Farm income, population and farmland prices: a relative information approach

This paper uses an entropy-based information approach to determine if farmland values are more closely associated with urban pressure or farm income. The basic question is: how much information on changes in farm real estate values is contained in changes in population versus changes in returns to production agriculture? Results suggest population is informative, but changes in farmland values are more strongly associated with changes in the distribution of returns. However, this relationship is not true for every region nor does it hold over time, as for some regions and time periods changes in population are more informative. Results have policy implications for both equity and efficiency.

Farmers’ willingness to pay for a tuberculosis cattle vaccine

We use contingent valuation (CV) and choice experiment (CE) methods to assess cattle farmers’ attitudes to and willingness to pay (WTP) for a bovine tuberculosis (bTB) cattle vaccine, to help inform vaccine development and policy. A survey questionnaire was administered by means of telephone interviews to a stratified sample of 300 cattle farmers in annually bTB-tested areas in England and Wales. Farmers felt that bTB was a major risk for the cattle industry and that there was a high risk of their cattle getting the disease. The CE estimate produced a mean WTP of £35 per animal per single dose for a vaccine that is 90% effective at reducing the risk of a bTB breakdown and an estimated £55 for such a vaccine backed by 100% insurance of loss if a breakdown should occur. The CV estimate produced a mean WTP of nearly £17 per dose/per animal/per year for a vaccine (including 100% insurance) which, given the average lifespan of cattle, is comparable to the CE estimate. These WTP estimates are substantially higher than the expected cost of a vaccine which suggests that farmers in high risk bTB ‘hotspot’ areas perceive a substantial net benefit from buying the vaccine.

The Farm-Retail Price Spread in an Imperfectly Competitive Food Industry

Gardner's popular model of perfect competition in the marketing sector is extended to a conjectural-variations oligopoly with endogenous entry. Revising Gardner's comparative statics on the "farm-retail price ratio," tests of hypotheses about food industry conduct are derived. Using data from a recent article by Wohlgenant, which employs Gardner's framework, tests are made of the validity of his maintained hypothesis-that the food industries are perfectly competitive. No evidence is found of departures from competition in the output markets of the food industries of eight commodity groups: (a) beef and veal, (b) pork, (c) poultry, (d) eggs, (e) dairy, (f) processed fruits and vegetables, (g) fresh fruit, and (h) fresh vegetables.

Organic certification, export market access and the impacts of policy: Bayesian estimation of avocado smallholder “times-to-organic certification” in Michoacán Mexico

This study analyzes organic adoption decisions using a rich set of time-to-organic durations collected from avocado small-holders in Michoacán Mexico. We derive robust, intrasample predictions about the profiles of entry and exit within the conventional-versus-organic complex and we explore the sensitivity of these predictions to choice of functional form. The dynamic nature of the sample allows us to make retrospective predictions and we establish, precisely, the profile of organic entry had the respondents been availed optimal amounts of adoption-restraining resources. A fundamental problem in the dynamic adoption literature, hitherto unrecognized, is discussed and consequent extensions are suggested.

Survival analysis of cereal crop variety innovations in the UK

This paper explores the changing survival patterns of cereal crop variety innovations in the UK since the introduction of plant breeders’ rights in the mid-1960s. Using non-parametric, semi-parametric and parametric approaches, we examine the determinants of the survival of wheat variety innovations, focusing on the impacts of changes to Plant Variety Protection (PVP) regime over the last four decades. We find that the period since the introduction of the PVP regime has been characterised by the accelerated development of new varieties and increased private sector participation in the breeding of cereal crop varieties. However, the increased flow of varieties has been accompanied by a sharp decline in the longevity of innovations. These trends may have contributed to a reduction in the returns appropriated by plant breeders from protected variety innovations and may explain the decline of conventional plant breeding in the UK. It may also explain the persistent demand from the seed industry for stronger protection. The strengthening of the PVP regime in conformity with the UPOV Convention of 1991, the introduction of EU-wide protection through the Community Plant Variety Office and the introduction of royalties on farm-saved seed have had a positive effect on the longevity of protected variety innovations, but have not been adequate to offset the long term decline in survival durations.

Revenue-neutral tax policy under price uncertainty

The firm's response to revenue-neutral taxation is investigated under price uncertainty. Revenue-neutral policies adjust simultaneously the marginal tax rate and the level of exemptions while keeping expected tax receipts constant. Nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is sufficient to sign the firm's response: a reduction in the marginal rate causes the firm to contract output. Implications are established for the equilibrium level of treasury receipts.

Revenue-neutral tax policies under price uncertainty: reply

In their comment on my 1990 article, Yeh, Suwanakul, and Mai extend my analysis-which focused attention exclusively on firm output-to allow for simultaneous endogeneity of price, aggregate output, and numbers of firms. They show that, with downward- sloping demand, industry output adjusts positively to revenue-neutral changes in the marginal rate of taxation. This result is significant for two reasons. First, we are more often interested in predictions about aggregate phenomena than we are in predictions about individual firms. Indeed, firm-level predictions are frequently irrefutable since firm data are often unavailable. Second, the authors derive their result under a set of conditions that appear to be more general than those invoked in my 1990 article. In particular, they circumvent the need to invoke specific assumptions about the nature of firms' aversions toward risk. I consider this a useful extension and I appreciate the careful scrutiny of my paper.

Distribution of research gains in multistage production systems: further results

The "marketing" sector in Muth's single-stage model is disaggregated in to two sequential stages: "processing" and "distribution. "Comparative statics are used to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for farmers to gain from downstream research. The farm benefits are shown to depend crucially on the stage in "marketing" to which research is directed.

Food marketing technology and contingency market valuation

Marketing activities are introduced into a rational expectations model of the food marketing system. The model is used to evaluate effects of alternative marketing technologies on the distribution of the benefits of contingency markets in agriculture. Benefits depend on two parameters: the cost share of farm inputs and the elasticity of substitution between farm and nonfarm inputs in food marketing. Over a broad spectrum of technologies, consumers are likely to be the net beneficiaries and farmers the net losers from the provision of contingency markets

Evaluating the alternatives

In this article, I study the impacts of a specific incentives-based approach to safety regulation, namely the control of quality through sampling and threatening penalties when quality fails to meet some minimum standard. The welfare-improving impacts of this type of scheme seem high and are cogently illustrated in a recent contribution by Segerson, which stimulated many of the ideas in this paper. For this reason, the reader is referred to Segerson for a background on some of the motivation, and throughout, I make an effort to indicate differences between the two approaches. There are three major differences. First, I dispense with the calculus as much as possible, seeking readily interpreted, closedform solutions to illustrate the main ideas. Second, (strategically optimal, symmetric) Nash equilibria are the mainstay of each of the current models. Third, in the uncertainquality- provision equilibria, each of the Nash suppliers chooses the level of the lower bound for quality as a control and offers a draw from its (private) distribution in a contribution to the (public) pool of quality.

Demand, supply and willingness-to-pay for extension services in an emerging-market setting

Although it may be wholly inappropriate to generalize, the most important resource available to a subsistence household is the total amount of time that its members have available to spend in productive enterprises. In this context, services that minimize the time that it takes to perform productive activities are valuable to the household. Consequently the household is willing to relinquish quantities of other resources in exchange for quantities of the time-saving service. These simple observations motivate a search for the values that subsistence households place on time-saving services. This search is especially important when it is realized that extension services promote productivity, enhance the surplus-generating potential of the household and can, as a consequence, promote immersion into markets that are currently constrained by thinness and instability. In this capacity, extension visitation has the potential to overcome one of the principal impediments to economic development, namely lack of density of market participation. In this article, we consider this issue in the context of a rich data set on milk-market participation by small-holder dairy producers in the Ethiopian highlands.

When do export subsidies have a redistributional role?

If an export subsidy is efficient, that is, has a surplus-transfer role, then there exists an implicit function relating the optimal level of the subsidy to the income target in the agricultural sector. If an export subsidy is inefficient no such function exists. We show that dependence exists in large-export equilibrium, not in small-export equilibrium and show that these results remain robust to concerns about domestic tax distortions. The failure of previous work to produce this result stems from its neglect of the income constraint on producer surplus in the programming problem transferring surplusfrom consumersand taxpayers to farmers.

