Tension between privacy and justice : ordering medical tests

Courts set guidelines for when genetic testing would be ordered - medical testing - life insurers - use of test results - confidentiality.

Facilitator for joint expert conference

Interlocutory judgment of the NSW Supreme Court in a medical negligence claim - circumstances under which a facilitator may be appointed to assist in the conduct of a joint expert conference - background - jurisdiction of the Court to appoint a facilitator - analysis of decision.

Hospital liability for sexual assault of a patient

Hospital liability for alleged sexual assault upon a medicated patient by an orderly - non-delegable duty owed by a hospital to its patients - vicarious liability - liability for criminal conduct by employer - recruitment processes - assessment of damages.

Trade in 'Dirty Air' : carbon crime and the politics of pollution

‘Carbon trading fraudsters may have accounted for up to 90% of all market activity in some European countries, with criminals pocketing billions, mainly in Britain, France, Spain, Denmark and Holland, according to Europol and the European law enforcement agency.’ (Mason, 2009). ‘Carbon offset projects often result in land grabs, local environmental and social conflicts, as well as the repression of local communities and movements. The CDM approval process for projects allows little space for the voices of Indigenous Peoples and local communities – in fact, no project has ever been rejected on the grounds of rights violations, despite these being widespread’. (Carbon Trade Watch, 2013)

Responsibility to protect and women, peace and security : aligning the protection agendas

In Responsibility to Protect and Women, Peace and Security: Aligning the Protection Agendas, editors Davies, Nwokora, Stamnes and Teitt address the intersections of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. Widespread or systematic sexual or gender-based violence is a war crime, a crime against humanity and an act of genocide, all of which are clearly addressed in the R2P principle. The protection of those at risk of widespread sexual violence is therefore not only relative to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, but a fundamental sovereign obligation for all states as part of their commitment to R2P. Contributions from policy-makers and academics consider both the merits and the utility of aligning the protection agendas of R2P and WPS. Ultimately, a number of actionable recommendations are made concerning a unification of the agendas to best support the global empowerment of women and prevention of mass atrocities.

Protecting the Displaced : Deepening the Responsibility to Protect

This edited collection has sought contributions from some of the foremost scholars of refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) studies to engage with the conceptual and practical difficulties entailed in realising how the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) can be fulfilled by states and the international community to protect vulnerable persons. Contributors to this book were given one theme: to consider, based on their experience and knowledge, how R2P may be aligned with the protection of the displaced. Contributions explore the history and progress so far in aligning R2P with refugee and IDP protection, as well as examining the conceptual and practical issues that arise when attempting to expand R2P from words into deeds.

Intake rigour : ensuring only “reportable deaths” become coroners’ cases

The failure of medical practitioners to consistently discharge their obligation to report sudden or unnatural deaths to coroners has rightly prompted concern. Following recent public scandals, coroners and health authorities have increasingly developed procedures to ensure that concerning deaths are reported to coroners. However, the negative consequences of deaths being unnecessarily reported have received less attention: unnecessary intrusion into bereavement; a waste of public resources; and added delay and hindrance to the investigation of matters needing a coroner’s attention. Traditionally, coroners have largely, unquestioningly assumed jurisdiction over any deaths for which a medical practitioner has not issued a cause of death certificate. The Office of the State Coroner in Queensland has recently trialled a system to more rigorously assess whether deaths apparently resulting from natural causes, which have been reported to a coroner, should be investigated by the coroner, rather than being finalised by a doctor issuing a cause of death certificate. This article describes that trial and its results.

The body in grief : death investigations, objections to autopsy, and the religious and cultural 'other'

Sudden, violent and otherwise unexplained deaths are investigated in most western jurisdictions through a Coronial or medico-legal process. A crucial element of such an investigation is the legislative requirement to remove the body for autopsy and other medical interventions, processes which can disrupt traditional religious and cultural grieving practices. While recent legislative changes in an increasing number of jurisdictions allow families to raise objections based on religious and cultural grounds, such concerns can be over-ruled, often exacerbating the trauma and grief of families. Based on funded research which interviews a range of Coronial staff in one Australian jurisdiction, this paper explores the disjuncture between medico-legal discourses, which position the body as corpse, and the rise of more ‘therapeutic’ discourses which recognise the family’s wishes to reposition the body as beloved and lamented.

Does withdrawing life-sustaining treatment cause death or allow the patient to die?

The paper discusses the view of Franklin Miller and Robert Truog that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment causes death and so is a form of killing. I reject that view. I argue that even if we think there is no morally relevant difference between allowing a patient to die and killing her (itself a controversial view), it does not follow that allowing to die is a form of killing. I then argue that withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is properly classified as allowing the patient to die rather than as killing her. Once this is accepted, the law cannot be criticised for inconsistency by holding, as it does, that it is lawful to withdraw life-sustaining treatment but unlawful to give patients a lethal injection.