Personal and household care giving for adult children to parents and social stratification

Using SHARE database the paper explores the factors conditioning personalcare giving from adult children to their parents. Frequency and intensity ofpersonal care is contrasted with the reciprocal expectations that children haveabout wealth inheritance from their parents and with the opportunity costs of helping, as well as with the capacity of parents of getting help from othersources of personal care. The results may help to understand how inequalitiesin accessing to formal services relate with intergenerational solidarity.

Occupational sex-composition and earnings : individual and social effects

This paper investigates the micro and macro-level factors affecting the empirical association between occupational sex-composition and individual earnings. This is done in two analytical steps using data from the second round of the European Social Survey. In a first step, country-fixed-effects regressions are used to test the extent to which job-specialization, gender attitudes and the relative supply of domestic work can account for the impact of occupational sex-composition on earnings. In accordance with previous research, it is found that all these micro-level variables have a significant effect on the analyzed association, yet only job-specialization can explain it away by itself. In a second analytical step, macro-level interactions are tested under the hypothesis that defamilialization policies reduce the pay-offs of sphere specialization by sex, generating incentives for all types of women to invest in the labor market. Empirical results suggest that gender attitudes and the relative supply of housework are much more loosely associated to earning in social-democratic and former communist societies than in conservative or liberal regimes. This finding is interpreted as consistent with the defamilialization hypothesis.

Synthesis and in vitro evaluation of a novel radioligand for αvβ3 integrin receptor imaging: [(18)F]FPPA-c(RGDfK).

The development of RGD-based antagonist of αvβ3 integrin receptor has enhanced the interest in PET probes to image this receptor for the early detection of cancer, to monitor the disease progression and the response to therapy. In this work, a novel prosthetic group (N-(4-fluorophenyl)pent-4-ynamide or FPPA) for the (18)F-labeling of an αvβ3 selective RGD-peptide was successfully prepared. [(18)F]FPPA was obtained in three steps with a radiochemical yield of 44% (decay corrected). Conjugation to c(RGDfK(N3)) by the Cu(II) catalyzed Huisgen azido alkyne cycloaddition provided the [(18)F]FPPA-c(RGDfK) with a radiochemical yield of 29% (decay corrected), in an overall synthesis time of 140min.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Austerity and anarchy: Budget cuts and social unrest in Europe, 1919-2008

Does fiscal consolidation lead to social unrest? Using cross-country evidencefor the period 1919 to 2008, we examine the extent to which societies becomeunstable after budget cuts. The results show a clear correlation between fiscalretrenchment and instability. Expenditure cuts are particularly potent infueling protests; tax rises have only small and insignificant effects. We test ifthe relationship simply reflects economic downturns, using a recently-developedIMF dataset on exogenous expenditure shocks, and conclude that this is not thecase. While autocracies and democracies show broadly similar responses to budgetcuts, countries with more constraints on the executive are less likely to seeunrest after austerity measures. Growing media penetration does not strengthenthe effect of cut-backs on the level of unrest. We also find that austerity episodesthat result in unrest lead to quick reversals of fiscal policy.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification ofindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfaremaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions inthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences infact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannotconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actualdistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictatorgames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individualswith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behavemore selfishly.

Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security

Why are the old politically successful? We build a simple interest group model in which political pressure is time-intensive, showing that in the political competitive equilibrium each group lobbies for government policies that lower their own value of time but the old do so to a greater extent and as a result are net gainers from the political process. What distinguishes the elderly from other political groups (and what makes them more succesful) is that they have lower labor productivity and/or that we are all likely to become elderly at some point, while we are relatively unlikely to change gender, race, sexual orientation, or even ocupation, The model has a variety of implications for the design of social security programs, which we test using data from the Social Security Administration. For example, the model predicts that social security programs with retirement incentives are larger and that the old are more "single-minded" in their politics, implications which we verify using cross-country government finance data and cross-country political participation surveys. Finally, we show that the forced savings programs intended to "reform" the social security system may increase the amount of intergenerational redistribution. As a model for evaluating policy reforms, ours has the attractive feature that reforms must be time time consistent from a political point of view rather than a public interest point of view.

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.

Housing’s Economic and Social Impacts, April 2007

Housing is an investment in Iowa’s communities and people. This report investigates the following questions: What impact does affordable housing have • on neighborhoods? • on local and state economies? • on expanding and stabilizing Iowa’s labor force? • on meeting social, individual and community needs?