When do export subsidies have a redistributional role? Reply

Our differences are three. The first arises from the belief that "... a nonzero value for the optimally chosen policy instrument implies that the instrument is efficient for redistribution" (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 3). Consider the two equations: (1) o* = f(P3) and (2) = -f(3) ++r h* (a, P3) representing the solution to the problem of maximizing weighted, Marshallian surplus using, simultaneously, a per-unit border intervention, 9, and a per-unit domestic intervention, wr. In the solution, parameter ot denotes the weight applied to producer surplus; parameter p denotes the weight applied to government revenues; consumer surplus is implicitly weighted one; and the country in question is small in the sense that it is unable to affect world price by any of its domestic adjustments (see the Appendix). Details of the forms of the functions f((P) and h(ot, p) are easily derived, but what matters in the context of Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's Comment is: Redistributivep referencest hatf avorp roducers are consistent with higher values "alpha," and whereas the optimal domestic intervention, 7r*, has both "alpha and beta effects," the optimal border intervention, r*, has only a "beta effect,"-it does not have a redistributional role. Garth Holloway is reader in agricultural economics and statistics, Department of Agricultural and Food Economics, School of Agriculture, Policy, and Development, University of Reading. The author is very grateful to Xavier Irz, Bhavani Shankar, Chittur Srinivasan, Colin Thirtle, and Richard Tiffin for their comments and their wisdom; and to Mario Mazzochi, Marinos Tsigas, and Cal Turvey for their scholarship, including help in tracking down a fairly complete collection of the papers that cite Alston and Hurd. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions. Note, in equation (1), that the border intervention is positive whenever a distortion exists because 8 > 0 implies 3 - 1 + 8 > 1 and, thus, f((P) > 0 (see Appendix). Using Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's definition, the instrument is now "efficient," and therefore has a redistributive role. But now, suppose that the distortion is removed so that 3 - 1 + 8 = 1, 8 = 0, and consequently the border intervention is zero. According to Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, the instrument is now "inefficient" and has no redistributive role. The reader will note that this thought experiment has said nothing about supporting farm incomes, and so has nothing whatsoever to do with efficient redistribution. Of course, the definition is false. It follows that a domestic distortion arising from the "excess-burden argument" 3 = 1 + 8, 8 > 0 does not make an export subsidy "efficient." The export subsidy, having only a "beta effect," does not have a redistributional role. The second disagreement emerges from the comment that Holloway "... uses an idiosyncratic definition of the relevant objective function of the government (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 2)." The objective function that generates equations (1) and (2) (see the Appendix) is the same as the objective function used by Gardner (1995) when he first questioned Alston, Carter, and Smith's claim that a "domestic distortion can make a border intervention efficient in transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers." The objective function used by Gardner (1995) is the same objective function used in the contributions that precede it and thus defines the literature on the debate about borderversus- domestic intervention (Streeten; Yeh; Paarlberg 1984, 1985; Orden; Gardner 1985). The objective function in the latter literature is the same as the one implied in another literature that originates from Wallace and includes most notably Gardner (1983), but also Alston and Hurd. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86(2) (May 2004): 549-552 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association This content downloaded on Tue, 15 Jan 2013 07:58:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 550 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. The objective function in Holloway is this same objective function-it is, of course, Marshallian surplus.1 The third disagreement concerns scholarship. The Comment does not seem to be cognizant of several important papers, especially Bhagwati and Ramaswami, and Bhagwati, both of which precede Corden (1974, 1997); but also Lipsey and Lancaster, and Moschini and Sckokai; one important aspect of Alston and Hurd; and one extremely important result in Holloway. This oversight has some unfortunate repercussions. First, it misdirects to the wrong origins of intellectual property. Second, it misleads about the appropriateness of some welfare calculations. Third, it prevents Alston, Smith, and Vercammen from linking a finding in Holloway (pp. 242-43) with an old theorem (Lipsey and Lancaster) that settles the controversy (Alston, Carter, and Smith 1993, 1995; Gardner 1995; and, presently, Alston, Smith, and Vercammen) about the efficiency of border intervention in the presence of domestic distortions.