The relative success of recognition-based inference in multichoice decisions

The utility of an "ecologically rational" recognition-based decision rule in multichoice decision problems is analyzed, varying the type of judgment required (greater or lesser). The maximum size and range of a counterintuitive advantage associated with recognition-based judgment (the "less-is-more effect") is identified for a range of cue validity values. Greater ranges of the less-is-more effect occur when participants are asked which is the greatest of to choices (m > 2) than which is the least. Less-is-more effects also have greater range for larger values of in. This implies that the classic two-altemative forced choice task, as studied by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), may not be the most appropriate test case for less-is-more effects.

Contextual emergence of mental states from neurodynamics

The emergence of mental states from neural states by partitioning the neural phase space is analyzed in terms of symbolic dynamics. Well-defined mental states provide contexts inducing a criterion of structural stability for the neurodynamics that can be implemented by particular partitions. This leads to distinguished subshifts of finite type that are either cyclic or irreducible. Cyclic shifts correspond to asymptotically stable fixed points or limit tori whereas irreducible shifts are obtained from generating partitions of mixing hyperbolic systems. These stability criteria are applied to the discussion of neural correlates of consiousness, to the definition of macroscopic neural states, and to aspects of the symbol grounding problem. In particular, it is shown that compatible mental descriptions, topologically equivalent to the neurodynamical description, emerge if the partition of the neural phase space is generating. If this is not the case, mental descriptions are incompatible or complementary. Consequences of this result for an integration or unification of cognitive science or psychology, respectively, will be indicated.

Children’s understanding of counterfactual alternatives

This study examines how children integrate information about counterfactual alternatives in making judgments. Previous research in adults had shown that they make judgments on the basis of comparisons between factual events and counterfactual alternatives. We suggest that children adopt a summative strategy instead, where they focus on the presented outcomes, both real and counterfactual, and base their judgments on the overall affective quality of these outcomes. Results from a single experiment comparing adults’ and children’s responses to a counterfactual judgment task show that children do tend to use a summative strategy as opposed to the comparative strategy adopted by adults. These results were further supported by participants’ justifications of their judgments, which were alternative focused for the adults, but outcome focused for the children. The results are discussed in relation to complexity-based theories of the development of human reasoning.

Rich and famous: recognition-based judgment in the Sunday Times rich list

Recognition as a cue to judgment in a novel, multi-option domain (the Sunday Times Rich List) is explored. As in previous studies, participants were found to make use of name recognition as a cue to the presumed wealth of individuals. Names that were recognized were judged to be the richest name from amongst the set presented at above chance levels. This effect persisted across situations in which more than one name was recognized; recognition was used as an inclusion criterion for the sub-set of names to be considered the richest of the set presented. However, when the question was reversed, and a “poorest” judgment was required, use of recognition as an exclusion criterion was observed only when a single name was recognized. Reaction times when making these judgments also show a distinction between “richest” and “poorest” questions with recognition of none of the options taking the longest time to judge in the “richest” question condition and full recognition of all the names presented taking longest to judge in the “poorest” question condition. Implications for decision-making using simple heuristics are discussed.

Deciding the price of fame

Previous studies of ignorance-driven decision-making have either analyzed when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds, or else they have examined whether human behavior is consistent with an ignorance driven inference strategy (e.g., the recognition heuristic). The current study merges these research goals by examining whether – under conditions where ignorance driven inference might be expected – the type of advantages theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgments, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgments. Their wealth judgments under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all the names (the “less-is-more effect”). these data are robust against a number of variations on the size of the pool from which participants have to choose and the nature of the wealth judgment.

Phonological similarity effects without a phonological store: an individual differences model

The feature model of immediate memory (Nairne, 1990) is applied to an experiment testing individual differences in phonological confusions amongst a group (N=100) of participants performing a verbal memory test. By simulating the performance of an equivalent number of “pseudo-participants” the model fits both the mean performance and the variability within the group. Experimental data show that high-performing individuals are significantly more likely to demonstrate phonological confusions than low performance individuals and this is also true of the model, despite the model’s lack of either an explicit phonological store or a performance-linked strategy shift away from phonological storage. It is concluded that a dedicated phonological store is not necessary to explain the basic phonological confusion effect, and the reduction in such an effect can also be explained without requiring a change in encoding or rehearsal strategy or the deployment of a different storage buffer.

When does ignorance make us smart? Additional factors guiding heuristic inference

“Fast & frugal” heuristics represent an appealing way of implementing bounded rationality and decision-making under pressure. The recognition heuristic is the simplest and most fundamental of these heuristics. Simulation and experimental studies have shown that this ignorance-driven heuristic inference can prove superior to knowledge based inference (Borges, Goldstein, Ortman & Gigerenzer, 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) and have shown how the heuristic could develop from ACT-R’s forgetting function (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). Mathematical analyses also demonstrate that, under certain conditions, a “less-is-more effect” will always occur (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). The further analyses presented in this paper show, however, that these conditions may constitute a special case and that the less-is-more effect in decision-making is subject to the moderating influence of the number of options to be considered and the framing of the question.

Less-is-more effects in knowledge-based heuristic inference

Inference on the basis of recognition alone is assumed to occur prior to accessing further information (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). A counterintuitive result of this is the “less-is-more” effect: a drop in the accuracy with which choices are made as to which of two or more items scores highest on a given criterion as more items are learned (Frosch, Beaman & McCloy, 2007; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). In this paper, we show that less-is-more effects are not unique to recognition-based inference but can also be observed with a knowledge-based strategy provided two assumptions, limited information and differential access, are met. The LINDA model which embodies these assumptions is presented. Analysis of the less-is-more effects predicted by LINDA and by recognition-driven inference shows that these occur for similar reasons and casts doubt upon the “special” nature of recognition-based inference. Suggestions are made for empirical tests to compare knowledge-based and recognition-based less-is-more effects

Lexical access across languages: a multinomial model of auditory distraction

Recall in many types of verbal memory task is reliably disrupted by the presence of auditory distracters, with verbal distracters frequently proving the most disruptive (Beaman, 2005). A multinomial processing tree model (Schweickert, 1993) is applied to the effects on free recall of background speech from a known or an unknown language. The model reproduces the free recall curve and the impact on memory of verbal distracters for which a lexical entry exists (i.e., verbal items from a known language). The effects of semantic relatedness of distracters within a language is found to depend upon a redintegrative factor thought to reflect the contribution of the speech-production system. The differential impacts of known and unknown languages cannot be accounted for in this way, but the same effects of distraction are observed amongst bilinguals, regardless of distracter-language.