Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets

In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation, along with a transfer that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call “invariance,” and show that the transfer is equal to zero if and only if the meeting technology satisfies this condition.

Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bank-ruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are selected with higher probability in any feasible mechanism. Informational rents are associated with unsound financial situations. By selecting the financially weakest contractor, stronger price competition (auctions) may not only increase the probability of default but also expected rents. Thus, weak conditions are suffcient for auctions to be suboptimal. In particular, we show that pooling firms with higher assets may reduce the cost of procurement even when default is costless for the sponsor.

Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt: Recovery and Sustainability

One of the striking aspects of recent sovereign debt restructurings is, conditional on default, delay length is positively correlated with the size of "haircut", which is size of creditor losses. In this paper, we develop an incomplete information model of debt restructuring where the prospect of uncertain economic recovery and the signalling about sustainability concerns together generate multi-period delay. The results from our analysis show that there is a correlation between delay length and size of haircut. Such results are supported by evidence. We show that Pareto ranking of equilibria, conditional on default, can be altered once we take into account the ex ante incentive of sovereign debtor. We use our results to evaluate proposals advocated to ensure orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises.

Emissions distribution in post-Kyoto international negotiations: a policy

An abundant scientific literature about climate change economics points out that the future participation of developing countries in international environmental policies will depend on their amount of pay offs inside and outside specific agreements. These studies are aimed at analyzing coalitions stability typically through a game theoretical approach. Though these contributions represent a corner stone in the research field investigating future plausible international coalitions and the reasons behind the difficulties incurred over time to implement emissions stabilizing actions, they cannot disentangle satisfactorily the role that equality play in inducing poor regions to tackle global warming. If we focus on the Stern Review findings stressing that climate change will generate heavy damages and policy actions will be costly in a finite time horizon, we understand why there is a great incentive to free ride in order to exploit benefits from emissions reduction efforts of others. The reluctance of poor countries in joining international agreements is mainly supported by historical responsibility of rich regions in generating atmospheric carbon concentration, whereas rich countries claim that emissions stabilizing policies will be effective only when developing countries will join them.Scholars recently outline that a perceived fairness in the distribution of emissions would facilitate a wide spread participation in international agreements. In this paper we overview the literature about distributional aspects of emissions by focusing on those contributions investigating past trends of emissions distribution through empirical data and future trajectories through simulations obtained by integrated assessment models. We will explain methodologies used to elaborate data and the link between real data and those coming from simulations. Results from this strand of research will be interpreted in order to discuss future negotiations for post Kyoto agreements that will be the focus of the next. Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. A particular attention will be devoted to the role that technological change will play in affecting the distribution of emissions over time and to how spillovers and experience diffusion could influence equality issues and future outcomes of policy negotiations.

Incentives in university technology transfers

There are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms: licensing agreements and the creation of spin-offs. In this paper, we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations, the main incentive issues that appear in this process, and the contractual solutions proposed to address them.

Effects of different Incentives on Attrition and Fieldwork Effort in Telephone Household Panel Surveys

Little is known about sample behavior and fieldwork effects of different incentives introduced in a household panel survey. This is especially true for telephone surveys. In a randomized experiment, the Swiss Household Panel implemented one prepaid and two promised nonmonetary incentives in the range of 10 to 15 Swiss Francs (7-10 e), plus a no incentive control group. The aim of the paper is to compare effects of these incentives especially on cooperation, but also on sample selection and fieldwork effort, separated by the household and the subsequent individual level. We find small positive cooperation effects of the prepaid incentive on both the household and the individual level especially in larger households. Sample composition is affected to a very minor extent. Finally, incentives tend to save fieldwork time and partially the number of contacts needed on the individual level.

Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box : The Relevance of Expressive Voting

This paper explores the impact of citizens' motivation to vote on the pattern of fiscal federalism. If the only concern of instrumental citizens was outcome they would have little incentive to vote because the probability that a single vote might change an electoral outcome is usually minuscule. If voters turn out in large numbers to derive intrinsic value from action, how will these voters choose when considering the role local jurisdictions should play? The first section of the paper assesses the weight that expressive voters attach to an instrumental evaluation of alternative outcomes. Predictions are tested with reference to case study analysis of the way Swiss voters assessed the role their local jurisdiction should play. The relevance of this analysis is also assessed with reference to the choice that voters express when considering other local issues. Textbook analysis of fiscal federalism is premised on the assumption that voters register choice just as 'consumers' reveal demand for services in a market, but how robust is this analogy.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.

Longer-term impacts of mentoring, educational services, and incentives to learn: evidence from a randomized trial in the United States

This paper is the first to use a randomized trial in the US to analyze the short- and long-term educational and employment impacts of an afterschool program that offered disadvantaged high-school youth: mentoring, educational services, and financial rewards with the objective to improve high-school graduation and postsecondary schooling enrollment. The short-term hefty beneficial average impacts quickly faded away. Heterogeneity matters. While encouraging results are found for younger youth, and when the program is implemented in relatively small communities of 9th graders; detrimental longlived outcomes are found for males, and when case managers are partially compensated by incentive payments and students receive more regular reminders of incentives.

