Daniel D. Tompkins letter to General Dearborn, June 28, 1812.

Transcript [original spelling and grammar retained]: Albany June 28 1812 Sir Your letter of the 23d has been received. I had anticipated your request by ordering the detachment from Washington, Essex, Clinton and Franklin Counties into service and have fixed the days and places of their Rendezvous. Upon application to the quarter master General I find there are but 139 tents & 60 camp kettles at this place & even those I take by a kind of stealth. The Deputy Quarter Master General declines giving an order for their delivery until he shall have a written order from the Quarter Master General, and the latter is willing I Shall take them but will not give the Deputy a written order for that purpose. Under Such circumstances I shall avail myself of the rule of Possession and by virtue of the Eleven Points of Law Send them tomorrow morning without a written order from anyone. You may remember that when you were Secretary of the war department I invited you to forward and deposit in our Frontier Arsenals, arms ammunition and camp equipage free of expense to be ready in case of war and the same invitation to the war department has been repeated some time, Since The United States have now from 5 to 600 regular troops at Plattsburgh, Rome, Canandaigua & c, where those arsenals are, and yet those recruits are now and must be for weeks to come unarmed and unequipped in every respect although within musket Shot of arsenals. The recruits at Plattsburgh are within 50 miles of two tribes of Canadian Indians. In case of an attack upon the Frontiers that portion of the United States army would be as inefficient and unable to defend the inhabitants or themselves even. The Militia Detachments on the Western Frontiers received the news of war with [cherafulness] and determined courage, and I am happy to find they are united late brothers, highly improved in Discipline & ready to devote themselves to any Service or danger which the good of the Country may require. But they are in barracks from which they cannot move a days march for the want of tents and other equipage, and they are in Separate and Independent Detachments without a General Officer to command them or combine their exertions for the accomplishment of any desirable and important object. The only officer of the United States here who can do anything is the Quarter Master General and he has not a tent Camp Kettle or Knapsack in this arsenal except what I have concluded to send off tomorrow morning as above mentioned to furnish men As to Cannon Muskets and Ammunition. I can find now one here who will exercise any authority over them or deliver a Single article upon my requisition. Neither can I find any Officer of the army who feel himself authorized to exercise any authority or do any act which will aid me in the all important object of protecting the Inhabitants of an extended Frontier exposed to the Cruelties of Savages and the depredations of the enemy. If I must rely upon the Militia Solely for Such protection I entreat you to give orders to your Officers to furnish upon my orders, for the use of the Militia Detachments , all needful weapons and articles with which the United States are Supplied and of which we are destitute . You may rely upon all the assistance which my talents, influence or authority can furnish in the active prosecution of the first & necessary way which has been declared by the Constituted Authorities of our beloved Country. I am, Sir, respectfully Your ob. Servt. Daniel D. Tompkins

Barnes Wines, Limited By-Law no. 82

A by-law "to fix the remuneration and expense allowances of directors". It reads "Be it enacted as a By-law of Barnes Wines Limited: 1. That each Director of the Company be paid the sum of Seventy-five ($75,00) Dollars annually in respect of general services rendered by the Director in his capacity as Director, such remuneration to accrue from the date of his election or appointment as a Director. 2. That each Director shall be paid and allowed travelling and other expenses properly incurred in connection with the affairs of the Company. 3. That this provision shall be and remain in force and effect in the fiscal years of the Company, 1971 to 1973 both inclusive. Enacted this 8th day of February, 1971."

Barnes Wines, LImited By-Law no. 81

The by-law reads: "A by-law to amend by-law no. 79 of the company by restricting the distribution of monies set aside for profit sharing to officers and employees regularly employed at the company's plant. Be it therefore enacted as a by-law of Barnes Wines, Limited as follows: That Schedule 'A' to By-Law no. 79 of the Company enacted on the 2nd day of February, 1953, be and the same is hereby amended by adding after the word "Company" in the last line of paragraph I thereof, the following: 'regularly employed at the Company's plant,' Enacted this 9th day of February, 1966. Witness the Corporate Seal of the Company. Unanimously confirmed by all the Shareholders of the Company at a Special General Meeting of the Shareholders of the Company held on the 21st day of February, 1966."

Barnes Wines, Limited By-Law No. 84

The By-Law reads: "A By-Law to change the Qualification of a director of the Corporation. Be it enacted and is hereby enacted as a By-law of Barnes Wines, Limited that: - Whereas it is deemed expedient to change the qualifications of a Director of the Corporation; Be it therefore enacted as a By-law of Barnes Wines, Limited, as follows: That By-law no. 75 of the Corporation be and the same is hereby amended by striking out Paragraph 4 thereof. Enacted this 9th day of April, 1973. Witness the Corporate seal of the Corporation."

Barnes Wines, Limited By-Law No. 78

The summary of the By-Law reads: "A By-Law to authorize the setting aside of certain monies annually out of the net profits of the Company before payment of dominion and provincial income taxes and provincial corporation tax to be paid to a trustee for distribution to the employees and officers of the Company and to authorize the execution of an agreement with a trustee to effect such purpose."

Barnes Wines, Limited By-Law No. 83

The By-Law is titled "Respecting the borrowing of money by the Corporation".

Barnes Wines, Limited By-Law No. 89

The summary of the law states "A special By-Law decreasing the number of directors of the Corporation".

Barnes Wines, Limited By-Law No. 92

The By-Law reads "being a by-law increasing the number of directors of the Corporation be it enacted and it is hereby enacted as a special by-law of Barnes Wines, Limited (hereinafter called the "Corporation") as follows: 1. The number of directors of the Corporation be and the same is hereby increased from five to six so that the Board of Directors of the Corporation shall hereafter be composed of six directors. 2. The quorum for meetings of directors be and the same is hereby fixed at three. 3. All prior by-laws and resolutions of the Corporation inconsistent herewith be and the same are hereby amended, modified and revised in order to give effect to this special by-law."

The Law and Economics of the Civil Law of Mandate

Présentation à la Annual Law & Economics Conference 2007, Université de Bologne.

Computer "Insecurity" and Viral Attacks : Liability Issues Regarding Unsafe Computer Systems Under Quebec Law

Un résumé en français est également disponible.

La corporation sert-elle bien ses stakeholders?

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures En vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit Option recherche (LL.M)"

The placebo effect: international patent law and the protection of traditional plant medicine

Une préoccupation essentielle traverse cette thèse: l'indifférence systémique de la Loi internationale sur la propriété intellectuelle a l'égard des savoirs traditionnels autochtones. De manière générale, un écart semble d'ailleurs croissant entre l'importance des accords internationaux sur les questions d'intérêt commercial et ceux de nature sociale. Les savoirs traditionnels autochtones sur les plantes médicinales sont particulièrement désavantagés dans ce système dichotomique puisqu'ils sont non seulement à l'origine d'énormes profits commerciaux mais se trouvent aussi au cœur de multiples croyances propres à ces sociétés. L'Accord sur les aspects des droits de propriété intellectuelle qui touchent au commerce (ADPIC) de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) a cristallisé le souci de la législation internationale à l'égard d'une protection efficace des intérêts commerciaux. Deux années auparavant, la Convention sur la diversité biologique (CDB) était signée, traduisant une préoccupation à l'égard du développement durable, et elle devenait le premier accord international à tenir compte des savoirs traditionnels autochtones. On considère souvent que ces deux accords permettent l'équilibre du développement commercial et durable, requis par l'économie internationale. Après plus ample examen, on a plutôt l'impression que l'idée d'une CDB défendant, avec succès et efficacité, la nécessité du développement durable et des savoirs traditionnels autochtones contre les pressions opposées de l'ADPIC et de l'OMC est, au mieux, simpliste. La thèse explore également la fonction de la Loi sur les brevets dans la création d’industries, notamment pharmaceutique, et la manière dont ces industries influencent la législation nationale et en particulier internationale. De même, elle traite du rôle que jouent les brevets dans l'affaiblissement et la dépossession des peuples autochtones dotés de savoirs traditionnels sur les plantes médicinales, conduisant à une situation ou ces savoirs sont marginalisés ainsi que leurs détenteurs. La thèse aborde les failles institutionnelles du système juridique international qui permet une telle situation et indique l'urgente nécessité d'examiner attentivement les inégalités économiques et sociales au Nord comme au Sud, et non seulement entre eux. Finalement, la thèse suggère que la législation internationale gagnerait à s'inspirer des diverses traditions juridiques présentes à travers le monde et, dans ce cas particulier, peut être les détenteurs des connaissances traditionnelles concernant les plantes médicinales seront mieux servi par le droit des obligations.

The Economics Of Civil Law Contract And Of Good Faith

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The Civil Law Of Contract

Cet article sera publié dans Ghent Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Gerrit De Geest (General Editor), 2nd edition, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2010.

Promoting while checking self-interest : a conflict-based governance approach to rebalance corporate power disequilibria in Canada and the United States

La délégation du pouvoir de gestion aux administrateurs et aux gestionnaires, une caractéristique intrinsèque à la gestion efficace de grandes entreprises dans un contexte de capitalisme, confère une grande discrétion à l’équipe de direction. Cette discrétion, si elle n’est pas surveillée, peut mener à des comportements opportunistes envers la corporation, les actionnaires et les autres fournisseurs de capital qui n’ont pas de pouvoir de gestion. Les conflits entre ces deux classes d’agents peuvent émerger à la fois de décisions de gouvernance générale ou de transactions particulières (ie. offre publique d’achat). Dans les cas extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent l’extraction de bénéfices privés pour les administrateurs et gestionnaires, l’expropriation des actionnaires, et des réductions de valeur pour la firme. Nous prenons le point de vue d’un petit actionnaire minoritaire pour explorer les méchanismes de gouvernance disponibles au Canada et aux États‐Unis. Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la corporation (séparation de la propriété et du contrôle et les conflits d’agence), nous concentrons notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, (2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons comment les intérêts de ces deux classes peuvent être réalignés afin de prévenir et résoudre les conflits au sein de la firme. La Partie 3 explore un équilibre dynamique de pouvoir corporatif qui cherche à minimiser le potentiel d’opportunisme toute en préservant une quantité de discrétion suffisante pour la gestion efficace de la firme. Nous analysons des moyens pour renforcer les protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles.