Bootstrap and Fast Double Bootstrap Tests of Cointegration Rank with Financial Time Series

The likelihood ratio test of cointegration rank is the most widely used test for cointegration. Many studies have shown that its finite sample distribution is not well approximated by the limiting distribution. The article introduces and evaluates by Monte Carlo simulation experiments bootstrap and fast double bootstrap (FDB) algorithms for the likelihood ratio test. It finds that the performance of the bootstrap test is very good. The more sophisticated FDB produces a further improvement in cases where the performance of the asymptotic test is very unsatisfactory and the ordinary bootstrap does not work as well as it might. Furthermore, the Monte Carlo simulations provide a number of guidelines on when the bootstrap and FDB tests can be expected to work well. Finally, the tests are applied to US interest rates and international stock prices series. It is found that the asymptotic test tends to overestimate the cointegration rank, while the bootstrap and FDB tests choose the correct cointegration rank.

The Power of Bootstrap Tests of Cointegration Rank with Financial Time Series

Bootstrap likelihood ratio tests of cointegration rank are commonly used because they tend to have rejection probabilities that are closer to the nominal level than the rejection probabilities of the correspond- ing asymptotic tests. The e¤ect of bootstrapping the test on its power is largely unknown. We show that a new computationally inexpensive procedure can be applied to the estimation of the power function of the bootstrap test of cointegration rank. The bootstrap test is found to have a power function close to that of the level-adjusted asymp- totic test. The bootstrap test estimates the level-adjusted power of the asymptotic test highly accurately. The bootstrap test may have low power to reject the null hypothesis of cointegration rank zero, or underestimate the cointegration rank. An empirical application to Euribor interest rates is provided as an illustration of the findings.

Tax havens and their impacts on the non-haven countries

Tax havens have attracted increasing attention from the authorities of non-haven countries. The financial crisis exacerbates the negative attitude to tax havens. Offshore zones are now under strong pressure from the international, both financial and political institutions. Thus, the thesis will focus on the current problem of the modern economy, namely tax havens and their impact on the non-haven countries. This thesis will be based on the several articles, in particular “Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens” by Joel Slemrod and John D. Wilson (University of Michigan, 2009) and “Do Havens Divert Economic Activity” by James R. Hines Jr., C. Fritz Foley and Mihir A. Desai (Ross School of Business, 2005). This paper provides two completely different and contradictory viewpoints on the problem of coexisting tax havens and non-haven countries. There are two models, examined in this work, present two important researches. The first one will be concentrated on the positive effect from tax havens whereas the last model will be focused on the completely negative effect from offshore jurisdictions. The first model gives us a good explanation and proof of its statement why tax havens can positively influence on nearby high-tax countries. It describes that the existence of offshore jurisdictions can stimulate the growth of operations and facilitates economic activity in non-haven countries. In contrast to above mentioned, the model with quite opposite view was presented. This economic model and its analysis confirms the undesirability of the existence of offshore areas. Taking into consideration, that the jurisdictions choose their optimal policy, the elimination of offshores will have positive impact on the rest of countries. The model proofs the statement that full or partial elimination of tax havens raises the equilibrium level of the public good and increases country welfare. According to the following study, it can be concluded that both of the models provide telling arguments to prove their assertions. Thereby both of these points of view have their right to exist. Nevertheless, the ongoing debate concerning this issue still will raise a lot of questions.

Lack of Critical Slowing Down Suggests that Financial Meltdowns Are Not Critical Transitions, yet Rising Variability Could Signal Systemic Risk

Complex systems inspired analysis suggests a hypothesis that financial meltdowns are abrupt critical transitions that occur when the system reaches a tipping point. Theoretical and empirical studies on climatic and ecological dynamical systems have shown that approach to tipping points is preceded by a generic phenomenon called critical slowing down, i.e. an increasingly slow response of the system to perturbations. Therefore, it has been suggested that critical slowing down may be used as an early warning signal of imminent critical transitions. Whether financial markets exhibit critical slowing down prior to meltdowns remains unclear. Here, our analysis reveals that three major US (Dow Jones Index, S&P 500 and NASDAQ) and two European markets (DAX and FTSE) did not exhibit critical slowing down prior to major financial crashes over the last century. However, all markets showed strong trends of rising variability, quantified by time series variance and spectral function at low frequencies, prior to crashes. These results suggest that financial crashes are not critical transitions that occur in the vicinity of a tipping point. Using a simple model, we argue that financial crashes are likely to be stochastic transitions which can occur even when the system is far away from the tipping point. Specifically, we show that a gradually increasing strength of stochastic perturbations may have caused to abrupt transitions in the financial markets. Broadly, our results highlight the importance of stochastically driven abrupt transitions in real world scenarios. Our study offers rising variability as a precursor of financial meltdowns albeit with a limitation that they may signal false alarms.

Resale in Auctions with Financial Constraints

This paper analyzes auctions where bidders face nancial constraints that may force them to resell part of the property of the good (or subcontract part of a project) at a resale market. First we show that the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria of second- price auctions (Garratt and Tröger, 2006) generalizes to situations with partial resale where only the high value bidder is nancially constrained. However, when all players face nancial constraints the ine¢ cient speculative equilibria disappear. Therefore, for auctioning big facilities or contracts where all bidders are nancially constrained and there is a resale market, the second price auction remains a simple and appropriate mechanism to achieve an e¢ cient allocation.

The Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders: Report on the Design, Implementation, and Descriptive Results for 2006

This technical memorandum documents the design, implementation, data preparation, and descriptive results for the 2006 Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders. The data collection was designed by the NOAA Fisheries Southeast Fisheries Science Center Social Science Research Group to track the financial and economic status and performance by vessels holding a federal moratorium permit for harvesting shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico. A two page, self-administered mail survey collected total annual costs broken out into seven categories and auxiliary economic data. In May 2007, 580 vessels were randomly selected, stratified by state, from a preliminary population of 1,709 vessels with federal permits to shrimp in offshore waters of the Gulf of Mexico. The survey was implemented during the rest of 2007. After many reminder and verification phone calls, 509 surveys were deemed complete, for an ineligibility-adjusted response rate of 90.7%. The linking of each individual vessel’s cost data to its revenue data from a different data collection was imperfect, and hence the final number of observations used in the analyses is 484. Based on various measures and tests of validity throughout the technical memorandum, the quality of the data is high. The results are presented in a standardized table format, linking vessel characteristics and operations to simple balance sheet, cash flow, and income statements. In the text, results are discussed for the total fleet, the Gulf shrimp fleet, the active Gulf shrimp fleet, and the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet. Additional results for shrimp vessels grouped by state, by vessel characteristics, by landings volume, and by ownership structure are available in the appendices. The general conclusion of this report is that the financial and economic situation is bleak for the average vessels in most of the categories that were evaluated. With few exceptions, cash flow for the average vessel is positive while the net revenue from operations and the “profit” are negative. With negative net revenue from operations, the economic return for average shrimp vessels is less than zero. Only with the help of government payments does the average owner just about break even. In the short-term, this will discourage any new investments in the industry. The financial situation in 2006, especially if it endures over multiple years, also is economically unsustainable for the average established business. Vessels in the active and inactive Gulf shrimp fleet are, on average, 69 feet long, weigh 105 gross tons, are powered by 505 hp motor(s), and are 23 years old. Three-quarters of the vessels have steel hulls and 59% use a freezer for refrigeration. The average market value of these vessels was $175,149 in 2006, about a hundred-thousand dollars less than the average original purchase price. The outstanding loans averaged $91,955, leading to an average owner equity of $83,194. Based on the sample, 85% of the federally permitted Gulf shrimp fleet was actively shrimping in 2006. Of these 386 active Gulf shrimp vessels, just under half (46%) were owner-operated. On average, these vessels burned 52,931 gallons of fuel, landed 101,268 pounds of shrimp, and received $2.47 per pound of shrimp. Non-shrimp landings added less than 1% to cash flow, indicating that the federal Gulf shrimp fishery is very specialized. The average total cash outflow was $243,415 of which $108,775 was due to fuel expenses alone. The expenses for hired crew and captains were on average $54,866 which indicates the importance of the industry as a source of wage income. The resulting average net cash flow is $16,225 but has a large standard deviation. For the population of active Gulf shrimp vessels we can state with 95% certainty that the average net cash flow was between $9,500 and $23,000 in 2006. The median net cash flow was $11,843. Based on the income statement for active Gulf shrimp vessels, the average fixed costs accounted for just under a quarter of operating expenses (23.1%), labor costs for just over a quarter (25.3%), and the non-labor variable costs for just over half (51.6%). The fuel costs alone accounted for 42.9% of total operating expenses in 2006. It should be noted that the labor cost category in the income statement includes both the actual cash payments to hired labor and an estimate of the opportunity cost of owner-operators’ time spent as captain. The average labor contribution (as captain) of an owner-operator is estimated at about $19,800. The average net revenue from operations is negative $7,429, and is statistically different and less than zero in spite of a large standard deviation. The economic return to Gulf shrimping is negative 4%. Including non-operating activities, foremost an average government payment of $13,662, leads to an average loss before taxes of $907 for the vessel owners. The confidence interval of this value straddles zero, so we cannot reject, with 95% certainty, that the population average is zero. The average inactive Gulf shrimp vessel is generally of a smaller scale than the average active vessel. Inactive vessels are physically smaller, are valued much lower, and are less dependent on loans. Fixed costs account for nearly three quarters of the total operating expenses of $11,926, and only 6% of these vessels have hull insurance. With an average net cash flow of negative $7,537, the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet has a major liquidity problem. On average, net revenue from operations is negative $11,396, which amounts to a negative 15% economic return, and owners lose $9,381 on their vessels before taxes. To sustain such losses and especially to survive the negative cash flow, many of the owners must be subsidizing their shrimp vessels with the help of other income or wealth sources or are drawing down their equity. Active Gulf shrimp vessels in all states but Texas exhibited negative returns. The Alabama and Mississippi fleets have the highest assets (vessel values), on average, yet they generate zero cash flow and negative $32,224 net revenue from operations. Due to their high (loan) leverage ratio the negative 11% economic return is amplified into a negative 21% return on equity. In contrast, for Texas vessels, which actually have the highest leverage ratio among the states, a 1% economic return is amplified into a 13% return on equity. From a financial perspective, the average Florida and Louisiana vessels conform roughly to the overall average of the active Gulf shrimp fleet. It should be noted that these results are averages and hence hide the variation that clearly exists within all fleets and all categories. Although the financial situation for the average vessel is bleak, some vessels are profitable. (PDF contains 101 pages)