Historians and their duties

We need to specify what ethical responsibility historians, as historians, owe, and to whom. We should distinguish between natural duties and (non-natural) obligations, and recognize that historians' ethical responsibility is of the latter kind. We can discover this responsibility by using the concept of “accountability”. Historical knowledge is central. Historians' central ethical responsibility is that they ought to tell the objective truth. This is not a duty shared with everybody, for the right to truth varies with the audience. Being a historian is essentially a matter of searching for historical knowledge as part of an obligation voluntarily undertaken to give truth to those who have a right to it. On a democratic understanding, people need and are entitled to an objective understanding of the historical processes in which they live. Factual knowledge and judgments of value are both required, whatever philosophical view we might have of the possibility of a principled distinction between them. Historians owe historical truth not only to the living but to the dead. Historians should judge when that is called for, but they should not distort historical facts. The rejection of postmodernism's moralism does not free historians from moral duties. Historians and moral philosophers alike are able to make dispassionate moral judgments, but those who feel untrained should be educated in moral understanding. We must ensure the moral and social responsibility of historical knowledge. As philosophers of history, we need a rational reconstruction of moral judgments in history to help with this.

The causes and consequences of Rent-seeking in Northern Ireland, 1945-72

Northern Ireland's economic performance during the 'golden age' was weak. Crafts suggested that rent-seeking was an important determinant of this poor record. This article offers support for such a conclusion. It is suggested that the growth record was shaped by British regulations preventing conflicts of ministerial interest not being made operational until 1963. This institutional divergence tended to promote rent-seeking behaviour, which impeded the pursuit of an industrial policy that could promote economic efficiency. In 1963 the institutional structure and the industrial policy framework changed. These changes stimulated the pursuit of efficiency and contributed to an improved regional economic performance.

Benchmark Status in Fixed-Income Asset Markets

What is a benchmark bond? We provide a formal theoretical treatment of this concept that relates endogenously determined benchmark status to the location of price discovery and we derive its implications. We describe a rich but little used econometric technique for identifying the benchmark that is congruent with our theoretical framework. We apply this in the context of the US corporate bond market and to the natural experiment that occurred when benchmark status was contested in the European sovereign bond markets after the introduction of the Euro. We show that France provides the benchmark at most maturities in the Euro-denominated sovereign bond market and that IBM provides the benchmark in the 10 year maturity in the US corporate bond market.

Optimal Credit Rationing in Not-For-Profit Financial Institutions

We examine the dynamic optimization problem for not-for-profit financial institutions (NFPs) that maximize consumer surplus, not profits. We characterize the optimal dynamic policy and find that it involves credit rationing. Interest rates set by mature NFPs will typically be more favorable to customers than market rates, as any surplus is distributed in the form of interest rate subsidies, with credit rationing being required to prevent these subsidies from distorting loan volumes from their optimal levels. Rationing overcomes a fundamental problem in NFPs; it allows them to distribute the surplus without distorting the volume of activity from the efficient level.