Iowa Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program, Helping Landowners Protect Iowa’s Natural Resources,January 2009

The Iowa Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program is a state, federal, local, and private partnership that provides incentives to landowners who voluntarily establish wetlands for water quality improvement in the tile-drained regions of Iowa. The goal of the program is to reduce nitrogen loads and movement of other agricultural chemicals from croplands to streams and rivers. In addition to improving water quality, these wetlands will provide wildlife habitat and increase recreational opportunities.

Biomass estimation of Triplectides egleri Sattler (Trichoptera, Leptoceridae) in a stream at Ducke Reserve, Central Amazonia

ABSTRACT Biomass is a fundamental measure for understanding the structure and functioning (e.g. fluxes of energy and nutrients in the food chain) of aquatic ecosystems. We aim to provide predictive models to estimate the biomass of Triplectides egleri Sattler, 1963, in a stream in Central Amazonia, based on body and case dimensions. We used body length, head-capsule width, interocular distance and case length and width to derive biomass estimations. Linear, exponential and power regression models were used to assess the relationship between biomass and body or case dimensions. All regression models used in the biomass estimation of T. egleri were significant. The best fit between biomass and body or case dimensions was obtained using the power model, followed by the exponential and linear models. Body length provided the best estimate of biomass. However, the dimensions of sclerotized structures (interocular distance and head-capsule width) also provided good biomass predictions, and may be useful in estimating biomass of preserved and/or damaged material. Case width was the dimension of the case that provided the best estimate of biomass. Despite the low relation, case width may be useful in studies that require low stress on individuals.

Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

Strategic behaviours in healthcare : evidence from primary care and pharmaceutical markets

We analyse the strategic behaviours of agents in a market through the appropriate¬ness of their skills to the market. If agents' skills are well adapted to market and they can reach their target, they will not need to adopt strategic behaviours. The agents will behave as selfish individuals. However, if their skills are not well adapted and they cannot attain their target alone, they will adopt strategic behaviours to reach their objectives. These behaviours will have a different impact on the utilities of other agents, depending on the skills and the objectives of the agent. If these agents need other agents to reach their objectives, they will behave as altruistic individuals who internalise the utilities of other agents in reaching their objectives and will adopt cooperative behaviours. However, if these agents fear that other agents could prevent them from reaching their target because they can foresee that the skills of other agents are better adapted than their own skills, the agents will then behave as predator individuals and will adopt destructive behaviours to attain their objective. It is in the interests of these agents to manipulate information to increase disorder and dissimulate their lack of skills. They will reproduce the strategies of animals that modify their appearance to escape predators or simulate being bait to attract their prey. These agents will seek to induce chaos into the behaviours of other agents to amplify the impact of their strategies. The appropriateness of skills to the market allows an understanding of the emer-gence of networks and associated strategies. The members of a networks are inputs who are excluded when their costs are higher than their benefits. A network simul-taneously allows cooperation and selfish, predatory behaviours among its members. A network may adopt informational strategies when seeking to become the leader in a market or when it cannot survive. The creation of networks and the manipulation of information are two overlapping evolutionary strategies, with the first strategy favouring the second. In our model, an agent does not behave like a firm that aims only to maximise the profits of the firm but rather as a member of a network who adopts strategic behaviours as a function of the interests of this network. If his skills are well adapted to the market and he can innovate, he will not invest in erroneous input; in contrast, if his skills are not adapted, the agent will invest in the erroneous input of information into the market in order to survive. Therefore, when any informational asymmetries between the agents and their principals characterise the market, the price cannot be the main element that allows equilibrium to be reached in the market; instead, the appropriateness of skills to the market enables equilibrium. We will now apply these hypotheses to explain the strategic behaviours of physicians and pharmaceutical companies.

Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and Rrommate markets

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172-186, 2011) introduced two new "population sensitivity" properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents: competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity. On various roommate market domains (marriage markets, no-odd-rings roommate markets, solvable roommate markets),we characterize the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.

Blood flow, flow reserve, and glucose utilization in viable and nonviable myocardium in patients with ischemic cardiomyopathy.

PURPOSE: The aim of the study was to determine whether glucose uptake in viable myocardium of ischemic cardiomyopathy patients depends on rest myocardial blood flow (MBF) and the residual myocardial flow reserve (MFR). METHODS: Thirty-six patients with ischemic cardiomyopathy (left ventricular ejection fraction 25 ± 10 %) were studied with N-ammonia and F-fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) positron emission tomography (PET). Twenty age-matched normals served as controls. Regional MBF was determined at rest and during dipyridamole hyperemia and regional FDG extraction was estimated from regional FDG to N-ammonia activity ratios. RESULTS: Rest MBF was reduced in viable (0.42 ± 0.18 ml/min per g) and nonviable regions (0.32 ± 0.09 ml/min per g) relative to remote regions (0.68 ± 0.23 ml/min per g, p < 0.001) and to normals (0.63 ± 0.13 ml/min per g). Dipyridamole raised MBFs in controls, remote, viable, and nonviable regions. MBFs at rest (p < 0.05) and stress (p < 0.05) in viable regions were significantly higher than that in nonviable regions, while MFRs did not differ significantly (p > 0.05). Compared to MFR in remote myocardium, MFRs in viable regions were similar (1.39 ± 0.56 vs 1.70 ± 0.45, p > 0.05) but were significantly lower in nonviable regions (1.23 ± 0.43, p < 0.001). Moreover, the FDG and thus glucose extraction was higher in viable than in remote (1.40 ± 0.14 vs 0.90 ± 0.20, p < 0.001) and in nonviable regions (1.13 ± 0.21, p < 0.001). The extraction of FDG in viable regions was independent of rest MBF but correlated inversely with MFRs (r =-0.424, p < 0.05). No correlation between the FDG extraction and MFR was observed in nonviable regions. CONCLUSION: As in the animal model, decreasing MFRs in viable myocardium are associated with increasing glucose extraction that likely reflects a metabolic adaptation of remodeling hibernating myocytes.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus