Immigration and free movement in an unusual electoral race: what implications for the next political cycle? EPC Policy Brief, 20 May 2014

Immigration and freedom of movement of EU citizens are among the main issues debated throughout the European Parliament election campaign and have some potential in determining who tomorrow’s EU leaders will be. This Policy Brief looks at how the two policies are debated at national level – in France, Germany and the UK – and at EU level between the ‘top candidates’ for European Commission Presidency – Jean-Claude Juncker (EPP), Ska Keller (Greens), Martin Schulz (PES) and Guy Verhofstadt (ALDE) – who have participated in several public debates. Two different campaigns have been unfolding in front of EU citizens’ eyes. The tense debate that can be identified at national level on these issues, is not transferred to the EU level, where immigration and free movement are less controversial topics. Furthermore, although participating in European elections, national parties present agendas responding exclusively to the economic and social challenges of their Member State, while the candidates for the Commission Presidency bring forward ‘more European’ programmes. Hence, several aspects need to be reflected upon: What will the consequences of this discontinuity be? How will this impact the future European agenda in terms of immigration and free movement? What institutional consequences will there be? Answering these questions is not a simple task, however, this paper aims to identify the parameters that need to be taken into account and the political landscape which will determine the future EU agenda in terms of immigration and free movement.

What’s the use of a transatlantic free trade area? Jean Monnet Policy Brief 05/2014

For many of those who remember the hostile EU-US trade relations of the 1980’s and the various trade disputes that have emerged between these two trade partners since then, the opening of negotiations on a joint free trade area would be good news. Strengthened trade cooperation between the partners holds the promise of expanding their mutual exchange of goods and services, not the least by solving obstacles to integration on less transparent issues such as the extent to which product characteristics should be defined by their regional characteristics (e.g. can Budweiser be produced outside the Budweis region in the Czech Republic?).

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

Migration and asylum: The movement of people in the Mediterranean Region - Future scenarios and the EU response. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 11/2014

Introduction. In recent years, the global discussion on migration and asylum has evolved from polarization of perspectives and mistrust, to improving partnerships and fostering cooperation between countries and regions. The paradigm has shifted from control and security exclusively to an increased awareness of the ramifications of migration in development and labour markets, the increasing demographic gap1 and the dangers of exclusion faced by migrant workers (regular or irregular). Eastern Europe will suffer the biggest population decline in the coming years, and Nigeria’s population will reach one billion by 2100. In Europe, the work replacement ratio will be two pensioners for one active worker. It has become clear that these facts cannot be ignored and that there is a need for greater convergence of policies (migration/mobility, fundamental rights, and economic growth), with a migrant-centred approach.2. The assumption that Europe will remain a geopolitical and economic hub that attracts immigrants at all skill levels might not hold water in the long run. The evolving demographic and economic changes have made it evident that the competitiveness of the EU (Europe 2020 Strategy) is also at stake, particularly if an adaptable workforce with the necessary skills is not secured in view of shortfalls in skill levels and because of serious labour mismatches. Therefore, it is the right moment to develop more strategic and long-term migration policies that take into account the evolving position of Europe and its neighbours in the world. By the same token, labour market strategies that meet needs and promote integration of regular migrants are still a pending task for the Member States (MS) in terms of the free movement of people, but also in relation with neighbouring and partner countries.

Taking its place in Europe – Iceland’s long road to its EU application. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper 03/2013

Iceland applied for EU membership in 2009. Before that it had sought to alleviate pressures on her to fully integrate with Europe firstly by pursuing limited integration through membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and later by joining the European Economic Area (EEA). This paper traces the steps taken by this peripheral European country from its struggle of independence from Denmark, through World War II, American occupation, the founding of a republic, NATO membership and the Cod Wars with Britain. The paper analyses the various phases of the debate on the ties to the European institutions leading to EEA and Schengen membership, the “miraculous economic success“ which ended in the epic crash of 2008 which precipitated a much contested EU application.

