Dynamic Inefficiency in an Overlapping Generation Economy with Pollution and Health Costs

Revised 2008-08.-- Published as an article in: Journal of Public Economic Theory (2008), 10(4), 563-594.

Second-best tax policy in a growing economy with externalities

This paper investigates the exploitation of environmental resources in a growing economy within a second-best scal policy framework. Agents derive utility from two types of consumption goods one which relies on an environmental input and one which does not as well as from leisure and from environmental amenity values. Property rights for the environmental resource are potentially incomplete. We connect second best policy to essential components of utility by considering the elasticity of substitution among each of the four utility arguments. The results illustrate potentially important relationships between environmental amentity values and leisure. When amenity values are complementary with leisure, for instance when environmental amenities are used for recreation, taxes on extractive goods generally increase over time. On the other hand, optimal taxes on extractive goods generally decrease over time when leisure and environmental amenity values are substitutes. Unders some parameterizations, complex dynamics leading to nonmonotonic time paths for the state variables can emerge.

Optimal Minimum Wage in a Competitive Economy: an Alternative Modelling Approach

This paper analyzes whether a minimum wage can be an optimal redistribution policy when distorting taxes and lump-sum transfers are also available in a competitive economy. We build a static general equilibrium model with a Ramsey planner making decisions on taxes, transfers, and minimum wage levels. Workers are assumed to differ only in their productivity. We find that optimal redistribution may imply the use of a minimum wage. The key factor driving our results is the reaction of the demand for low skilled labor to the minimum wage law. Hence, an optimal minimum wage appears to be most likely when low skilled households are scarce, the complementarity between the two types of workers is large or the difference in productivity is small. The main contribution of the paper is a modelling approach that allows us to adopt analysis and solution techniques widely used in recent public finance research. Moreover, this modelling strategy is flexible enough to allow for potential extensions to include dynamics into the model.

Should Fiscal Policy be different in a Non-Competitive Framework?

Published as an article in: Journal of Monetary Economics, 2003, vol. 50, issue 6, pages 1311-1331.

O novo pacto federativo: porque a apresentação de uma emenda possibilitou uma discussão na redefinição da Federação Brasileira

Estudo de caso que analisa a aprovação da emenda de plenário nº 387 de 2010, chamada de emenda Ibsen Pinheiro/Humberto Souto, que pretendeu redistribuir as riquezas advindas dos royalties do petróleo, a partir do estabelecimento de critérios de maior equalização como o da distribuição via Fundo de Participação de Estados e Municípios (FPE/FPM). A partir do entendimento segundo o qual tal aprovação se deu por causa da fragmentação (derrocada) do pacto federativo, dado a centralização histórica do processo de arrecadação tributária nas mãos da União, posição alcançada e motivada, diga-se de passagem, pela abdicação de Estados e Municípios do papel de principal arrecadador, se tornando atores secundários. O estudo argumenta que a principal dificuldade enfrentada pelos entes subnacionais é de ordem econômica e os desenhos constitucionais desde a promulgação da Constituição republicana de 1891, não foi capaz de dirimir tal situação. E mesmo com a promulgação da Constituição de 1988, chamada de a mais descentralizadora, uma melhor distribuição de recursos falhou em suas tentativas.

Tax-Based Fisheries Management: The Case Study Of The Cantabrian Anchovy Fishery

A dynamic optimisation framework is adopted to show how tax-based management systems theoretically correct the inefficient allocation of fishing resources derived from the stock externality. Optimal Pigouvian taxes on output (τ) and on inputs (γ) are calculated, compared and considered as potential alternatives to the current regulation of VIII division Cantabrian anchovy fishery. The sensibility analysis of optimal taxes illustrates an asymmetry between (τ) and (γ) when cost price ratio varies. The distributional effects also differ. Special attention will be paid to the real implementation of the tax-based systems in fisheries.

Quota and Licensing Systems in the VIII Division European Anchovy

Paper presented at 12th Annual Conference of EAERE 2003 Bilbao (Spain)

Optimal overall emissions taxation in durable goods oligopoly

We analyze optimal second-best emission taxes in a durable good industry under imperfect competition. The analysis is performed for three different types of emissions and for situations where the good is rented, sold or simultaneously sold and rented. We show, for durable goods that may cause pollution in a period (or in periods) different from the production period, that the expected overall emission tax and the expected total marginal environmental damage per unit produced in each period are the relevant variables to consider in the analysis of overinternalization and in the comparison of optimal emission taxes for renting, selling and renting-selling firms. Our results allow to extend some previous results in the literature to these durable goods and provide an adequate perspective on some other results (in particular, we point out the limitations of focusing only, for those durable goods, on the level and effects of the optimal emission tax in the production period).

The Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders: Report on the Design, Implementation, and Descriptive Results for 2006

This technical memorandum documents the design, implementation, data preparation, and descriptive results for the 2006 Annual Economic Survey of Federal Gulf Shrimp Permit Holders. The data collection was designed by the NOAA Fisheries Southeast Fisheries Science Center Social Science Research Group to track the financial and economic status and performance by vessels holding a federal moratorium permit for harvesting shrimp in the Gulf of Mexico. A two page, self-administered mail survey collected total annual costs broken out into seven categories and auxiliary economic data. In May 2007, 580 vessels were randomly selected, stratified by state, from a preliminary population of 1,709 vessels with federal permits to shrimp in offshore waters of the Gulf of Mexico. The survey was implemented during the rest of 2007. After many reminder and verification phone calls, 509 surveys were deemed complete, for an ineligibility-adjusted response rate of 90.7%. The linking of each individual vessel’s cost data to its revenue data from a different data collection was imperfect, and hence the final number of observations used in the analyses is 484. Based on various measures and tests of validity throughout the technical memorandum, the quality of the data is high. The results are presented in a standardized table format, linking vessel characteristics and operations to simple balance sheet, cash flow, and income statements. In the text, results are discussed for the total fleet, the Gulf shrimp fleet, the active Gulf shrimp fleet, and the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet. Additional results for shrimp vessels grouped by state, by vessel characteristics, by landings volume, and by ownership structure are available in the appendices. The general conclusion of this report is that the financial and economic situation is bleak for the average vessels in most of the categories that were evaluated. With few exceptions, cash flow for the average vessel is positive while the net revenue from operations and the “profit” are negative. With negative net revenue from operations, the economic return for average shrimp vessels is less than zero. Only with the help of government payments does the average owner just about break even. In the short-term, this will discourage any new investments in the industry. The financial situation in 2006, especially if it endures over multiple years, also is economically unsustainable for the average established business. Vessels in the active and inactive Gulf shrimp fleet are, on average, 69 feet long, weigh 105 gross tons, are powered by 505 hp motor(s), and are 23 years old. Three-quarters of the vessels have steel hulls and 59% use a freezer for refrigeration. The average market value of these vessels was $175,149 in 2006, about a hundred-thousand dollars less than the average original purchase price. The outstanding loans averaged $91,955, leading to an average owner equity of $83,194. Based on the sample, 85% of the federally permitted Gulf shrimp fleet was actively shrimping in 2006. Of these 386 active Gulf shrimp vessels, just under half (46%) were owner-operated. On average, these vessels burned 52,931 gallons of fuel, landed 101,268 pounds of shrimp, and received $2.47 per pound of shrimp. Non-shrimp landings added less than 1% to cash flow, indicating that the federal Gulf shrimp fishery is very specialized. The average total cash outflow was $243,415 of which $108,775 was due to fuel expenses alone. The expenses for hired crew and captains were on average $54,866 which indicates the importance of the industry as a source of wage income. The resulting average net cash flow is $16,225 but has a large standard deviation. For the population of active Gulf shrimp vessels we can state with 95% certainty that the average net cash flow was between $9,500 and $23,000 in 2006. The median net cash flow was $11,843. Based on the income statement for active Gulf shrimp vessels, the average fixed costs accounted for just under a quarter of operating expenses (23.1%), labor costs for just over a quarter (25.3%), and the non-labor variable costs for just over half (51.6%). The fuel costs alone accounted for 42.9% of total operating expenses in 2006. It should be noted that the labor cost category in the income statement includes both the actual cash payments to hired labor and an estimate of the opportunity cost of owner-operators’ time spent as captain. The average labor contribution (as captain) of an owner-operator is estimated at about $19,800. The average net revenue from operations is negative $7,429, and is statistically different and less than zero in spite of a large standard deviation. The economic return to Gulf shrimping is negative 4%. Including non-operating activities, foremost an average government payment of $13,662, leads to an average loss before taxes of $907 for the vessel owners. The confidence interval of this value straddles zero, so we cannot reject, with 95% certainty, that the population average is zero. The average inactive Gulf shrimp vessel is generally of a smaller scale than the average active vessel. Inactive vessels are physically smaller, are valued much lower, and are less dependent on loans. Fixed costs account for nearly three quarters of the total operating expenses of $11,926, and only 6% of these vessels have hull insurance. With an average net cash flow of negative $7,537, the inactive Gulf shrimp fleet has a major liquidity problem. On average, net revenue from operations is negative $11,396, which amounts to a negative 15% economic return, and owners lose $9,381 on their vessels before taxes. To sustain such losses and especially to survive the negative cash flow, many of the owners must be subsidizing their shrimp vessels with the help of other income or wealth sources or are drawing down their equity. Active Gulf shrimp vessels in all states but Texas exhibited negative returns. The Alabama and Mississippi fleets have the highest assets (vessel values), on average, yet they generate zero cash flow and negative $32,224 net revenue from operations. Due to their high (loan) leverage ratio the negative 11% economic return is amplified into a negative 21% return on equity. In contrast, for Texas vessels, which actually have the highest leverage ratio among the states, a 1% economic return is amplified into a 13% return on equity. From a financial perspective, the average Florida and Louisiana vessels conform roughly to the overall average of the active Gulf shrimp fleet. It should be noted that these results are averages and hence hide the variation that clearly exists within all fleets and all categories. Although the financial situation for the average vessel is bleak, some vessels are profitable. (PDF contains 101 pages)

