A New Start for the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice? Setting of Priorities for the New European Commission. CEPS Commentary, 23 September 2014

The nomination of a First Vice-President (Frans Timmermans) in charge of rule of law and the EU Charter of Fundamental is one of the more far-reaching innovations contained in the new institutional shape of the Juncker Commission. This CEPS Commentary by Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild welcomes the fact that a new fundamental rights and rule of law First Vice-President will exercise a coordination and advisory role over the other two JHA Commissioners – Věra Jourová, responsible for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality (DG Justice); and Dimitris Avramopoulos, responsible for Migration and Home Affairs (DG Home Affairs), but expresses a note caution whether this new role and triangular relationship can be made to work effectively in practice.

The future of the area of freedom, security and justice. Addressing mobility, protection and effectiveness in the long run. EPC Discussion Paper, 23 January 2014

With the Stockholm Programme coming to an end in 2014, the “Brussels Community” is increasing agitated with a recurring question: what will replace the Stockholm Programme? Paradoxically, this uncertainty is fuelled by the existence of a new and clear Treaty provision – Article 68 TFEU – which states “The European Council shall define the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice”. Clear in its wording, this provision may lead to different understandings and unclear implications in practice. In order to provide more clarity, the European Policy Centre (EPC) set up a Task Force to reflect on the impact of this provision and more generally the future of the area of freedom, security and justice after 2014. Results of this process are reflected in this discussion paper which addresses the process and content regarding the definition of future strategic guidelines.

Any changes? The future agenda of Sweden's security policy. OSW Commentary No. 126, 28.01.2014

Sweden’s annual security and defence conference, which this year focused on the future of the country’s security policy, was held in Sälen on 12-14 January. It was attended by almost all the leaders of Sweden’s ruling and opposition parties. The discussions have revealed whether and how the mindset of the Swedish elite has changed following the heated debates on defence issues in 2013. The opposition parties (Social Democrats, the Green Party, and the Left Party), which are likely to form a coalition government after the election to the Swedish parliament in September 2014, were given the opportunity to present their own priorities. The discussions have brought to the surface conflicting perceptions within the political elite concerning the threats and challenges to Swedish security, and divergent positions on the future direction of the country’s security and defence policy. It is highly likely that, due to a coalition compromise, the current course of Sweden’s security policy (namely, a policy of non-alignment along with close co-operation with NATO) will be maintained following the parliamentary election, albeit with new “leftist” influences (a greater involvement in the United Nations). Big changes that could lead to a significant strengthening of Sweden’s defence capabilities, or a decision on NATO membership, are not likely. Paradoxically, polls suggest that in the long run a more radical change in Stockholm’s security policy may be shaped by a gradual, bottom-up evolution of public opinion on the issue.

Between energy security and energy market integration. Guidelines for the future development of the EU’s external energy policy in Europe’s neighbourhood. OSW Report, June 2011

For many years the European Union has been improving the efficient use of energy resources and yet the demand for energy in the EU continues to increase. When Europe belonged to one of the world’s key energy markets with relatively easy access to energy resources, growing energy needs were not seen as a source of concern. Today, however, as the competition for energy resources is intensifying and the global position of the EU energy market is being challenged by growing economies in the developing countries, above all China and India, the EU needs to adopt bold policies to guarantee the sustainable supply of energy. This report argues the EU needs to develop a fully-fledged external energy policy; i.e. a common, coherent, strategic approach that build bridges between the interests and needs of the EU integrated energy market on the one hand and supplier countries on the other. The EU’s external energy policy has two main objectives. The first one is to ensure a sustainable, stable and cost-effective energy supply. The second is to promote energy market integration and regulatory convergence with neighbouring countries (often but not always this supports the achievement of the first objective). However, in order to improve its effectiveness, the EU’s external energy policy needs to be seen in a broader economic and political context. Any progress in energy cooperation with third countries is contingent upon the EU’s general stance and offer to those countries.

No more compulsory engagement. The emancipation of German security policy. OSW Commentary no. 57, 2011-07-18

Germany’s stance on Libya at the UN Security Council and its later decision not to take part in the military intervention gave rise to heated controversy both in Germany and abroad. At home, this was criticised as “an enormous mistake of historic impact”1; while abroad this raised questions about Germany’s willingness to co-operate with its key Western allies. With its decision on Libya, Germany sealed the process of making its security policy independent from the stances of the US and France. It thus ceased to feel any compulsion to provide not only military engagement but also political support for overseas operations initiated by its key allies, even if these are legitimised by the UN Security Council. Germany’s stance, apart from finishing off a certain process, is also setting a starting point for a discussion inside Germany about its military engagement in international security policy. This will bring about a more assertive and selective approach to cooperation with NATO and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy.