What’s the use of a transatlantic free trade area? Jean Monnet Policy Brief 05/2013

No abstract.

The ENP in practice - the European Union's policy towards Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova one year after the publication of the Strategy Paper. OSW Point of View, June 2005

Clear qualitative changes have taken place in relations between the European Union and its Eastern neighbours over the past year. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been playing a significant part in the context of these changes. In the cases of Moldova and Ukraine, which are the countries interested in enhancing co-operation with the EU, the ENP has provided a formula that allows taking steps to implement this objective. The ENP has also contributed to "outlining an alternative" to Belarus' current self-isolation. However, the ENP has first of all given a clear message to Russia by specifying the EU's interests and objectives concerning Eastern Europe. The ENP has clearly stated that the EU wants to build democracy and a free market in those countries, and has signalled that the European Union intends to discuss the issues concerning the countries directly with them, and not through Moscow's offices.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part III: More reform than renegotiation or repatriation. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 42/December 2014. [see Abstract for I and II]

This paper, the third in a series for a CEPS project on the ‘The British Question’, is pegged on an ambitious exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders. The reviews considered in this paper cover the following EU policies: the single market for services, financial markets, the free movement of people, cohesion, energy, agriculture, fisheries, competition, social and employment policies, and fundamental rights. The declared objective of Prime Minister Cameron is to secure a ‘new settlement’ between the UK and the EU. From political speeches in the UK one can identify three different types of possible demand: reform of EU policies, renegotiation of the UK’s specific terms of membership, and repatriation of competences from the EU back to the member states. As most of the reviews are now complete, three points are becoming increasingly clear: i) The reform agenda – past, present or future - concerns virtually every branch of EU policy, including several cases reviewed here that are central to stated UK economic interests. The argument that the EU is ‘unreformable’ is shown to be a myth. ii) The highly sensitive cases of immigration from the EU and social policies may translate into requests for renegotiation of specific conditions for the UK, but further large-scale opt-outs, as in the case of the euro and justice and home affairs, are implausible. iii) While demands for repatriation of EU competences are voiced in general terms in public debate in the UK, no specific proposals emerge from the evidence as regards competences at the level at which they are identified in the treaties, and there is no chance of achieving consensus for such ideas among member states. Michael Emerson and Steven Blockmans, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 35, October 2013 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-i-%E2%80%98competences-about-right-so-far%E2%80%99)(http://aei.pitt.edu/45599/); Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Steve Peers and Michael Wriglesworth, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 40, June 2014 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-ii-again-huge-contradiction-between-evidence-and-eurosc)(http://aei.pitt.edu/52452/).

The prospects for the EU-Ukraine free trade agreement. OSW Commentary No. 94, 2012-10-15

The European Union and Ukraine initialled the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement (DCFTA) on 19 July 2012. The scope of the agreement which the EU and Ukraine reached following their negotiations is much more extensive than that of a typical free trade agreement. It envisages not only the lifting of tariff and extra-tariff barriers but also, more importantly, Kyiv adopting EU legal solutions and standards in this area. Whether the agreement will be signed and implemented is still an open question and depends on the existing political conditions. On the one hand, the repression imposed by the government in Kyiv on its political opponents (including the detention of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko) has provoked criticism from the EU, which refuses to sign the agreement if the government in Kyiv continues to violate democratic principles. The manner in which Ukraine’s parliamentary elections are conducted this October will be the key test. On the other hand, Russia is increasingly active in its efforts to involve Ukraine in the integration projects it has initiated (the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Community). It should be noted that Moscow has effective instruments to exert its will, such as the dependence of the Ukrainian economy on supplies of Russian oil and gas and on exports to the Russian market. Besides, Moscow also has political instruments at its disposal. It is impossible to participate in integration projects both with the EU and with Russia. Therefore, Kyiv will have to make a strategic decision and choose the direction of its economic integration. Unless Ukraine takes concrete action to implement its agreements with the EU, primarily including the free trade agreement, its economic dependence on Russia will grow, and it will be more likely to join the Russian integration projects.

