Interest rate determination in the interbank market

The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of equilibrium in the market for daily funds. We use the EONIA panel database which includes daily information on the lending rates applied by contributing commercial banks. The data clearly shows an increase in both the time series volatility and the cross section dispersion of rates towards the end of the reserve maintenance period. These increases are highly correlated. With respect to quantities, we find that the volume of trade as well as the use of the standing facilities are also larger at the end of the maintenance period. Our theoretical model shows how the operational framework of monetary policy causes a reduction in the elasticity of the supply of funds by banks throughout the reserve maintenance period. This reduction in the elasticity together with market segmentation and heterogeneity are able to generate distributions for the interest rates and quantities traded with the same properties as in the data.

Political autonomy and independence: theory and experimental evidence

We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached.

Political institutions and the development of telecommunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries' political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development. Keywords: Political constraints, telecommunications, GMM, economic development. JEL codes: O1, O3.

Political elites in federalized countries: the case of Spain (1980-2005)

This paper explores the social profile of the regional elite that has emerged in Spain since the federalization of the State. For the first time, researchers present data about crucial variables like gender, place of birth, age, education, and profession. They make interregional comparisons, and try to explain some unexpected findings like the behavior of political elites in some regions like Catalonia. The authors compare also the social profile of MPs of the two largest parties.

New evidence of the real interest rate parity for OECD countries using panel unit root tests with breaks

This paper tests for real interest parity (RIRP) among the nineteen major OECD countries over the period 1978:Q2-1998:Q4. The econometric methods applied consist of combining the use of several unit root or stationarity tests designed for panels valid under cross-section dependence and presence of multiple structural breaks. Our results strongly support the fulfillment of the weak version of the RIRP for the studied period once dependence and structural breaks are accounted for.

Political institutions and the development of telecomunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries’ political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development.

The choice of banking firm: Are the interest rate a significant criteria?

The objective of the research is to know the factors that in Spain determine the choice of banking organization. The obtained results indicate that the dimension of the network of branches is the reason more valued. In spite of the increasing symmetry of the Spanish banking market, the preferences of the clients of the savings banks and those of the banks are not absolutely coincident, being the proximity - the main reason for election- much more valued by the former than by the latter. The existence of divergences in the preferences has also been detected according to the region and the typology of city of residence.

Political alliances and organisational change in political parties: a framework for analysis

This article sets out a theoretical framework for the study of organisational change within political alliances. To achieve this objective it uses as a starting point a series of premises, the most notable of which include the definition of organisational change as a discrete, complex and focussed phenomenon of changes in power within the party. In accordance with these premises, it analyses the synthetic model of organisational change proposed by Panebianco (1988). After examining its limitations, a number of amendments are proposed to adapt it to the way political alliances operate. The above has resulted in the design of four new models. In order to test its validity and explanatory power in a preliminary manner, the second part looks at the organisational change of the UDC within the CiU alliance between 1978 and 2001. The discussion and conclusions reached demonstrate the problems of determinism of the Panebianco model and suggest, tentatively, the importance of the power balance within the alliance as a key factor.