Income Taxation and Growth in an OLG Economy: Does Aggregate Uncertainty Play any Role?

We analyze the effects of capital income taxation on long-run growth in a stochastic, two-period overlapping generations economy. Endogenous growth is driven by a positive externality of physical capital in the production sector that makes firms exhibit an aggregate technology in equilibrium. We distinguish between capital income and labor income, and between attitudes towards risk and intertemporal substitution of consumption. We show necessary and sufficient conditions such that i) increments in the capital income taxation lead to higher equilibrium growth rates, and ii) the effect of changes in the capital income tax rate on the equilibrium growth may be of opposite signs in stochastic and in deterministic economies. Such a sign reversal is shown to be more likely depending on i) how the intertemporal elasticity of substitution compares to one, and ii) the size of second- period labor supply. Numerical simulations show that for reasonable values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, a sign reversal shows up only for implausibly high values of the second- period’s labor supply. The conclusion is that deterministic OLG economies are a good approximation of the effect of taxes on the equilibrium growth rate as in Smith (1996).

Deepwater shorelines

Research has proven that Shoreline Erosion is caused by excess water contained within the shore face. This Research presents an opportunity to control erosion by managing the near shore water table. Our Research on Bogue Banks North Carolina suggests that our buildings and other impervious surfaces collect and concentrate water from storm rain runoff into the surface water table and within the critical beach front water exit point. Presently our Potable Fresh Water is supplied from deep wells located beneath an impervious layer of Marl. After our use, the Waste water is drained into the Surface Aquifer, the combined waste and storm rain water raises the Surface Aquifer water table and produces Erosion. The Deep Aquifers presently supplying our Potable Water have an unknown recharge rate, with increasing reports of Salt Water intrusion. We believe our Vital Fresh water supply system should be modified to supply Reverse Osmosis treatment plants from shallow wells. This will lower the Surface Water Table. These Shallow wells, either horizontal or vertical, might be located within the beach front, adjacent to high erosion risk properties. Beach Drains and Reverse Osmosis Water systems are new and proven technologies. By combining these technologies we can reduce or reverse Shore Erosion, ensure a safe Potable Water supply, reduce requirements for periodic beach nourishment, reduce taxes and protect our property well into the Future. (PDF contains 5 pages)

Cost effectiveness of a combination of instruments for global warming: a quantitative approach for Spain

4 p.

Environmental fiscal reform and unemployment in Spain in the presence of an informal sector

4 p.

The Slow Search for Solutions: Lessons from Historical Energy Transitions by Sector and Service

28 p.

Market Instruments and CO2 Mitigation: A General Equilibrium Analysis for Spain

25 p.