Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Prediction markets supporting technology assessment

In this thesis, we study the use of prediction markets for technology assessment. We particularly focus on their ability to assess complex issues, the design constraints required for such applications and their efficacy compared to traditional techniques. To achieve this, we followed a design science research paradigm, iteratively developing, instantiating, evaluating and refining the design of our artifacts. This allowed us to make multiple contributions, both practical and theoretical. We first showed that prediction markets are adequate for properly assessing complex issues. We also developed a typology of design factors and design propositions for using these markets in a technology assessment context. Then, we showed that they are able to solve some issues related to the R&D portfolio management process and we proposed a roadmap for their implementation. Finally, by comparing the instantiation and the results of a multi-criteria decision method and a prediction market, we showed that the latter are more efficient, while offering similar results. We also proposed a framework for comparing forecasting methods, to identify the constraints based on contingency factors. In conclusion, our research opens a new field of application of prediction markets and should help hasten their adoption by enterprises. Résumé français: Dans cette thèse, nous étudions l'utilisation de marchés de prédictions pour l'évaluation de nouvelles technologies. Nous nous intéressons plus particulièrement aux capacités des marchés de prédictions à évaluer des problématiques complexes, aux contraintes de conception pour une telle utilisation et à leur efficacité par rapport à des techniques traditionnelles. Pour ce faire, nous avons suivi une approche Design Science, développant itérativement plusieurs prototypes, les instanciant, puis les évaluant avant d'en raffiner la conception. Ceci nous a permis de faire de multiples contributions tant pratiques que théoriques. Nous avons tout d'abord montré que les marchés de prédictions étaient adaptés pour correctement apprécier des problématiques complexes. Nous avons également développé une typologie de facteurs de conception ainsi que des propositions de conception pour l'utilisation de ces marchés dans des contextes d'évaluation technologique. Ensuite, nous avons montré que ces marchés pouvaient résoudre une partie des problèmes liés à la gestion des portes-feuille de projets de recherche et développement et proposons une feuille de route pour leur mise en oeuvre. Finalement, en comparant la mise en oeuvre et les résultats d'une méthode de décision multi-critère et d'un marché de prédiction, nous avons montré que ces derniers étaient plus efficaces, tout en offrant des résultats semblables. Nous proposons également un cadre de comparaison des méthodes d'évaluation technologiques, permettant de cerner au mieux les besoins en fonction de facteurs de contingence. En conclusion, notre recherche ouvre un nouveau champ d'application des marchés de prédiction et devrait permettre d'accélérer leur adoption par les entreprises.

Extreme times in financial markets.

We apply the theory of continuous time random walks (CTRWs) to study some aspects involving extreme events in financial time series. We focus our attention on the mean exit time (MET). We derive a general equation for this average and compare it with empirical results coming from high-frequency data of the U.S. dollar and Deutsche mark futures market. The empirical MET follows a quadratic law in the return length interval which is consistent with the CTRW formalism.

Random diffusion and leverage effect in financial markets

We prove that Brownian market models with random diffusion coefficients provide an exact measure of the leverage effect [J-P. Bouchaud et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 228701 (2001)]. This empirical fact asserts that past returns are anticorrelated with future diffusion coefficient. Several models with random diffusion have been suggested but without a quantitative study of the leverage effect. Our analysis lets us to fully estimate all parameters involved and allows a deeper study of correlated random diffusion models that may have practical implications for many aspects of financial markets.

Less Risk, More Effort : Demand Risk Allocation in Incomplete Contracts

This article investigates the allocation of demand risk within an incomplete contract framework. We consider an incomplete contractual relationship between a public authority and a private provider (i.e. a public-private partnership), in which the latter invests in non-verifiable cost-reducing efforts and the former invests in non-verifiable adaptation efforts to respond to changing consumer demand over time. We show that the party that bears the demand risk has fewer hold-up opportunities and that this leads the other contracting party to make more effort. Thus, in our model, bearing less risk can lead to more effort, which we describe as a new example of âeuro~counter-incentivesâeuro?. We further show that when the benefits of adaptation are important, it is socially preferable to design a contract in which the demand risk remains with the private provider, whereas when the benefits of cost-reducing efforts are important, it is socially preferable to place the demand risk on the public authority. We then apply these results to explain two well-known case studies.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

Bayesian estimation of speciation and extinction from incomplete fossil occurrence data.

The temporal dynamics of species diversity are shaped by variations in the rates of speciation and extinction, and there is a long history of inferring these rates using first and last appearances of taxa in the fossil record. Understanding diversity dynamics critically depends on unbiased estimates of the unobserved times of speciation and extinction for all lineages, but the inference of these parameters is challenging due to the complex nature of the available data. Here, we present a new probabilistic framework to jointly estimate species-specific times of speciation and extinction and the rates of the underlying birth-death process based on the fossil record. The rates are allowed to vary through time independently of each other, and the probability of preservation and sampling is explicitly incorporated in the model to estimate the true lifespan of each lineage. We implement a Bayesian algorithm to assess the presence of rate shifts by exploring alternative diversification models. Tests on a range of simulated data sets reveal the accuracy and robustness of our approach against violations of the underlying assumptions and various degrees of data incompleteness. Finally, we demonstrate the application of our method with the diversification of the mammal family Rhinocerotidae and reveal a complex history of repeated and independent temporal shifts of both speciation and extinction rates, leading to the expansion and subsequent decline of the group. The estimated parameters of the birth-death process implemented here are directly comparable with those obtained from dated molecular phylogenies. Thus, our model represents a step towards integrating phylogenetic and fossil information to infer macroevolutionary processes.