The Labour Allocation Decisions of Farm Households: Defining a theoretical model. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 31, October 2012

This paper presents a theoretical model for the analysis of decisions regarding farm household labour allocation. The agricultural household model is selected as the most appropriate theoretical framework; a model based on the assumption that households behave to maximise utility, which is a function of consumption and leisure, and is subject to time and budget constraints. The model can be used to describe the role of government subsidies in farm household labour allocation decisions; in particular the impact of decoupled subsidies on labour allocation can be examined. Decoupled subsidies are a labour-free payment and as such represent an increase in labour-free income or wealth. An increase in wealth allows farm households to work less while maintaining consumption. On the other hand, decoupled subsidies represent a decline in the return to farm labour and may lead to a substitution effect, i.e., farmers may choose to substitute non-farm work for farm work. The theoretical framework proposed in this paper allows for the examination of these two conflicting effects.

Between Irrelevance and Integration? New Challenges to Diplomacy in the 21st Century and the Role of the EEAS. EU Diplomacy Paper No. 8, November 2014

The changing nature of diplomacy poses new challenges for diplomatic actors in the 21st century, who have to adapt their structures in order to remain relevant on the international stage. The growing interdependence and complexity of issues necessitate a more networked approach to diplomacy, while states retain their predominance in diplomacy. The main underlying challenge of modern diplomacy therefore requires finding a balance between traditional and new elements. This paper examines to what extent the European External Action Service (EEAS) meets the new challenges of modern diplomacy and copes with the diverse interests of the other stakeholders involved, namely the institutions and Member States of the European Union (EU). On the basis of a conceptual framework of modern diplomacy and an analysis of the different aspects of the EEAS’ structures, the paper argues that the EEAS does not fully meet the new challenges to diplomacy, since the interests of the other stakeholders put constraints on its free development. The latter therefore have to choose between irrelevance and integration with regard to EU foreign policy and the future of the EEAS.

Supporting the Revolution: America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981-1989. ACES Working Paper (Report) No. 8, 2007

Early on the morning of December 13, 1981, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the leader of the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), declared martial law, ending the so-called "Polish Crisis," which began with the creation of the Independent Free Trade Union "Solidamosc" in August 1980. Over the next eight years, the Communist government and the opposition struggled over power, culminating in 1989 with the creation of a Solidamosc-led government which ended fifty years of Communist rule in Poland and led the way to further democratic revolutions throughout Eastern Europe. The purpose of this dissertation is to utilize newly available and underutilized archival sources as well as oral history interviews, from both international and American perspectives, to fully chronicle American policy toward Poland from the declaration of martial law until the creation of the Solidarnosc government. Rather than explaining Polish-American relations in bilateral terms, the dissertation illuminates the complex web of influences that determined American policy in Washington and affected its implementation within Poland. This includes descriptions of internal tensions within the Reagan administration, differences between American decisions in Washington and implementation in Warsaw, lobbying from Polish-American groups, clashes between Capitol Hill and the White House, coordination with American labor organizations to support Solidarnosc, disagreements with West European allies in NATO and international financial organizations, cooperation with the Vatican and the Polish Catholic Church, synchronization with American humanitarian organizations working in Poland, limitations caused by the realities of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, and complications caused by domestic Polish concerns. By taking a broad view of American policy and highlighting internal Polish decisions, with both the Communist government and the democratic opposition, the dissertation provides concrete examples of America's role in Poland's transformation, arguing, however, that this role was very limited. These conclusions are relevant to arguments about the end of the Cold War, the nature of American power, as well as current discussions about possibilities to promote democracy within hostile regimes.

EMU Convergence: Reason for Encouragement. ACES Working Paper (Report) No. 6, 2007

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether convergence is actually occurring within Europe, which groups of countries are converging, and the macroeconomic indicators for which such convergence is apparent. Free trade and a single currency should lead to convergence in rates of inflation, but perhaps not in unemployment rates or in GDP growth. These latter aspects of economic performance are politically important, because the voters become decidedly displeased if unemployment is high and growth slow, as has been the case in France, Germany, and Italy during recent years.

Comparison of PRC and Vietnam's Responses to the Elimination of U.S. Textile and Apparel Quotas: Economic and Cultural Perspectives. ACES Working Paper No. 1, 2007

International trade in textiles and apparel has, as of January 1, 2005, been set free from the very intricate Multi-Fiber textile and apparel quota Arrangement (MFA). This event has raised many uncertainties about the new international trade climate and has placed enormous pressure on China as the expected clear cut beneficiary of this liberalization.' Other countries considered to be major contenders include Vietnam which also has a large population employed in the textile and apparel (T&A) sector. Since the old quota system had provided a certain degree of market certainty to competing T&A producers, will the new free trade environment lead to a shake out where mass producers with large economies of scale dominate the new reality? The removal of T&A quotas will create opportunities for Vietnam and China along with other developing countries, but it will also expose them to additional competition from each other. The outcome of this competition will depend on the demand in the US, the ability of the exporting countries to differentiate their exports and on their ability to transfer additional resources to expand domestic output in the direction of the new 'free market signals' and away from rent seeking objectives. Obviously, exporting countries that adjust to this new environment quickly will improve their competitiveness, and will be the new beneficiaries of a quota free international trade in textiles and apparel. This paper attempts to shed some light on the differences and similarities in the responses of Chinese and Vietnamese T&A sectors to this new environment. It first focuses on the demand side attempting to determine whether or not Chinese and Vietnamese T&A items, formally under quota control, are substitutes or compliments. On the supply side, the paper focuses on institutional differences between each country's T&A sectors, the different domestic government policies that have contributed to their growth and the unique cultural differences which will determine the future progress in each country's T&A sectors.

The Second Phase of the Common European Asylum System: A Step Forward in the Protection of Asylum Seekers? IES WORKING PAPER 7/2013

The aim of this paper is to analyse what is the impact of the second phase of the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in the protection of rights of Asylum Seekers in the European Union. The establishment of a CEAS has been always a part of the development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Its implementation was planned in two phases: the first one, focused on the harmonisation of internal legislation on minimum common standards; the second, based on the result of an evaluation of the effectiveness of the agreed legal instruments, should improve the effectiveness of the protection granted. The five instruments adopted between 2002 and 2005, three Directives, on Qualification, Reception Conditions and Asylum Procedures, and two Regulations, the so-called “Dublin System”, were subjected to an extensive evaluation and modification, which led to the end of the recasting in 2013. The paper discusses briefly the international obligations concerning the rights of asylum seekers and continues with the presentation of the legal basis of the CEAS and its development, together with the role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in asylum matters. The research will then focus on the development in the protection of asylum seekers after the recasting of the legislative instruments mentioned above. The paper will note that the European standards result now improved, especially concerning the treatment of vulnerable people, the quality of the application procedure, the effectiveness of the appeal, the treatment of gender issues in decision concerning procedures and reception. However, it will be also highlighted that Member States maintained a wide margin of appreciation in many fields, which can lead to the compression of important guarantees. This margin concerns, for example, the access to free legal assistance, the definition of the material support to be granted to each applicant for international protection, the access to labour market, the application of the presumptions of the “safety” of a third country. The paper will therefore stress that the long negotiations that characterised the second phase of the CEAS undoubtedly led to some progress in the protection of Asylum Seekers in the EU. However, some provisions are still in open contrast with the international obligations concerning rights of asylum seekers, while others require to the Member State consider carefully its obligation in the choice of internal policies concerning asylum matters.