Twelve factors influencing sustainable recycling of municipal solid waste in developing countries

Sustainable management of solid waste is a global concern, as exemplified by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG) that 191 member states support. The seventh MDG indirectly advocates for municipal solid waste management (MSWM) by aiming to ensure environmental sustainability into countries’ policies and programs and reverse negative environmental impact. Proper MSWM will likely result in relieving poverty, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, and preventing disease, which are MDG goals one, four, five, and six, respectively (UNMDG, 2005). Solid waste production is increasing worldwide as the global society strives to obtain a decent quality of life. Several means exist in which the amount of solid waste going to a landfill can be reduced, such as incineration with energy production, composting of organic wastes, and material recovery through recycling, which are all considered sustainable methods by which to manage MSW. In the developing world, composting is already a widely-accepted method to reduce waste fated for the landfill, and incineration for energy recovery can be a costly capital investment for most communities. Therefore, this research focuses on recycling as a solution to the municipal solid waste production problem while considering the three dimensions of sustainability environment, society, and economy. First, twenty-three developing country case studies were quantitatively and qualitatively examined for aspects of municipal solid waste management. The municipal solid waste (MSW) generation and recovery rates, as well as the composition were compiled and assessed. The average MSW generation rate was 0.77 kg/person/day, with recovery rates varying from 5 – 40%. The waste streams of nineteen of these case studies consisted of 0 – 70% recyclable material and 17 – 80% organic material. All twenty-three case studies were analyzed qualitatively by identifying any barriers or incentives to recycling, which justified the creation of twelve factors influencing sustainable municipal solid waste management (MSWM) in developing countries. The presence of regulations, enforcement of laws, and use of incentive schemes constitutes the first factor, Government Policy. Cost of MSWM operations, the budget allocated to MSWM by local to national governments, as well as the stability and reliability of funds comprise the Government Finances factor influencing recycling in the third world. Many case studies indicated that understanding features of a waste stream such as the generation and recovery rates and composition is the first measure in determining proper management solutions, which forms the third factor Waste Characterization. The presence and efficiency of waste collection and segregation by scavengers, municipalities, or private contractors was commonly addressed by the case studies, which justified Waste Collection and Segregation as the fourth factor. Having knowledge of MSWM and an understanding of the linkages between human behavior, waste handling, and health/sanitation/environment comprise the Household Education factor. Individuals’ income influencing waste handling behavior (e.g., reuse, recycling, and illegal dumping), presence of waste collection/disposal fees, and willingness to pay by residents were seen as one of the biggest incentives to recycling, which justified them being combined into the Household Economics factor. The MSWM Administration factor was formed following several references to the presence and effectiveness of private and/or public management of waste through collection, recovery, and disposal influencing recycling activity. Although the MSWM Personnel Education factor was only recognized by six of the twenty-two case studies, the lack of trained laborers and skilled professionals in MSWM positions was a barrier to sustainable MSWM in every case but one. The presence and effectiveness of a comprehensive, integrative, long-term MSWM strategy was highly encouraged by every case study that addressed the tenth factor, MSWM Plan. Although seemingly a subset of private MSWM administration, the existence and profitability of market systems relying on recycled-material throughput, involvement of small businesses, middlemen, and large industries/exporters is deserving of the factor Local Recycled-Material Market. Availability and effective use of technology and/or human workforce and the safety considerations of each were recurrent barriers and incentives to recycling to warrant the Technological and Human Resources factor. The Land Availability factor takes into consideration land attributes such as terrain, ownership, and development which can often times dictate MSWM. Understanding the relationships among the twelve factors influencing recycling in developing countries, made apparent the collaborative nature required of sustainable MSWM. Factors requiring the greatest collaborative inputs include waste collection and segregation, MSWM plan, and local recycled-material market. Aligning each factor to the societal, environmental, and economic dimensions of sustainability revealed the motives behind the institutions contributing to each factor. A correlation between stakeholder involvement and sustainability existed, as supported by the fact that the only three factors driven by all three dimensions of sustainability were the same three that required the greatest collaboration with other factors. With increasing urbanization, advocating for improved health for all through the MDG, and changing consumption patterns resulting in increasing and more complex waste streams, the utilization of the collaboration web offered by this research is ever needed in the developing world. Through its use, the institutions associated with each of the twelve factors can achieve a better understanding of the collaboration necessary and beneficial for more sustainable MSWM.