Hezbollah's identities and their relevance for cultural and religious IR

This working paper analyses the role of religious and resistance identities in Hezbollah’s transformation and foreign relations. It argues that this Islamist movement has privileged material concerns over the religious dogma when both factors have not been coincidental. To do so, it uses a theoretical framework that presents the main characteristics of the anthropological and political interpretations of the role of culture and religion in defining the behaviour of international actors. In the chapter dedicated to Hezbollah, close attention is paid to the domestic and regional levels of analysis. When assessing Hezbollah’s religious identity, this paper argues that the salience of the pan-Islamic religious identity in Hezbollah’s origins has been replaced by an increased political pragmatism. It also argues that the fight against Israel represents Hezbollah’s raison d’être and that its resistance identity has not suffered major transformations and has been easily combined with religious rhetoric. Linking Hezbollah’s case study with the theoretical framework, this paper argues that political conceptions of cultural and religious identities provide the best analytical tool to understand the evolution of this Islamist movement.

Social mobility in 20th century, Switzerland

The study of social mobility enables us to assess the extent to which a given society is "open". Addressing this issue is particularly crucial in our democratic societies, where it is expected that the place of individuals in society should no longer be determined at birth, but rather by individual quality. The present inquiry investigates this issue in the context of Switzerland, a country characterised by specific institutional settings, notably through the close association its educational system shares with the labour market. Through a detailed empirical analysis based on robust statistical analyses carried out from a unique tailor-made dataset, I demonstrate that Swiss society has not become more open throughout the twentieth century. Although some barriers have lost some salience, Swiss society has overall remained extremely rigid. In particular, because it channels individuals into highly segmented tracks very early on, the Swiss educational system does not attenuate social background differences. Thus, Switzerland is found in a particular configuration where an individual's place in society is highly determined not only by his or her educational attainment, but also by his or her social background. In other words, Switzerland constitutes a sort of "non-meritocratic meritocracy". - L'étude de la mobilité sociale permet d'évaluer dans quelle mesure une société donnée est « ouverte ». S'intéresser à cette question est particulièrement crucial dans nos sociétés démocratiques, où il est attendu que la place des individus ne soit plus déterminée à la naissance, mais plutôt par les qualités individuelles. La présente étude examine cette question dans le cadre de la Suisse, un pays aux caractéristiques institutionnelles spécifiques, particulièrement de part le lien étroit que son système éducatif entretien avec le marché du travail. A travers une analyse empirique détaillée fondée sur des analyses statistiques robustes menées à partir d'un jeu de données unique construit sur-mesure, je démontre que la société suisse n'est pas devenue plus ouverte au cours du 20ème siècle. Même si certaines barrières ont perdu de l'importance, dans son ensemble, la société suisse est restée extrêmement rigide. En particulier, parce qu'il oriente très tôt les individus dans des filières fortement segmentées, le système éducatif suisse n'atténue pas les différences entre milieux sociaux. Ainsi, la Suisse se trouve dans une configuration particulière où, d'une part, la place d'un individu dans la société est hautement déterminée par son niveau d'étude et, d'autre part, par son origine sociale. En d'autres termes, la Suisse apparaît comme une sorte de « méritocratie non-méritocratique ».

Origins and efficiency of the electric industry regulation in Spain, 1910-1936

The aim of this paper is to discover the origins of utility regulation in Spain, and to analyse, from a microeconomic perspective, its characteristics and the impact of regulation on consumers and utilities. Madrid and the Madrilenian utilities are taken as a case study. The electric industry in the period studied was a natural monopoly2. Each of the three phases of production, generation, transmission and distribution, had natural monopoly characteristics. Therefore, the most efficient form to generate, transmit and distribute electricity was the monopoly because one firm can produce a quantity at a lower cost than the sum of costs incurred by two or more firms. A problem arises because when a firm is the single provider it can charge prices above the marginal cost, at monopoly prices. When a monopolist reduces the quantity produced, price increases, causing the consumer to demand less than the economic efficiency level, incurring a loss of consumer surplus. The loss of the consumer surplus is not completely gained by the monopolist, causing a loss of social surplus, a deadweight loss. The main objective of regulation is going to be to reduce to a minimum the deadweight loss. Regulation is also needed because when the monopolist fixes prices at marginal cost equal marginal revenue there would be an incentive for firms to enter the market creating inefficiency. The Madrilenian industry has been chosen because of the availability of statistical information on costs and production. The complex industry structure and the atomised demand add interest to the analysis. This study will also provide some light on the tariff regulation of the period which has been poorly studied and will complement the literature on the US electric utilities regulation where a different type of regulation was implemented.

A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress

This paper studies party discipline in a congress within a political agency framework with retrospective voting. Party discipline serves as an incentive device to induce office- motivated congress members to perform in line with the party leadership's objective of controlling both the executive and the legislative branches of government. I show fi…rst that the same party is more likely to control both branches of government (i.e., uni…ed government) the stronger the party discipline in the congress is. Second, the leader of the governing party imposes more party discipline under uni…ed government than does the opposition leader under divided government. Moreover, the incumbents' aggregate performance increases with party discipline, so a representative voter becomes better off. JEL classi…cation: D72. Keywords: Party discipline; Political agency; Retrospective voting; Office-motivated politicians.

Competition for Procurement Shares

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57