The wage effect of an indexation clause: Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms

An endogenous switching model of ex-ante wage changes under indexed and non-indexed settlements is estimated for the Spanish manufacturing sector using collective bargaining firm data for the 1984-1991 period. The likelihood of indexing the settlement is higher for nationwide unions than for other union groups within the works council and increases with the expected level of inflation. For wage change equations, a common structure for indexed and non-indexed settlements is strongly rejected, showing a source of nominal rigidity. For indexed contracts, the expected ex-ante total inflation coverage is nearly complete. It is also shown that workers pay a significant ex-ante wage change premium (differential) to obtain a cost of living allowance clause. However, the realised contingent compensation exceeds such a premium for all industries. Finally, important spillover effects in wage setting and the decision to index the settlement have been detected.

Wage determination in the Spanish industry

In this paper we estimate wage equations for the Spanish industryusing time series data on 85 industrial sectors, which allows us todistinguish between aggregate and sector specific effects in wagedetermination. Industry wages respond mainly to economy wide labourmarket conditions and to a much lesser extent to sector specificproductivity gains. The size of the insider effect has not remainedstable through the sample period. The estimated equations show a strongtransitory effect of unemployment on wages, which is in accordancewith the non--stationarity of the Spanish unemployment rate. Thishysteresis effect seems well accounted for by the sharp rise in theproportion of long term unemployment.

Compensating wage differentials and voluntary job changes: Evidence from West Germany

Does the labor market place wage premia on jobs that involve physical strain,job, insecurity or bad regulation of hours? This paper derives bounds on themonetary returns to these job disamenities in the West German labor market.We show that in a market with dispersion in both job characteristics andwages, the average wage change of workers who switch jobs voluntarily and optfor consuming more (less) disamenities,provides an upper (lower) bound on themarket return to the disamenity. Using longitudinal information from workersin the German Socio Economic Panel, we estimate an upper bound of 5% and alower bound of 3.5% for the market return to work strain in a job.

Globalization and wage inequality in South and East Asia, and Latin America: A gender approach

In this paper we analyse the reasons behind the evolution of the gender gap and wage inequality in South and East Asian and Latin American countries. Health human capital improvements, the exposure to free market openness and equal treatment enforcement laws seem to be the main exogenous variables affecting women s economic condition. During the second globalization era (in the years 1975-2000) different combinations of these variables in South East Asian and Latin American countries have had as a result the diminution of the gender gap. The main exception to this rule according to our data is China where economic reforms have been simultaneous to the increase of gender differences and inequality between men and women.This result has further normative consequences for the measure of economic inequality. Theimprovement of women s condition has as a result the diminution of the dispersion of wages.Therefore in most of the countries analysed the consequence of the diminution of the gender gapduring the second global era is the decrease of wage inequality both measured with Gini and Theil indexes.

Real wage rigidities and the new Keynesian model

Most central banks perceive a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade-off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of non trivial real imperfections.We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation-unemployment relation found in the data.

An investigation of the relationship between job characteristics and the gender wage gap

This paper re-examines gender wage differences, taking into account notonly worker characteristics but also job characteristics. Considerationof a wide set of job quality indicators can explain a fraction of thewage gap that would otherwise be attributed to pure wage discrimination.In any case, the fraction of the wage gap that remains associated todifferential rewards for identical factors across sexes is stillsubstantial. Our results suggest that in order to avoid overestimationof the fraction of the wage gap attributable to discrimination, it isnecessary to control for job characteristics.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Attentional networks efficiency in preterm children.

Recent studies have reported specific executive and attentional deficits in preterm children. However, the majority of this research has used multidetermined tasks to assess these abilities, and the interpretation of the results lacks an explicit theoretical backdrop to better understand the origin of the difficulties observed. In the present study, we used the Child Attention Network Task (Child ANT; Rueda et al. 2004) to assess the efficiency of the alerting, orienting and executive control networks. We compared the performance of 25 preterm children (gestational age < or = 32 weeks) to 25 full-term children, all between 5(1/2) and 6(1/2) years of age. Results showed that, as compared to full-term children, preterm children were slower on all conditions of the Child ANT and had a specific deficit in executive control abilities. We also observed a significantly higher correlation between the orienting and executive control networks in the preterm group, suggesting less differentiation of these two networks in this population.

Understanding portfolio efficiency with conditioning information

We show that unconditionally efficient returns do not achieve the maximum unconditionalSharpe ratio, neither display zero unconditional Jensen s alphas, when returns arepredictable. Next, we define a new type of efficient returns that is characterized by thoseunconditional properties. We also study a different type of efficient returns that is rationalizedby standard mean-variance preferences and motivates new Sharpe ratios and Jensen salphas. We revisit the testable implications of asset pricing models from the perspective ofthe three sets of efficient returns. We also revisit the empirical evidence on the conditionalvariants of the CAPM and the Fama-French model from a portfolio perspective.

Wage structures and family economies in the Catalan textile industry in an age of nascent capitalism

This paper deals with changes in managerial practices in Catalonia in anage of nascent capitalism (1830-1925) and adaptive family strategies inorder to face the absence of state welfare. During the 19 t h Century andin the absence of recorded labor contracts, human resources of the firmwere organized by means of implicit contracts and informal labor markets.With the advent of scientific organization of labor, wage per hour workedbegan to be recorded. This is why in the 1920s the perfect competitionmodel applies to our case. On the other hand, in the same period, and inthe absence of state welfare, ideas stemming from cooperative game theoryapply to the pattern of household income formation. Kin related networkswere used to improve the living standards of the household. In thisparticular direction we also show that there was a demonstration effectby means of which migrant s living standards were higher than those ofnatives.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.