Cumulative costs for the prosthetic reconstructions and maintenance in young adult patients with birth defects affecting the formation of teeth

OBJECTIVES: To assess retrospectively the cumulative costs for the long-term oral rehabilitation of patients with birth defects affecting the development of teeth. METHODS: Patients with birth defects who had received fixed reconstructions on teeth and/or implants > or =5 years ago were asked to participate in a comprehensive clinical, radiographic and economic evaluation. RESULTS: From the 45 patients included, 18 were cases with a cleft lip and palate, five had amelogenesis/dentinogenesis imperfecta and 22 were cases with hypodontia/oligodontia. The initial costs for the first oral rehabilitation (before the age of 20) had been covered by the Swiss Insurance for Disability. The costs for the initial rehabilitation of the 45 cases amounted to 407,584 CHF (39% for laboratory fees). Linear regression analyses for the initial treatment costs per replaced tooth revealed the formula 731 CHF+(811 CHF x units) on teeth and 3369 CHF+(1183 CHF x units) for reconstructions on implants (P<.001). Fifty-eight percent of the patients with tooth-supported reconstructions remained free from failures/complications (median observation 15.7 years). Forty-seven percent of the patients with implant-supported reconstructions remained free from failures/complications (median observation 8 years). The long-term cumulative treatment costs for implant cases, however, were not statistically significantly different compared with cases reconstructed with tooth-supported fixed reconstructions. Twenty-seven percent of the initial treatment costs were needed to cover supportive periodontal therapy as well as the treatment of technical/biological complications and failures. CONCLUSION: Insurance companies should accept to cover implant-supported reconstructions because there is no need to prepare healthy teeth, fewer tooth units need to be replaced and the cumulative long-term costs seem to be similar compared with cases restored on teeth.

Open Source und Kartellrecht

„Open source and European antitrust laws: An analysis of copyleft and the prohibition of software license fees on the basis of art. 101 TFEU and the block exemptions“ Open source software and open source licenses (like the GNU GPL) are not only relevant for computer nerds or activists – they are already business. They are for example the fundament of LINUX, the only real rival of MICROSOFT’s WINDOWS-line in the field of operating systems for IBM PC compatibles. Art. 101 TFEU (like the identical predecessor art. 81 TEC) as part of the EU antitrust laws prohibits contract terms like price fixing and some forms of technology control. Are copyleft – the „viral effect“, the „cancer“ – and the interdiction of software license fees in the cross hairs of this legal rule? On the other side the European Union has since 2004 a new Technology Transfer Block Exemption with software license agreements for the first time in its scope: a safe harbour and a dry place under a umbrella for open source software? After the introduction (A) with a description of open source software the following text analyses the system of the European Unions competition law respectivley antitrust law and the requirements of the block exemptions (B). Starting point of antitrust analysis are undertakings – but who are the untertakings (C) in the field of widespread, independent developers as part of the „bazar organization“? To see how much open source has to fear from the law of the European Union, at the end the anti competitive and pro competitive effects of open source are totalized within the legal framework (D). The conclusion (E) shows: not nothing, but not much.

The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Cost of Going Public

This paper examines the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), a legal framework intended to increase transparency and accountability of listed companies, on the cost of going public in the US. We expect SOX to increase the direct cost of going public, but decrease the underpricing because of reduced asymmetric information. Our main results corroborate these hypotheses. First, we find an increase in the cost of going public of 90 bp of gross proceeds. Second, we record a reduction in underpricing of 6 pp, which is related to a reduced offer price adjustment. This supports our hypothesis that SOX represents a mechanism to reduce asymmetric information.

