Key principles for developing industrially relevant strategic technology management toolkits

When considering the potential uptake and utilization of technology management tools by industry, it must be recognized that companies face the difficult challenges of selecting, adopting and integrating individual tools into a toolkit that must be implemented within their current organizational processes and systems. This situation is compounded by the lack of sound advice on integrating well-founded individual tools into a robust toolkit that has the necessary degree of flexibility such that they can be tailored for application to specific problems faced by individual organizations. As an initial stepping stone to offering a toolkit with empirically proven utility, this paper provides a conceptual foundation to the development of toolkits by outlining an underlying philosophical position based on observations from multiple research and commercial collaborations with industry. This stance is underpinned by a set of operationalized principles that can offer guidance to organizations when deciding upon the appropriate form, functions and features that should be embodied by any potential tool/toolkit. For example, a key objective of any tool is to aid decision-making and a core set of powerful, flexible, scaleable and modular tools should be sufficient to allow users to generate, explore, shape and implement possible solutions across a wide array of strategic issues. From our philosophical stance, the preferred mode of engagement is facilitated workshops with a participatory process that enables multiple perspectives and structures the conversation through visual representations in order to manage the cognitive load in the collaborative environment. The generic form of the tools should be configurable for the given context and utilized in a lightweight manner based on the premise of 'start small and iterate fast'. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.

Mapping experience in organizations: A learning process for strategic technology planning

Today's fast-paced, dynamic environments mean that for organizations to keep "ahead of the game", engineering managers need to maximize current opportunities and avoid repeating past mistakes. This article describes the development study of a collaborative strategic management tool - the Experience Scan to capture past experience and apply learning from this to present and future situations. Experience Scan workshops were held in a number of different technology organizations, developing and refining the tool until its format stabilized. From participants' feedback, the workshop-based tool was judged to be a useful and efficient mechanism for communication and knowledge management, contributing to organizational learning.

Depicting the future strategic plans of the Royal Australian Navy using a roadmapping framework as a visual composite canvas

Strategic planning can be an arduous and complex task; and, once a plan has been devised, it is often quite a challenge to effectively communicate the principal missions and key priorities to the array of different stakeholders. The communication challenge can be addressed through the application of a clearly and concisely designed visualisation of the strategic plan - to that end, this paper proposes the use of a roadmapping framework to structure a visual canvas. The canvas provides a template in the form of a single composite visual output that essentially allows a 'plan-on-a-page' to be generated. Such a visual representation provides a high-level depiction of the future context, end-state capabilities and the system-wide transitions needed to realise the strategic vision. To demonstrate this approach, an illustrative case study based on the Australian Government's Defence White Paper and the Royal Australian Navy's fleet plan will be presented. The visual plan plots the in-service upgrades for addressing the capability shortfalls and gaps in the Navy's fleet as it transitions from its current configuration to its future end-state vision. It also provides a visualisation of project timings in terms of the decision gates (approval, service release) and specific phases (proposal, contract, delivery) together with how these projects are rated against the key performance indicators relating to the technology acquisition process and associated management activities. © 2013 Taylor & Francis.

Dialogical strategies for orchestrating strategic innovation networks: the case of the Internet of Things

Strategic innovation has been shown to provide significant value for organisations whilst at the same time challenging traditional ways of thinking and working. There is less known, however, as to how organisations collaborate in innovation networks to achieve strategic innovation. In this paper we explore how innovation networks are orchestrated in developing a strategic innovation initiative around the Internet of Things. We show how a hub actor brings together a diverse group of actors to initially create and subsequently orchestrate the strategic innovation network through the employ of three dialogical strategies, namely persuasive projection, reflective development, and definitional control. Further, we illuminate how different types of legitimacy are established through these various dialogical strategies in orchestrating strategic innovation networks.

Theory and practice in strategic planning for health information systems

Bradshaw, K. & Urquhart, C. (2005). Theory and practice in strategic planning for health information systems. In: D. Wainwright (Ed.), UK Academy for Information Systems 10th conference 2005, 22-24 March 2005 (CD-ROM). Newcastle upon Tyne: Northumbria University.

Strategic intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Alliance Diplomacy in Anglo-French relations before the Second World War

Jackson, Peter, and Joe Maiolo, 'Strategic intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Alliance Diplomacy in Anglo-French relations before the Second World War', Military History (2006) 65(2) pp.417-461 RAE2008

The Kosovo Bombing Campaign

Wheeler, Nicholas. 'The Kosovo Bombing Campaign', In: The Politics of International Law, C. Reus-Smit (Ed.), (Cambridge Studies in International Relations 96. Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 189-216, 2004. 1. Introduction Christian Reus-Smit; 2. The politics of international law Christian Reus-Smit; 3. When states use armed force Dino Kritsiotis; 4. Soft law, hard politics, and the Climate Change Treaty Robyn Eckersley; 5. Emerging customary norms, and anti-personnel landmines Richard Price; 6. International law, politics, and migrant rights Amy Gurowitz; 7. The International Criminal Court David Wippman; 8. The Kosovo bombing campaign Nicholas Wheeler; 9. International financial institutions Antony Anghie; 10. Law, politics, and international governance Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet; 11. Socety, power, and ethics Christian Reus-Smit. RAE2008

Product?market positioning and prospector strategy : An analysis of strategic patterns from the resource?based perspective

Morgan, R.; Strong, C.; and McGuinness, T. (2003). Product-market positioning and prospector strategy: An analysis of strategic patterns from the resource-based perspective. European Journal of Marketing. 37(10), pp.1409-1439 RAE2008

The emerging strategic partnership between the European Union and the African Union