The European Council’s Guidelines for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 2020: Subverting the ‘Lisbonisation’ of Justice and Home Affairs? CEPS Essay No. 13, 14 July 2014

In its Conclusions of 26-27 June 2014, the European Council has adopted the new “Strategic Guidelines for Legislative and Operational Planning for the coming years within the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)”. These Guidelines reveal a pre-Lisbon Treaty mindset among the EU member states and the Justice and Home Affairs Council. This essay argues that the Guidelines are mainly driven by the interests and agendas of national Ministries of Interior and Justice and are only “strategic” to the extent that they aim at first, re-injecting ‘intergovernmentalism’ or bringing back the old EU Third Pillar ways of working to the new EU institutional setting of the AFSJ and second, at sidelining the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and rule of law in the AFSJ. The paper argues that the European Council Guidelines seek to prevent the advances in Justice and Home Affairs cooperation as envisaged in the Treaty of Lisbon, particularly its emphasis on supranational democratic, legal and judicial accountability. As a consequence of this move to ‘de-Lisbonise’ JHA cooperation, fundamental rights and rule of law-related initiatives will be neglected and the interest of the individual will be displaced from the centre of gravity in the coming AFSJ 2020 policy agenda.

The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy Responses to the Attacks in Paris: Towards an EU Security and Liberty Agenda. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 81/February 2015

This paper examines the main EU-level initiatives that have been put forward in the weeks following the attacks in Paris in January 2015, which will be discussed in the informal European Council meeting of 12 February 2015. It argues that a majority of these proposals predated the Paris shootings and had until that point proved contentious as regards their efficacy, legitimacy and lawfulness. The paper finds that EU counterterrorism responses raise two fundamental challenges: A first challenge is posed to the freedom of movement, Schengen and EU citizenship. Priority is being given to the expanded use of large-scale surveillance and systematic monitoring of all travellers including EU citizens, which stands in contravention of Schengen and the free movement principle. A second challenge concerns EU democratic rule of law. Current pressures calling for the adoption of measures such as the EU Passenger Name Record challenge the scrutiny roles held by the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU on counterterrorism measures in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting. The paper proposes that the EU adopts a new European Agenda on Security and Liberty based on an EU security (criminal justice-led) cooperation model that is firmly anchored in current EU legal principles and rule of law standards. This model would call for ‘less is more’ concerning the use, processing and retention of data by police and intelligence communities. Instead, it would pursue better and more accurate use of data meeting the quality standards of evidence in criminal judicial proceedings.

More Union in European Defence. CEPS Task Force Report, 26 February 2015

Years of uncoordinated cuts in defence spending have eroded the EU’s role as a security actor in what is now a multipolar world. This CEPS Task Force report aims to provide member states and the EU institutions with the narrative to strengthen defence cooperation in the EU, in the face of numerous emergencies in the EU’s strategic neighbourhood and ever-present security threats. The report is a record of the deliberations over several months between high-level experts in the field of European security and defence, who conclude that the Treaty of Lisbon demands and permits a great deal more in terms of our common security and defence activities. And that member states could achieve much more value for money than the €190 billion that they spend to keep up 28 national armies, comprising roughly 1.5 million service personnel. This report suggests policy actions to further the EU’s strategic, institutional, capabilities, and resources cooperation in the field of defence. Ultimately, in the view of the Task Force experts, further integration should amount to a European Defence Union.

Britain’s Political Earthquake: What aftershocks for Europe and the UK? CEPS Commentary, 11 May 2015

In the wake of last week’s elections in Britain, Michael Emerson examines in this CEPS Commentary the implications of the astonishing results for the EU and the UK and outlines a possible reform package that David Cameron might present to the EU institutions and other member states to fulfil his pledge to achieve a “reformed EU”. He also urges the Prime Minister to consider adding a constructive component to his reform package, namely positioning the UK to act once again as a leading proponent of a more effective European foreign, security and defence policy.

Ensuring the EU’s future as a security provider Five recommendations for the June European Council’s session on CSDP. EPC Commentary, 23 June 2015

On 25 and 26 June 2015, the Heads of State or Government of the European Union (EU) will convene to discuss the implementation of their Conclusions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from December 2013. A substantial and frank debate among EU leaders is urgently needed in order to forge a lasting and credible vision for CSDP.

Prospects for Security on the European Continent. EU Diplomacy Paper 05/2015.

This collective EU Diplomacy Paper on relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) consists of essays written by students of the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies programme at the College of Europe in the class on EU-NATO relations taught by Fulbright Professor Mark Sheetz in the academic year 2014-15. It seeks to provide a blueprint of what the near future of the transatlantic alliance and of the European security framework might look like. Special attention will be given to the possible effects of Finland joining NATO, Swedish-NATO relations, the question whether NATO should continue to exist at all, and finally the use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in relation with the transatlantic military alliance.

Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 205/31.03.2016

Russia’s increasingly aggressive policy and its enhanced military activity in the Nordic-Baltic region has led to revaluations in Sweden’s and Finland’s security and defence policies and a rethinking of the formats of their military co-operation. While remaining outside NATO, the two states have been developing closer bilateral defence co-operation and working more closely with the United States, while at the same time developing co-operation with NATO. Sweden and Finland perceive the United States as the guarantor of regional and European security. From their point of view, the United States is currently the country that has both the necessary military capabilities and the political will to react in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO in the Nordic-Baltic region, in which both countries would inevitably become involved despite their non-aligned status. For Sweden and Finland, intensified co-operation with the United States offers an alternative to NATO membership, which is currently out of the question for domestic political reasons. Meanwhile, the US has also become increasingly aware of the strategic importance of the two states, which, for the purposes of contingency planning, are in fact an extension of NATO’s north-eastern flank.