Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission for the year 1967

ENGLISH: The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission was created and operates under the authority of a Convention first negotiated between the governments of the Republic of Costa Rica and the United States of America. The Convention entered into force in 1950. It is open to adherence by other governments whose nationals fish for tunas in the eastern Pacific area. Under this provision, Panama adhered in 1953, Ecuador in 1961, the United Mexican States in 1964. Canada applied for membership in 1967. Her membership will become effective on April 1, 1968. On August 21, 1967 the Ecuadorian government, for financial reasons, elected to withdraw from active membership. Under Convention ruling, this means that she remains a full member until August 21, 1968. SPANISH: La Comisión Interamericana del Atún Tropical fue originada y está bajo la autoridad de una Convención que fue negociada inicialmente entre los gobiernos de la República de Costa Rica y los Estados Unidos de América. La Convención entró en vigencia en 1950. Está abierta a la afiliación de otros gobiernos cuyos ciudadanos pescan atunes en el área del Pacífico oriental. Bajo esta estipulación, Panamá se afilió en 1953, Ecuador en 1961 y los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en 1964. Canadá presentó su ap1licación en 1967. Su afiliación será efectiva el 1 de abril de 1968. El 21 de agosto de 1967, el gobierno ecuatoriano por razones financieras decidió retirar su participación activa. Bajo las reglas de la Convención el Ecuador sigue actuando como miembro hasta el 21 de agosto de 1968. (PDF contains 144 pages.)

Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission for the year 1968

ENGLISH: The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission operates under the authority and direction of a Convention originally entered into by the Republic of Costa Rica and the United States of America. The Convention, which came into force in 1950, is open to adherence by other governments whose nationals fish in the eastern tropical Pacific. Under this provision the Republic of Panama adhered in 1953, the Republic of Ecuador in 1961, the United Mexican States in 1964 and Canada in 1968. In 1967 Ecuador gave notice of her intent to withdraw from the Commission and her withdrawal became effective on August 21, 1968. SPANISH:La Comisión Interamericana del Atún Tropical está bajo la autoridad y dirección de una Convención la cual fue originalmente formada por la República de Costa Rica y los Estados Unidos de América. La Convención, vigente desde 1950, está abierta a la afiliación de otros gobiernos cuyos nacionales pesquen en. el Pacífico oriental tropical. Bajo esta medida la República de Panamá se afilió en 1953, la. República del Ecuador en 1961, los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en 1964 y' el Canadá en 19Ei8. En 1967, el Ecuador anunció su intención de retirarse de la Comisión y la resignación se hizo efectiva el 21 de agosto de 1968. (PDF contains 128 pages.)

Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission for the year 1969

ENGLISH: The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission operates under the authority and direction of a convention originally entered into by the Republic of Costa Rica and the United States of America. The convention, which came into force in 1950, is open to adherence by other governments whose nationals fish for tropical tunas in the eastern Pacific Ocean. Under this provision the Republic of Panama adhered in 1953, the Republic of Ecuador in 1961, the United Mexican States in 1964 and Canada in 1968. In 1967, Ecuador gave notice of her intent to withdraw from the Commission, and her withdrawal became effective on August 21, 1968. SPANISH: La Comisión Interamericana del Atún Tropical está bajo la autoridad y dirección de una convención la cual fue originalmente formada por la República de Costa Rica y los Estados Unidos de América. La Convención, vigente desde 1950, está abierta a la afiliación de otros gobiernos cuyos nacionales pesquen túnidos en el Pacifico oriental tropical. Bajo esta medida la República de Panamá se afilió en 1953, la República del Ecuador en 1961, los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en 1964, y Canadá en 1968. En 1967, el Ecuador anunció su intención de retirarse de la Comisión y la renuncia se hizo efectiva el 21 de agosto de 1968. (PDF contains 117 pages.)

Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission for the year 1970

ENGLISH: The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission operates under the authority and direction of a convention originally entered into by the Republic of Costa Rica and the United States of America. The convention, which came into force in 1950, is open to adherence by other governments whose nationals fish for tropical tunas in the eastern Pacific Ocean. Under this provision the Republic of Panama adhered in 1953, the Republic of Ecuador in 1961, the United Mexican States in 1964, Canada in 1968 and Japan in 1970. In 1967, Ecuador gave notice of her intent to withdraw from the Commission, and her withdrawal became effective on August 21, 1968. SPANISH:La Comisión Interamericana del Atún Tropical está bajo la autoridad y dirección de una convención la cual fue originalmente formada por la República de Costa Rica y los Estados Unidos de América. La Convención, vigente desde 1950, está abierta a la afiliación de otros gobiernos cuyos nacionales pesquen atún en el Pacífico oriental tropical. Bajo esta medida la República de Panamá se afilió en 1953, la República del Ecuador en 1961, los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en 1964, Canadá en 1968 y el Japón en 1970. En 1967, el Ecuador anunció su intención de retirarse de la Comisión y la renuncia se hizo efectiva el 21 de agosto de 1968. (PDF contains 128 pages.)

Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission for the year 1971

ENGLISH: The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission operates under the authority and direction of a convention originally entered into by the Republic of Costa Rica and the United States of America. The convention, which came into force in 1950, is open to adherence by other governments whose nationals fish for tropical tunas in the eastern Pacific Ocean. Under this provision the Republic of Panama adhered in 1953, the Republic of Ecuador in 1961, the United Mexican States in 1964, Canada in 1968 and Japan in 1970. In 1967, Ecuador gave notice of her intent to withdraw from the Commission, and her withdrawal became effective on August 21,1968. SPANISH: La Comisión Interamericana del Atún Tropical está bajo la autoridad y dirección de una convención la cual fue originalmente formada por la República de Costa Rica y los Estados Unidos de América. La Convención, vigente desde 1950, está abierta a la afiliación de otros gobiernos cuyos nacionales pesquen atún en el Pacífico oriental tropical. Bajo esta medida la República de Panamá se afilió en 1953, la República del Ecuador en 1961, los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en 1964, Canadá en 1968 y el Japón en 1970. En 1967, el Ecuador anunció su intención de retirarse de la Comisión y la renuncia se hizo efectiva el 21 de agosto de 1968. (PDF contains 127 pages.)

Four essays on the empirical analysis of political ideology

This thesis examines four distinct facets and methods for understanding political ideology, and so it includes four distinct chapters with only moderate connections between them. Chapter 2 examines how reactions to emotional stimuli vary with political opinion, and how the stimuli can produce changes in an individuals political preferences. Chapter 3 examines the connection between self-reported fear and item nonresponse on surveys. Chapter 4 examines the connection between political and moral consistency with low-dimensional ideology, and Chapter 5 develops a technique for estimating ideal points and salience in a low-dimensional ideological space.

Essays on cooperation and reciprocity

This dissertation comprises three essays that use theory-based experiments to gain understanding of how cooperation and efficiency is affected by certain variables and institutions in different types of strategic interactions prevalent in our society.

Chapter 2 analyzes indefinite horizon two-person dynamic favor exchange games with private information in the laboratory. Using a novel experimental design to implement a dynamic game with a stochastic jump signal process, this study provides insights into a relation where cooperation is without immediate reciprocity. The primary finding is that favor provision under these conditions is considerably less than under the most efficient equilibrium. Also, individuals do not engage in exact score-keeping of net favors, rather, the time since the last favor was provided affects decisions to stop or restart providing favors.

Evidence from experiments in Cournot duopolies is presented in Chapter 3 where players indulge in a form of pre-play communication, termed as revision phase, before playing the one-shot game. During this revision phase individuals announce their tentative quantities, which are publicly observed, and revisions are costless. The payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end under real time revision, whereas in a Poisson revision game, opportunities to revise arrive according to a synchronous Poisson process and the tentative quantity corresponding to the last revision opportunity is implemented. Contrasting results emerge. While real time revision of quantities results in choices that are more competitive than the static Cournot-Nash, significantly lower quantities are implemented in the Poisson revision games. This shows that partial cooperation can be sustained even when individuals interact only once.

Chapter 4 investigates the effect of varying the message space in a public good game with pre-play communication where player endowments are private information. We find that neither binary communication nor a larger finite numerical message space results in any efficiency gain relative to the situation without any form of communication. Payoffs and public good provision are higher only when participants are provided with a discussion period through unrestricted text chat.

Essays on economics networks

This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest.

In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium.

We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the “global” structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more “local”. Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets.

As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions.

Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.

Soundings: the Newsletter of the Monterey Bay Chapter of the American Cetacean Society. 2009

(PDF contains 88 pages.)

Essays in optimal resource allocation under uncertainty with capacity constraints

This thesis brings together four papers on optimal resource allocation under uncertainty with capacity constraints. The first is an extension of the Arrow-Debreu contingent claim model to a good subject to supply uncertainty for which delivery capacity has to be chosen before the uncertainty is resolved. The second compares an ex-ante contingent claims market to a dynamic market in which capacity is chosen ex-ante and output and consumption decisions are made ex-post. The third extends the analysis to a storable good subject to random supply. Finally, the fourth examines optimal allocation of water under an appropriative rights system.

Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Affects Environmental: presented at American Society of Civil Engineers National Water Resources Engineering Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona, 14 January 1971

The Chesapeake and Delaware Canal is a man-made waterway connecting the upper Chesapeake Bay with the Delaware Bay. It started in 1829 as a private barge canal with locks, two at the Delaware end, and one at the Chesapeake end. For the most part, natural tidal and non-tidal waterways were connected by short dredged sections to form the original canal. In 1927, the C and D Canal was converted to a sea-level canal, with a controlling depth of 14 feet, and a width of 150 feet. In 1938 the canal was deepened to 27 feet, with a channel width of 250 feet. Channel side slopes were dredged at 2.5:1, thus making the total width of the waterway at least 385 feet in those segments representing new cuts or having shore spoil area dykes rising above sea level. In 1954 Congress authorized a further enlargement of the Canal to a depth of 35 feet and a channel width of 450 feet. (pdf contains 27 pages)

The avifauna of Laguna Llancanelo (Mendoza, Argentina), a South American wetland of international importance

Laguna Llancanelo is a large (40,000 ha), very shallow (less than 3 m deep), inland saline waterbody, located in southern Mendoza, Argentina. A survey of the avifauna was undertaken during 1983 to 1985; field trips were made mostly to the northeastern and central-western sectors of the lagoon, in the months of April, May, September, October and December. Complementary studies were made by an aerial survey and assessments of terrestrial birds in the surroundings of the lagoon. A total of 64 species in 22 families of birds usually associated with aquatic environments were recorded. The best-represented families of aquatic birds in terms of numbers of species were: Anatidae (13 swans, geese, ducks), Scolopacidae (7 sandpipers and other small waders), Ardeidae (6 herons, bitterns, egrets, Podicipedidae (4 grebes), Rallidae (4 rails, coots) and Charadriidae (4 plovers, lapwings). The most abundant nesting birds on the lagoon were: Black-necked swan Cygnus melancoryphus (824), silvery grebe Podiceps occipitalis (202) and black-crowned night heron Nycticorax nycticorax (100).

Soundings: the Newsletter of the Monterey Bay Chapter of the American Cetacean Society. 2010

(PDF contains 92 pages.)

Essays on Correlated Equilibrium and Voter Turnout

This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game theory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium outcomes.

Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and characterizes the resulting set of Aumann's correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.

In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson's quasi-principals' equilibria. I characterize an upper bound on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.

Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers. We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one's own party. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.