A Viable Alternative to Basel III Prudential Capital Rules. CEPS Policy Brief No. 291, May 2013

Stefano Micossi argues in this paper that the Basel framework for bank prudential requirements is deeply flawed and that the Basel III revision has failed to correct these flaws, making the system even more complicated, opaque and open to manipulation. In practice, he finds that the present system does not offer regulators and financial markets a reliable capital standard for banks and its divergent implementation in the main jurisdictions of the European Union and the United States has broken the market into special fiefdoms governed by national regulators in response to untoward special interests. The time is ripe to stop tinkering with minor adjustment and revisions in order to rescue the system, because the system cannot be rescued. In response to the current situation, Micossi calls for abandoning reference to risk-weighted assets calculated by banks with their internal risk management models for the determination of banks’ prudential capital, together with the preoccupation with the asset side of banks in correcting for risk exposure. He suggests that the alternative may be provided by a combination of a straight capital ratio and a properly designed deposit insurance system. It is a logical, complete and much less distortive alternative; it would serve better the cause of financial stability as well as the interest of the banks in clear, transparent and level playing field.

Geopolitical shifts in the Eastern Mediterranean. Security Policy Brief No. 43, February 2013

Three major geopolitical events are putting the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean at risk. Most of the region is in a deep monetary and economic crisis. The Arab Spring is causing turmoil in the Levant and the Maghreb. Gas and oil discoveries, if not well managed, could further destabilise the region. At the same time, Russia and Turkey are staging a comeback. In the face of these challenges, the EU approaches the Greek sovereign debt crisis nearly exclusively from a financial and economic viewpoint. This brief argues that the EU has to develop a comprehensive strategy for the region, complementing its existing multilateral regional framework with bilateral agreements in order to secure its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Pool it, share it, use it: the European Council on defence. Security Policy Brief No. 44, March 2013

Three major geopolitical events are putting the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean at risk. Most of the region is in a deep monetary and economic crisis. The Arab Spring is causing turmoil in the Levant and the Maghreb. Gas and oil discoveries, if not well managed, could further destabilise the region. At the same time, Russia and Turkey are staging a comeback. In the face of these challenges, the EU approaches the Greek sovereign debt crisis nearly exclusively from a financial and economic viewpoint. This brief argues that the EU has to develop a comprehensive strategy for the region, complementing its existing multilateral regional framework with bilateral agreements in order to secure its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The euro area's tightrope walk: debt and competitiveness in Italy and Spain. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/11, September 2013

Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.

Microcredit and EU Cohesion Policy

After nearly four years of the most serious financial and economic crisis Europe has seen in 80 years, most EU Member States are facing high budget deficits, growing public debts, while most entrepreneurs are facing difficulties in accessing finance due to the credit crunch. Meanwhile there are more than 23 million unemployed in the EU and unemployment rates have reached an average of 10% and more than 20% in Greece and Spain1. Microcredit can provide an answer to the employment challenges caused by the current economic crisis and to reach the 75% employment target rate set in the Europe 2020 strategy.

Does the European Semester deliver the right policy advice? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/12, 20 September 2013

The July 2013 European Council recommendations to the euro area recognise a number of fiscal and macrostructural challenges, but do not fully exploit the options made possible by the European economic governance framework. There are particular problems with the Council's suggestions for the euro area as whole, which are not (or not adequately) reflected by the country-specific recommendations. A major drawback is that the Council recommendations do not give sufficient importance to symmetric intra-euro area adjustments. Reference to the euro area's ‘aggregate fiscal stance’ is empty rhetoric. Insufficient attention is paid to demand management. The most comprehensive recommendations are made on structural reforms. The July/August 2013 Article IV IMF recommendations on macroeconomic policies could also have been more ambitious, but they correspond better to the economic situation of the euro area than the Council’s recommendations. The President of the Eurogroup should continue discussions on the completion of the economic governance framework, including completion of the banking union and the setting-up of a euro-area institution responsible for managing the euro area’s aggregate fiscal stance.

Memo to Merkel: Post-election Germany and Europe. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/05, 24 September 2013

Recent economic data points to the seeds of an economic recovery in the European Union. However, significant risks remain and bold policies are still needed. There are three central risks. Competitiveness adjustment is incomplete, casting doubt on the sustainability of public debt. Banking remains unstable and fragmented along national lines, resulting in unfavorable financial conditions, which further erode growth, job creation and competitiveness. Rising unemployment, especially among the young, is inequitable, unjust and politically risky. Germany has a central role to play in addressing these risks. The new German government should work on three priorities: Domestic economic policy should be more supportive of growth and adjustment, with higher public investment, a greater role for high-value added services, and more supportive immigration policy. Germany should support a meaningful banking union with a centralised resolution mechanism requiring a transfer of sovereignty to Europe for all countries including Germany. The establishment of a private investment initiative combined with a European Youth Education Fund and labour market reforms should be promoted. Building on these priorities, a significant deepening of the euro area is needed, with a genuine transfer of sovereignty, stronger institutions and democratically legitimate decision-making structures in areas of common policy.

Reviewing the EU's market abuse rules. ECMI Policy Brief No. 19, 27 February 2012

Updated May 2012 and reposted: In 2011, an EU legislative package on market abuse was proposed, which comprises two sets of documents: 1) a draft Regulation that will largely replace the existing Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and the level 2 measures; and a new Directive dealing with criminal sanctions. Market abuse rules are needed to ensure market integrity and investor confidence, and to allow companies to raise capital and contribute to economic growth, thereby increasing employment. This ECMI Policy Brief argues that rules on market abuse should be technically well designed, proportionate and crystal clear, but also subject to more efficient and harmonised supervision than before. The paper focuses particularly on the draft Regulation. The use of a regulation is welcome, as (in integrated financial markets) abuses should be regulated in a harmonised manner by member states, which has not always been the case, as the 2007 report from the European Securities Markets Expert (ESME) Group extensively demonstrated. At the same time, this paper criticises some of the provisions contained in the draft Regulation, notably the new notion of inside information not to abuse (Art. 6(e)) and the unchanged definition of inside information for listed companies to disclose, and it proposes new definitions. The extension of disclosure obligations to issuers whose shares are traded on demand only on ‘listing’ multilateral trading facilities is also widely criticised. Other comments deal with the proposed rules on managers’ transactions, insiders’ lists and accepted market practices.

The European Central Bank in the age of banking union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/13, 1 October 2013

During the crisis the European Central Bank’s roles have been greatly extended beyond its price stability mandate. In addition to the primary objective of price stability and the secondary objective of supporting EU economic policies, we identify ten new tasks related to monetary policy and financial stability. We argue that there are three main constraints on monetary policy: fiscal dominance, financial repercussions and regional divergences. By assessing the ECB’s tasks in light of these constraints, we highlight a number of synergies between these tasks and the ECB’s primary mandate of price stability. But we highlight major conflicts of interest related to the ECB’s participation in financial assistance programmes. We also underline that the ECB’s government bond purchasing programmes have introduced the concept of ‘monetary policy under conditionality’, which involves major dilemmas. A solution would be a major change towards a US-style system, in which state public debts are small, there are no federal bail-outs for states, the central bank does not purchase state debt and banks do not hold state debt. Such a change is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.

Who decides? Resolving failed banks in a European framework. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/16, 29 November 2013

As the basis for a European regime for resolving failing and failed banks, the European Commission has proposed the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) and a regulation establishing a European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a Single Bank Resolution Fund (SBRF). There is a debate about which parts of the proposed SRM-SBRF to add to the BRRD. The BRRD sets out a resolution toolkit that can be used by national resolution authorities. The SRM would involve European institutions more at the expense of national resolution authorities. This change could affect resolution outcomes. Domestic resolution authorities might be more generous than supranational authorities in providing assistance to banks. A supranational approach might be more effective in minimising costs for taxpayers. But regardless of the final design, more attention is needed to ensure that resolution authorities are politically independent from governments. When public support is provided to failed institutions it should come from a bankfunded resolution fund. This would reduce taxpayers’ direct costs, and would make banks less likely to take risks and advocate for bailouts.

