type models that accommodates overdispersion, intermittent dynamics, multiple regimes, and sign and size asymmetries in financial durations. In particular, our functional coefficient autoregressive conditional duration (FC-ACD) model relies on a smooth-transition autoregressive specification. The motivation lies on the fact that the latter yields a universal approximation if one lets the number of regimes grows without bound. After establishing that the sufficient conditions for strict stationarity do not exclude explosive regimes, we address model identifiability as well as the existence, consistency, and asymptotic normality of the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimator for the FC-ACD model with a fixed number of regimes. In addition, we also discuss how to consistently estimate using a sieve approach a semiparametric variant of the FC-ACD model that takes the number of regimes to infinity. An empirical illustration indicates that our functional coefficient model is flexible enough to model IBM price durations.

Competition and cooperation between international courts: a critical approach to the new paradigms of cross-border dispute resolution model

This article examines the arising cross-border dispute resolution models (Cooperation and Competition among national Courts) from a critical perspective. Although they have been conceived to surpass the ordinary solution of a Modern paradigm (exclusive jurisdiction, choice of court, lis pendens, forum non conveniens, among others), they are insufficient to deal with problems raised with present globalization, as they do not abandon aspects of that paradigm, namely, (i) statebased Law; and (ii) standardization of cultural issues.

Forecasting Multivariate Time Series under Present-Value-Model Short- and Long-run Co-movement Restrictions

This paper has two original contributions. First, we show that the present value model (PVM hereafter), which has a wide application in macroeconomics and fi nance, entails common cyclical feature restrictions in the dynamics of the vector error-correction representation (Vahid and Engle, 1993); something that has been already investigated in that VECM context by Johansen and Swensen (1999, 2011) but has not been discussed before with this new emphasis. We also provide the present value reduced rank constraints to be tested within the log-linear model. Our second contribution relates to forecasting time series that are subject to those long and short-run reduced rank restrictions. The reason why appropriate common cyclical feature restrictions might improve forecasting is because it finds natural exclusion restrictions preventing the estimation of useless parameters, which would otherwise contribute to the increase of forecast variance with no expected reduction in bias. We applied the techniques discussed in this paper to data known to be subject to present value restrictions, i.e. the online series maintained and up-dated by Shiller. We focus on three different data sets. The fi rst includes the levels of interest rates with long and short maturities, the second includes the level of real price and dividend for the S&P composite index, and the third includes the logarithmic transformation of prices and dividends. Our exhaustive investigation of several different multivariate models reveals that better forecasts can be achieved when restrictions are applied to them. Moreover, imposing short-run restrictions produce forecast winners 70% of the time for target variables of PVMs and 63.33% of the time when all variables in the system are considered.

A model of private bank-note issue

A random-matching model (ofmoney) is formulated in which there is complete public knowledge of the trading histories of a subset of the population, called the banking sector, and no public knowledge of the trading histories of the complement of that subset, called the non bank sector. Each person, whether a banker or a non banker, is assumed to have the technological capability to create indivisible and durable objects called notes. If outside money is indivisible and sufficiently scarce, then the optimal mechanism is shown to have note issue and note destruction (redemption) by members of the banking sector.

On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

General equilibrium model with restricted participation in financial markets

The paper analyses a general equilibrium model with financiaI markets in which households may face restrictions in trading financiaI assets such as borrowing constraints and collateral (restricted participation model). However, markets are not assumed to be incomplete. We consider a standard general equilibrium model with H > 1 households, 2 periods and S states of nature in the second period. We show that generically the set of equilibrium allocations ia indeterminate, provided the existence of at least one nominal asset and one household for who some restriction is binding. Suppose there are C > 1 commodities in each state of nature and assets pays in units of some commodity. In this case for each household with binding restrictions it is possible to reduce the set of feasible assets trading and obtain a new equilibrium that utility improve alI those households. There is however an upper bound on the number of households to be improved related to the number of states of nature and the number of commodities. In particular, if the number of households ia smaller than the number of states of nature it is possible to Pareto improve any equilibrium by reducing the feasible choice set for each household.

A model of rural conflict : violence and land reform policy in Brazil

In the past ten years the struggle for land in Brazil has taken the shape of invasions of private land by welI organized groups of land less squatters. It is argued in this paper that these invasions and the resulting contlicts are a direct response to the land reform program which has been adopted by the govemment since 1985. which is based on the expropriation of farms and the creation of settlement projects. The set of formal and informal institutions which compromise the land reform program are used as the background for a game-theory model of rural contlicts. T estable implications are derived trom this model with particular emphasis on the etfect of policy variables on violence. These are then tested with panel data at state levei from 1988 to 1995. - It is shown that govemment policy which has the intent of reducing the amount of violence has the opposite etfect of leading to more incentives for contlicts.

Growth and distribution: a revised classical model

This paper discusses distribution and the historical phases of capitalism. It assumes that technical progress and growth are taking place, and, given that, its question is on the functional distribution of income between labor and capital, having as reference classical theory of distribution and Marx’s falling tendency of the rate of profit. Based on the historical experience, it, first, inverts the model, making the rate of profit as the constant variable in the long run and the wage rate, as the residuum; second, it distinguishes three types of technical progress (capital-saving, neutral and capital-using) and applies it to the history of capitalism, having the UK and France as reference. Given these three types of technical progress, it distinguishes four phases of capitalist growth, where only the second is consistent with Marx prediction. The last phase, after World War II, should be, in principle, capital-saving, consistent with growth of wages above productivity. Instead, since the 1970s wages were kept stagnant in rich countries because of, first, the fact that the Information and Communication Technology Revolution proved to be highly capital using, opening room for a new wage of substitution of capital for labor; second, the new competition coming from developing countries; third, the emergence of the technobureaucratic or professional class; and, fourth, the new power of the neoliberal class coalition associating rentier capitalists and financiers

An economic model of gun control

Guns stolen from law-abiding households provide the principal source of guns for criminals. The lethality of crime instruments increases with the availability of guns, so the gun market is subject to externalities that generate excessive ownership and inadequate spending on protective measures to deter gun theft. One motive for gun ownership is self defense, and the gun market is subject to coordination failure: the more guns purchased lawfully, the more will be stolen by criminals, so the greater the incentive for lawful . consumers to purchase guns for self defense. As a result, there may be multiple equilibria in the gun market and more than one equilibrium crime rate. We show that a simple refundable deposit for guns will internalize the externalities in the gun market and may cause large downward jumps in gun ownership, the lethality of crime instruments, and the social costs of crime.

A competitive growth model with endogenous fertility

This paper investigates the interaction between endogenous fertility behavior and the distribution of income and wealth arnong farnilies in a competitive market economy. We construct a growth model in which altruistic dynasties are heterogeneous in their initial stocks of physical capital. Dynasties make choices of farnily size along with decisions about consumption and intergenerational transfers. We show that if the rate of time preference is increasing in the number of children and preferences over nurnber of children satisfy a norrnality assumption, all steady states are characterized by equality of capital stocks and consumption arnong families. We also provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the steady state. In order to illustrate these results, we present an example in which preferences over number of children are logarithrnic and the technology is Cobb-Douglas. For this combination of preferences and technology, there exists a unique egalitarian steady state. Moreover, the economy converges to this steady state in only one generation .

A pricing model for sovereign bonde

Similar to the modeling used to evaluate ccnporate boncls, where it is a put optioo. 011 corporate assets, we modeled sovereign bonds. Instead of company's assets as underlining assets, we used foreign excbange reserves. The results show a fundamental pricing model for sovereign bond and an optimum relation between the debt size, term, mix between floating and fixed interest payments, and size of reserves. The model is tested with a Brazilian BradyBond.