A Moral Stakeholder Theory of the Firm

To be a coherent and genuinely alternative conception to the shareholder model, any moral stakeholder theory must meet the following conditions: (1) It must be an ethical theory; (2) It must identify a limited group as stakeholders; (3) The group must be identified on morally relevant grounds; (4) Stakeholder claims must be non-universal; (5) And not held against everyone. A principle for identifying the stakeholder is suggested as a person who has much to lose – financially, socially, or psychologically – by the failure of the firm. The emerging picture contrasts sharply with the conventional conception of the firm.

What can the Stakeholder Theory Learn from Enron?

Roughly speaking, Enron has done for reflection on corporate governance what AIDS did for research on the immune system. So far, however, virtually all of this reflection on and subsequent reform of governance has come from those with a stake in the success of modern capitalism. This paper identifies a number of governance challenges for critics of capitalism, and in particular for those who urge corporations to voluntarily adopt missions of broader social responsibility and equal treatment for all stakeholder groups. I argue that by generally neglecting the governance relation between shareholders and senior managers, stakeholder theorists have underestimated the way in which shareholder-focused governance can be in the interests of all stakeholder groups. The enemy, if you will, is not capitalists (shareholders), but greedy, corrupt or incompetent managers. A second set of governance challenges for stakeholder theorists concerns their largely untested proposals for governance reforms that would require managers to act in the interests of all stakeholders and not just shareholders; in other words to treat shareholders as just another stakeholder group. I suggest that in such a governance regime it may be almost impossible to hold managers accountable to anyone – just as it was when state-owned enterprises were given “multi-stakeholder” mandates in the 1960s and 1970s.

Comment la souris peut-elle dormir avec un éléphant? : Commentaire sur l’étude de cas « Bombardier »

Un an après la rédaction originelle de notre étude de cas, il semblerait que la question de la responsabilité sociale en matière de motoneige ait trouvée, en la juge Hélène Langlois, une réponse négative. Malgré les efforts de Bombardier en matière de responsabilité sociale, ce sont les résidents en bordure des pistes qui auront finalement eu gain de cause devant la Cour supérieure du Québec en ce qui concerne les inconvénients de la motoneige.

Is There Personal Identity in Economics?

John B. Davis explores the question of what the economic individual is. He bases his considerations of orthodox economics on the assumption that these theories implicitly rely on a conception of the individual that has its origin in Locke’s idea of the self as subjective inwardness. Economic history then is the attempt to deal with Locke’s inherent problems that this view involved. If neoclassical economics still has aspects of human psychology, mainstream economics dropped the subjective concept of the individual out of their considerations. However, Davis demonstrates that even the neoclassical concept of the individual fails to pass the existence test of individual identity. The latter is an idea developed in analogy to philosophers’ concern about personal identity and examines if the individual can be distinguished among different individuals and if he or she can be reidentified as the selfsame individual through time. The failure of the theory of the individual in orthodox economics led Davis to develop a concept of a socially embedded individual in accordance with heterodox accounts of economics. He submits this conception to the same test of individual identity. It appears that the socially embedded individual can be said to hold an identity in specific circumstances.