Global and regional financial safety nets: lessons from Europe and Asia. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/06 [07?], November 2013

The Asian financial crisis (1997) and the European crisis (2009) have both contributed to the development and deepening of regional safety net arrangements. This paper analyses the relationships between global and regional financial safety nets, and uncovers the potential tensions and operational challenges associated with the involvement of several institutional players with potentially different interests, analytical biases and governance. The G20 has acknowledged the importance of these new players for the international monetary system, but the principles for cooperation between the IMF and regional financing arrangements are far too broad and ad hoc to contribute to a coherent and effective architecture. This paper tries to establish some lessons learned from the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the current European crisis in order to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency, equity and governance of these arrangements. In particular, it proposes changes to the IMF articles of agreement to allow for lending or guarantees to regional arrangements directly and it establishes some key desirable features and practices of regional mechanisms that should be adopted everywhere to ensure some global consistency, particularly in the field of macroeconomic surveillance, programme design and conditionality.

Strong governments, weak banks. CEPS Policy Brief No. 305, 25 November 2013

Banks in the northern eurozone have capital ratios that are, on average, less than half of the capital ratios of banks in the eurozone’s periphery. The authors explain this by the fact that northern eurozone banks profit from the financial solidity of their governments and follow business strategies aimed at issuing too much subsidised debt. In doing so, they weaken their balance sheets and become more fragile – less able to withstand future shocks. Paradoxically, financially strong governments breed fragile banks. The opposite occurs in countries with financially weak governments. In these countries banks are forced to strengthen themselves because they are unable to rely on their governments. As a result they have significantly more capital and reserves than banks in the northern eurozone. Recommendations More than in the south, the governments of northern Europe should stand up and force the banks to issue more equity. This should go much further than what is foreseen in the Basel III accord. If the experience of the southern eurozone countries is any guide, banks in the north of the eurozone should at least double the capital and the reserves as a percentage of their balance sheets. Failure to do so risks destroying the financial solidity of the northern European governments when, in the future, negative shocks force these governments to come to the rescue of their undercapitalised banks. The new responsibilities entrusted to the European Central Bank as the single supervisor in the eurozone create a unique opportunity for that institution to change the regulatory and supervisory culture in the eurozone – one that has allowed the large banks to continue living dangerously, with insufficient capital.

The new European framework for managing bank crises. CEPS Policy Brief No. 304, 21 November 2013

This Policy Brief describes and discusses the proposals for a European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for banks and for a Directive on Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR). The authors find that the proposals are generally well designed and present a consistent approach, yet there is room for improvement, including the streamlining of procedures for the start of resolution, which now entail much overlap in the powers attributed to the various institutions involved (the Commission, the Single Resolution Board and the European Central Bank). The paper makes a number of key recommendations to facilitate discussions for stakeholders and regulators.

The macroeconomic imbalance procedure and Germany: when is a current account surplus an 'imbalance'? CEPS Policy Brief No. 301, 13 November 2013

In this new Policy Brief, CEPS Director Daniel Gros argues that the 13 November announcement of the European Commission that Germany is running an excessive current account surplus appears to be much ado about little. All the Commission can, and will, do is to start an ‘in depth analysis’. This might lead to strong political reactions and an enormous echo in the media. But nothing of concrete substance is likely to follow.

Transaction Banking: Respecting its role in the real economy. ECRI Policy Brief No. 6, 6 December 2013

This paper sketches the main features and issues related to recent market developments in global transaction banking (GTB), particularly in trade finance, cash management and correspondent banking. It describes the basic functioning of the GTB, its interaction with global financial markets and related implications of global regulatory developments such as Basel III. The interest in GTB has recently increased, since its low-risk profile, tendency to follow growth rates worldwide and relative independence from other financial instruments became an interesting diversification opportunity both for banks’ business models and for investors. Transaction banking has been a resilient business during the crisis, despite the reduction in world trade figures. In the post crisis period, GTB must cope with new challenges related to increased local and global regulation and the risk of inconsistency in regulatory approaches, which could negatively impact the global network and increased competition by new market entrants. Increased sophistication of corporate clients, as well as the pressure to develop and adopt technological innovations more quickly than other areas of banking continues to impact the business. The future of the industry closely depends on its ability to adjust to complex regulatory developments while at the same time being able to operate a global and efficient network.