Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2009 Qualified Allocation Plan, July 10, 2008

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2010 Qualified Allocation Plan, July 9, 2009

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2011 Qualified Allocation Plan, November 29, 2010

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2012 Qualified Allocation Plan, December 8, 2011

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2013 Qualified Allocation Plan, October 9, 2012

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2014 Qualified Allocation Plan, October 2, 2013

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 4% Qualified Allocation Plan, October 6, 2014

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 4% Qualified Allocation Plan, September 7, 2016

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2015 9% Qualified Allocation Plan, October 6, 2014

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2016 9% Qualified Allocation Plan, September 25, 2015

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Iowa Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 2017 9% Qualified Allocation Plan, September 23, 2016

As the Housing Credit Agency responsible for allocating Tax Credits in the State of Iowa, IFA must adopt a written Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP). The purpose of the QAP is to set forth the criteria that IFA will use in evaluating and monitoring Projects submitted to it by the Developer/Ownership Entity for consideration in making an allocation of Tax Credits. The Governor must approve the QAP after the public has had the opportunity to comment through a public hearing.

Tax Cost of Investment Projects: the case of ICMS credits

This article discusses the impact on the profitability of firms under Complementary Law 102/2000 (which abrogated the Law 89/96 - Kandir Law) allowing the appropriation of ICMS credits, due to investment in fixed assets goods, at a ratio of 1/48 per month. The paper seeks to demonstrate how this new system - which resulted in the transformation of the ICMS as a value added tax (VAT) consumption-type to an income-type - leads to a loss of approximately 30% of the value of credits to be recovered and the effect it generates on the cost of investment and the profits for small, medium and large firms. From the methodological point of view, it is a descriptive and quantitative research, which proceeded in three stages. Initially, we have obtained estimated value of net sales and volume of investments, based on report Painel de Competitividade prepared by the Federacao das Indtustrias do Estado de Sao Paulo (Fiesp/Serasa). Based on this information, it was possible to obtain estimates of the factors of generation of debits and credits for ICMS, using the model Credit Control of Fixed Assets (CIAP). Finally, we have calculated three indicators: (i) present value of debt recovery/value of credits, (ii) present value of debt recovery / investment value, (iii) present value of debt recovery / sales profitability. We have conclude that the system introduced by Complementary Law 102/2000 implicates great opportunity cost for firms and that legislation should be reviewed from this perspective, aiming to ensure lower costs associated with investment projects.

Empirical evidence on the difference between the effective and the statutory tax rates for listed groups in Germany

The difference between the statutory and effective tax rate for listed groups is a complex variable influenced by a variety of factors. This paper aims to analyze whether this difference exists for listed groups in the German market and tests which factors have an impact on it. Thus the sample consists of 130 corporations listed in the three major German stock indices. The findings suggest that the companies that pay less than the statutory rate clearly outweigh the ones that pay more, and that the income earned from associated companies has a significant impact on this difference.

On the relation between tax rates and evasion in a multi-period economy

We extend the basic tax evasion model to a multi-period economy exhibiting sustained growth. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Both taxes and fines determine individual saving and the rate of capital accumulation. In this context we show that the sign of the relation between the level of the tax rate and the amount of evaded income is the same as that obtained in static setups. Moreover, high tax rates on income are typically associated with low growth rates as occurs in standard growth models that disregard the tax evasion phenomenon.

Are two tax rates better than one?

Abstract: Should two–band income taxes be progressive given a general income distribution? We provide a negative answer under utilitarian and max-min welfare functions. While this result clarifies some ambiguities in the literature, it does not rule out progressive taxes in general. If we maximize total or weighted utility of the poor, as often intended by the society, progressive taxes can be justified, especially when the ‘rich’ are very rich. Under these objectives we obtain new necessary conditions for progressive taxes, which only depend on aggregate features of income distributions. The validity of these conditions is examined using plausible income distributions.