Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Capitalism, unemployment and the transition to the contemporary pattern of growth

A new model of unemployment based on an idea of Marx is presented and used to interpret the development of the British economy from the beginning of capitalism to the present. It is shown that unemployment may be created purposely by capitalists in order to weaken the bargaining position of the workers. This mechanism leads to complex temporal pattern of unemployment and can explain why wages took almost a century and a half to react to the growing capital to labour ratio that characterised early British capitalism.

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.

On bilateral agreements: just a matter of matching

This paper aims at assessing the importance of the initial technological endowments when firms decide to establish a technological agreement. We propose a Bertrand duopoly model where firms evaluate the advantages they can get from the agreement according to its length. Allowing them to exploit a learning process, we depict a strict connection between the starting point and the final result. Moreover, as far as learning is evaluated as an iterative process, the set of initial conditions that lead to successful ventures switches from a continuum of values to a Cantor set.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Instal·lació i disseny de protocols d'operació del subdetector SPD. de LHCb. Algorismes de trigger.

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada al Laboratori Europeu de Física de Partícules (CERN), Suissa, entre maig i setembre del 2006. L’estada al laboratori CERN ha tingut dues vessants complementàries, les dues relacionades amb la imminent posada en marxa de l'experiment LHCb a finals del 2007, quan l'accelerador LHC comenci a funcionar. D'una banda, s’ha treballat en la integració del subdetector SPD en LHCb, i de l'altra al desenvolupament dels algorismes de trigger de LHCb.

Studies on Trypanosoma rangeli Tejera, 1920: V - Developmental pattern in the alimentary canal of Rhodnius prolixus

The morphological sequence of Trypanosoma rangeli development in the alimentary canal of Rhodnius prolixus, is described, with observation made in dissected guts from 6 hours to 45 days post-infection. No metacyclic-forms are produced in the digestive tract at any time, and transmission by the contaminative route must be considered atypical. Amastigotes appear to be an essential stage in the development of T. rangeli in the gut of R. prolixus. The epidemiological importance of the developmental pattern of T. rangeli in the vector´s gut is discussed, and its usefulness for aging infection is considered.

Studies on Trypanosoma rangeli Tejera 1920: VI. Developmental pattern in the haemolymph of Rhodnius prolixus

The morphological sequence of Trypanosoma rangeli development in the body cavity of Rhodnius prolixus is described. The metacyclic trypanosome is the product of successive division and transformation during the intra and extracellular development in the haemocoele. The significance of the early invasion of T. rangeli into the haemolymph is discussed. The epidemiological importance of the developmental pattern of T. rangeli in the vectors haemolymph and the host-response to the parasite are considered.

The changing pattern of pathology due to Schistosoma mansoni infection

A survey of the autopsy data on hepatosplenic schistosomiasis during periods, before and after the advent of new chemotherapeutic drugs, revealed that: a) the pathological presentation was the same for the two periods; b) the number of cases in the last five years is progressively decreasing; c) hepatosplenic disease due to schistosomiasis is becoming rare in young people. These data represent a change in the pattern of pathology in schistosomiasis, probably related to new chemotherapy.

New FFT/IFFT Factorizations with Regular Interconnection Pattern Stage-to-Stage Subblocks

Les factoritzacions de la FFT (Fast Fourier Transform) que presenten un patró d’interconnexió regular entre factors o etapes son conegudes com algorismes paral·lels, o algorismes de Pease, ja que foren originalment proposats per Pease. En aquesta contribució s’han desenvolupat noves factoritzacions amb blocs que presenten el patró d’interconnexió regular de Pease. S’ha mostrat com aquests blocs poden ser obtinguts a una escala prèviament seleccionada. Les noves factoritzacions per ambdues FFT i IFFT (Inverse FFT) tenen dues classes de factors: uns pocs factors del tipus Cooley-Tukey i els nous factors que proporcionen la mateix patró d’interconnexió de Pease en blocs. Per a una factorització donada, els blocs comparteixen dimensions, el patró d’interconnexió etapa a etapa i a més cada un d’ells pot ser calculat independentment dels altres.