Many among the emerging generation of political elites in Africa see the role the European Union (EU) plays in the maintenance of an unprecedented period of peace in Western Europe as an inspirational example of the manner in which the African Union (AU) can contribute to peace and stability in Africa. This doctoral thesis examines security cooperation between the EU and the AU, with a particular focus on the nature and substance of that cooperation. It suggests that despite the establishment of various EU–AU institutions and ties with a role in security policy and cooperation, such security cooperation is limited in substance. This study argues that EU–AU security cooperation is especially constrained by the emergence of alternative partners, most notably China, and by failures of implementation and follow-through. Two case studies, the first dealing with EU–AU cooperation in peacekeeping, and the second addressing the silent water crisis along with the link between water and security, have been analysed in detail to determine the effectiveness and sustainability of the EU–AU partnership. A number of important lessons for regionalism, interregionalism and multilateralism are drawn from the bond between the EU and the AU. This doctoral thesis will prove that, despite an emphasis on the problematic term ‘strategic’ by both EU and AU policymakers, EU–AU cooperation is limited and somewhat lacking in strategic direction. The cooperation between the EU and the AU focuses mainly on EU financial support for AU peacekeeping and specific projects in Africa (e.g. in the water sector), as well as on a limited political dialogue. Nonetheless, the EU–AU link represents the most comprehensive partnership the AU has with any non-African actor. This study will furthermore demonstrate that the United Nations (UN) is an indispensable third-party to their relationship and it is therefore more appropriate to speak of the AU–EU–UN nexus. This doctoral thesis concludes that the AU–EU–UN nexus is an important example of interregionalism in a global context and that such interregionalism is an important emerging part of global governance.

Justifying jihad: US politics, propaganda and the Afghan mujahedeen

Hard-line anti-communists in the United States recognised the potential for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to embroil their super-power rival in a ‘Vietnam-like quagmire.’ Their covert operation to arm the mujahedeen is well documented. This dissertation argues that propaganda and public diplomacy were powerful and essential instruments of this campaign. It examines the protagonists of this strategy, their policies, initiatives and programmes offering a comprehensive analysis heretofore absent. It stretches from the dying days of the Carter administration when Zbigniew Brzezinski saw the ‘opportunity’ presented by the invasion to the Soviet’s withdrawal in 1989. The aim of these information strategies was to damage Soviet credibility and enhance that of the US, considered under threat from growing ‘moral equivalence’ amongst international publics. The conflict could help the US regain strategic advantage in South Asia undermined by the ‘loss’ of Iran. The Reagan administration used it to justify the projection of US military might that it believed was eviscerated under Carter and emasculated by the lingering legacy of Vietnam. The research engages with source material from the Reagan Presidential Library, the United States Information Agency archives and the Library of Congress as well as a number of online archives. The material is multi-archival and multi-media including documentaries, booklets, press conferences, summit programmes and news-clips as well as national security policy documents and contemporaneous media commentary. It concludes that propaganda and public diplomacy were integral to the Reagan administration and other mujahedeen supporters’ determination to challenge the USSR. It finds that the conflict was used to justify military rearmament, further strategic aims and reassert US power. These Cold War machinations had a considerable impact on the course of the conflict and undermined efforts at resolution and reconciliation with profound implications for the future stability of Afghanistan and the world.

"Call for prices": Strategic implications of raising consumers' costs

Many consumer durable retailers often do not advertise their prices and instead ask consumers to call them for prices. It is easy to see that this practice increases the consumers' cost of learning the prices of products they are considering, yet firms commonly use such practices. Not advertising prices may reduce the firm's advertising costs, but the strategic effects of doing so are not clear. Our objective is to examine the strategic effects of this practice. In particular, how does making price discovery more difficult for consumers affect competing retailers' price, service decisions, and profits? We develop a model in which a manufacturer sells its product through a high-service retailer and a low-service retailer. Consumers can purchase the retail service at the high-end retailer and purchase the product at the competing low-end retailer. Therefore, the high-end retailer faces a free-riding problem. A retailer first chooses its optimal service levels. Then, it chooses its optimal price levels. Finally, a retailer decides whether to advertise its prices. The model results in four structures: (1) both retailers advertise prices, (2) only the low-service retailer advertises price, (3) only the high-service retailer advertises price, and (4) neither retailer advertises price. We find that when a retailer does not advertise its price and makes price discovery more difficult for consumers, the competition between the retailers is less intense. However, the retailer is forced to charge a lower price. In addition, if the competing retailer does advertise its prices, then the competing retailer enjoys higher profit margins. We identify conditions under which each of the above four structures is an equilibrium and show that a low-service retailer not advertising its price is a more likely outcome than a high-service retailer doing so. We then solve the manufacturer's problem and find that there are several instances when a retailer's advertising decisions are different from what the manufacturer would want. We describe the nature of this channel coordination problem and identify some solutions. © 2010 INFORMS.

Strategic non-cooperation as soft balancing: Why Iraq was not just about Iraq

Many commentators explain recent transatlantic rifts by pointing to diverging norms, interests and geopolitical preferences. This paper proceeds from the premise that not all situations of conflict are necessarily due to underlying deadlocked preferences. Rather, non-cooperation may be a strategic form of soft balancing. That is, more generally, if they believe that they are being shortchanged in terms of influence and payoffs, weaker states may deliberately reject possible cooperation in the short run to improve their influence vis-à-vis stronger states in the long run. This need not be due to traditional relative gains concern. States merely calculate that their reputation as a weak negotiator will erode future bargaining power and subsequently their future share of absolute gains. Strategic non-cooperation is therefore a rational signal of resolve. This paper develops the concept of strategic non-cooperation as a soft balancing tool and applies it to the Iraq case in 2002-2003. © 2005 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.