Divided attention, selective attention and drawing: processing preferences in Williams syndrome are dependent on the task administered

The visuo-spatial abilities of individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) have consistently been shown to be generally weak. These poor visuo-spatial abilities have been ascribed to a local processing bias by some [R. Rossen, E.S. Klima, U. Bellugi, A. Bihrle, W. Jones, Interaction between language and cognition: evidence from Williams syndrome, in: J. Beitchman, N. Cohen, M. Konstantareas, R. Tannock (Eds.), Language, Learning and Behaviour disorders: Developmental, Behavioural and Clinical Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 367-392] and conversely, to a global processing bias by others [Psychol. Sci. 10 (1999) 453]. In this study, two identification versions and one drawing version of the Navon hierarchical processing task, a non-verbal task, were employed to investigate this apparent contradiction. The two identification tasks were administered to 21 individuals with WS, 21 typically developing individuals, matched by non-verbal ability, and 21 adult participants matched to the WS group by mean chronological age (CA). The third, drawing task was administered to the WS group and the typically developing (TD) controls only. It was hypothesised that the WS group would show differential processing biases depending on the type of processing the task was measuring. Results from two identification versions of the Navon task measuring divided and selective attention showed that the WS group experienced equal interference from global to local as from local to global levels, and did not show an advantage of one level over another. This pattern of performance was broadly comparable to that of the control groups. The third task, a drawing version of the Navon task, revealed that individuals with WS were significantly better at drawing the local form in comparison to the global figure, whereas the typically developing control group did not show a bias towards either level. In summary, this study demonstrates that individuals with WS do not have a local or a global processing bias when asked to identify stimuli, but do show a local bias in their drawing abilities. This contrast may explain the apparently contrasting findings from previous studies. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Who knows best? Awareness of divided attention difficulty in a neurological rehabilitation setting

Objective: To explore whether patients relearning to walk after acquired brain injury and showing cognitive-motor interference were aware of divided attention difficulty; whether their perceptions concurred with those of treating staff. Design: Patients and neurophysiotherapists (from rehabilitation and disabled wards) completed questionnaires. Factor analyses were applied to responses. Correlations between responses, clinical measures and experimental decrements were examined. Results: Patient/staff responses showed some agreement; staff reported higher levels of perceived difficulty; responses conformed to two factors. One factor (staff/patients alike) reflected expectations about functional/motor status and did not correlate with decrements. The other factor (patients) correlated significantly with dual-task motor decrement, suggesting some genuine awareness of difficulty (cognitive performance prioritized over motor control). The other factor (staff) correlated significantly with cognitive decrement (gait prioritized over sustained attention). Conclusions: Despite some inaccurate estimation of susceptibility; patients and staff do exhibit awareness of divided attention difficulty, but with a limited degree of concurrence. In fact, our results suggest that patients and staff may be sensitive to different aspects of the deficit. Rather than 'Who knows best?', it is a question of 'Who knows what?.

Dissociating word stem completion and cued recall as a function of divided attention at retrieval

The aim of this study was to investigate the widely held, but largely untested, view that implicit memory (repetition priming) reflects an automatic form of retrieval. Specifically, in Experiment 1 we explored whether a secondary task (syllable monitoring), performed during retrieval, would disrupt performance on explicit (cued recall) and implicit (stem completion) memory tasks equally. Surprisingly, despite substantial memory and secondary costs to cued recall when performed with a syllable-monitoring task, the same manipulation had no effect on stem completion priming or on secondary task performance. In Experiment 2 we demonstrated that even when using a particularly demanding version of the stem completion task that incurred secondary task costs, the corresponding disruption to implicit memory performance was minimal. Collectively, the results are consistent with the view that implicit memory retrieval requires little or no processing capacity and is not seemingly susceptible to the effects of dividing attention at retrieval.

Robustness of mutual information to inter-subject variability for automatic artefact removal from EEG

The externally recorded electroencephalogram (EEG) is contaminated with signals that do not originate from the brain, collectively known as artefacts. Thus, EEG signals must be cleaned prior to any further analysis. In particular, if the EEG is to be used in online applications such as Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) the removal of artefacts must be performed in an automatic manner. This paper investigates the robustness of Mutual Information based features to inter-subject variability for use in an automatic artefact removal system. The system is based on the separation of EEG recordings into independent components using a temporal ICA method, RADICAL, and the utilisation of a Support Vector Machine for classification of the components into EEG and artefact signals. High accuracy and robustness to inter-subject variability is achieved.

I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject

Abstract I argue for the following claims: [1] all uses of I (the word ‘I’ or thought-element I) are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I. [2] no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless [3] I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though [4] I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, and although [5] if I’m thinking about something specifically as myself, I can’t fail to be thinking of myself, and although [6] a genuine understanding use of I always involves the subject thinking of itself as itself, whatever else it does or doesn’t involve, and although [7] if I take myself to be thinking about myself, then I am thinking about myself.