Iowa State Daily (April 26, 2012)

Contents'This is an American Issue': Obama discusses rising tuition fees in Iowa City visitIowa State gears up for Drake RelaysISU policies set in place to prevent discriminationEvent shows off innovationFreedom's flame burns brightLocusic site focuses on local talent

General Catalog 1987–1989, Iowa State University Bulletin

The Iowa State University Bulletin is a general catalog of information regarding fees, curricula and related policies and procedures.

Iowa State University Bulletin, General Catalog 1991–93

The Iowa State University Bulletin is a general catalog of information regarding fees, curricula and related policies and procedures.

General Catalog 1985–87, Iowa State University Bulletin

The Iowa State University Bulletin is a general catalog of information regarding fees, curricula and related policies and procedures.

Iowa State University Bulletin, General Catalog 1995–97

The Iowa State University Bulletin is a general catalog of information regarding fees, curricula and related policies and procedures.

Iowa State University Bulletin, General Catalog 1993–95

The Iowa State University Bulletin is a general catalog of information regarding fees, curricula and related policies and procedures.

General Catalog 1983–85, Iowa State University Bulletin

The Iowa State University Bulletin is a general catalog of information regarding fees, curricula and related policies and procedures.

General Catalog 1989–1991, Iowa State University Bulletin

The Iowa State University Bulletin is a general catalog of information regarding fees, curricula and related policies and procedures.

Ethical procedures and patient consent differ in Europe.

BACKGROUND Research ethics approvals, procedures and requirements for institutional research ethics committees vary considerably by country and by type of organisation. OBJECTIVE To evaluate the requirements and procedures of research ethics committees, details of patient information and informed consent based on a multicentre European trial. DESIGN Survey of European hospitals participating in the prospective observational study on chronic postsurgical pain (euCPSP) using electronic questionnaires. SETTING Twenty-four hospitals in 11 European countries. PARTICIPANTS From the 24 hospitals, 23 local investigators responded; 23 answers were analysed. OUTCOME MEASURES Comparison of research ethics procedures and committee requirements from the perspective of clinical researchers. Comparison of the institutions' procedures regarding patient information and consent. Description of further details such as costs and the duration of the approval process. RESULTS The approval process lasted from less than 2 weeks up to more than 2 months with financial fees varying between 0 and 575 &OV0556;. In 20 hospitals, a patient information sheet of variable length (half page up to two pages) was provided. Requirements for patients' informed consent differed. Written informed consent was mandatory at 12, oral at 10 and no form of consent at one hospital. Details such as enough time for consideration, possibility for withdrawal and risks/benefits of participation were provided in 25 to 30% of the institutions. CONCLUSION There is a considerable variation in the administrative requirements for approval procedures by research ethics committees in Europe. This results in variation of the extent of information and consent procedures for the patients involved. TRIAL REGISTRATION euCPSP in Clinicaltrials.gov identifier: NCT01467102; PAIN-OUT in Clinicaltrials.gov identifier: NCT02083835.

An Experimental Study of Complex-Offer Auctions: Payment Cost Minimization vs. Offer Cost Minimization

A Payment Cost Minimization (PCM) auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization (OCM) auction to be used in wholesale electric power markets with the intention to lower the procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns about this proposal have relied on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using an experimental approach, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that both auctions result in start-up fees that are significantly higher than the start-up costs. Overall, the two auctions perform similarly in terms of procurement cost and efficiency. Surprisingly, I do not find a substantial difference between less market power and more market power designs. Both designs result in similar inefficiencies and equally higher procurement costs over the competitive prediction. The PCM auction tends to have lower price volatility than the OCM auction when the market power is minimal but this property vanishes in the designs with market power. These findings lead me to conclude that both the PCM and the OCM auctions do not belong to the class of truth revealing mechanisms and do not easily elicit competitive behavior.

Simple-Offer vs. Complex-Offer Auctions in Deregulated Electricity Markets

In my recent experimental research of wholesale electricity auctions, I discovered that the complex structure of the offers leaves a lot of room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti- competitive and inefficient outcomes in the market. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. In this paper, using the experimental method I compare the performance of two complex-offer auctions (COAs) against the performance of a simple-offer auction (SOA), in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs --- fixed and variable ---through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that the SOA significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the COAs and achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.