Gay Parenthood and the Revolution of the Modern Family: An Examination of the Unique Barriers Confronting Gay Adoptive Parents

Abstract: In recent decades, the structure of the American family has been revolutionized to incorporate families of diverse and unconventional compositions. Gay and lesbian couples have undoubtedly played a crucial role in this revolution by establishing families through the tool of adoption. Eleven adoptive parents from the state of Connecticut were interviewed to better conceptualize the unique barriers gay couples encounter in the process adoption. Both the scholarly research and the interview data illustrate that although gay couples face enormous legal barriers, the majority of their hardship comes through social interactions. As a result, the cultural myths and legal restrictions that create social hardships for gay adoptive parents forge a vicious and discriminatory cycle of marginalization that American legal history illustrates is best remedied through judicial intervention at the Supreme Court level. While judicial intervention, alone, cannot change the reality of gay parenthood, I argue that past judicial precedent illustrates that such change can serve as a tool of individual, political, and legal validation for the gay community for obtaining equal rights.

Patenting genes and gene sequences: Analysis of public health implications and the law

At issue is whether or not isolated DNA is patent eligible under the U.S. Patent Law and the implications of that determination on public health. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has issued patents on DNA since the 1980s, and scientists and researchers have proceeded under that milieu since that time. Today, genetic research and testing related to the human breast cancer genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 is conducted within the framework of seven patents that were issued to Myriad Genetics and the University of Utah Research Foundation between 1997 and 2000. In 2009, suit was filed on behalf of multiple researchers, professional associations and others to invalidate fifteen of the claims underlying those patents. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears patent cases, has invalidated claims for analyzing and comparing isolated DNA but has upheld claims to isolated DNA. The specific issue of whether isolated DNA is patent eligible is now before the Supreme Court, which is expected to decide the case by year's end. In this work, a systematic review was performed to determine the effects of DNA patents on various stakeholders and, ultimately, on public health; and to provide a legal analysis of the patent eligibility of isolated DNA and the likely outcome of the Supreme Court's decision. ^ A literature review was conducted to: first, identify principle stakeholders with an interest in patent eligibility of the isolated DNA sequences BRCA1 and BRCA2; and second, determine the effect of the case on those stakeholders. Published reports that addressed gene patents, the Myriad litigation, and implications of gene patents on stakeholders were included. Next, an in-depth legal analysis of the patent eligibility of isolated DNA and methods for analyzing it was performed pursuant to accepted methods of legal research and analysis based on legal briefs, federal law and jurisprudence, scholarly works and standard practice legal analysis. ^ Biotechnology, biomedical and clinical research, access to health care, and personalized medicine were identified as the principle stakeholders and interests herein. Many experts believe that the patent eligibility of isolated DNA will not greatly affect the biotechnology industry insofar as genetic testing is concerned; unlike for therapeutics, genetic testing does not require tremendous resources or lead time. The actual impact on biomedical researchers is uncertain, with greater impact expected for researchers whose work is intended for commercial purposes (versus basic science). The impact on access to health care has been surprisingly difficult to assess; while invalidating gene patents might be expected to decrease the cost of genetic testing and improve access to more laboratories and physicians' offices that provide the test, a 2010 study on the actual impact was inconclusive. As for personalized medicine, many experts believe that the availability of personalized medicine is ultimately a public policy issue for Congress, not the courts. ^ Based on the legal analysis performed in this work, this writer believes the Supreme Court is likely to invalidate patents on isolated DNA whose sequences are found in nature, because these gene sequences are a basic tool of scientific and technologic work and patents on isolated DNA would unduly inhibit their future use. Patents on complementary DNA (cDNA) are expected to stand, however, based on the human intervention required to craft cDNA and the product's distinction from the DNA found in nature. ^ In the end, the solution as to how to address gene patents may lie not in jurisprudence but in a fundamental change in business practices to provide expanded licenses to better address the interests of the several stakeholders. ^

Gacaca and DDR : the disputable record of state-building in Rwanda

State-building is currently considered to be an indispensable process in overcoming state fragility: a condition characterized by frequent armed conflicts as well as chronic poverty. In this process, both the capacity and the legitimacy of the state are supposed to be enhanced; such balanced development of capacity and legitimacy has also been demanded in security sector reform (SSR), which is regarded as being a crucial part of post-conflict state-building. To enhance legitimacy, the importance of democratic governance is stressed in both state-building and SSR in post-conflict countries. In reality, however, the balanced enhancement of capacity and legitimacy has rarely been realized. In particular, legitimacy enhancement tends to stagnate in countries in which one of multiple warring parties takes a strong grip on state power. This paper tries to understand why such unbalanced development of state-building and SSR has been observed in post-conflict countries, through a case study of Rwanda. Analyses of two policy initiatives in the security sector - Gacaca transitional justice and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) - indicate that although these programs achieved goals set by the government, their contribution to the normative objectives promoted by the international community was quite debatable. It can be understood that this is because the country has subordinated SSR to its state-building process. After the military victory of the former rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the ruling elite prioritized the establishment of political stability over the introduction of international norms such as democratic governance and the rule of law. SSR was implemented only to the extent that it contributed to, and did not threaten, Rwanda's RPF-led state-building.

3.4 United States Supreme Court 1938

Gaines’ legal team, led by Houston, had faith in the justice system of the United States and anticipated getting a fair trial at the federal level. So far, all decisions had occurred in Missouri, a state with a segregated system.The fact that Gaines v Canada had reached the Supreme Court was promising indeed. It was rare that any case involving African-Americans would be considered by the highest court in the land. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had been appointing Justices that were more willing to consider cases concerned with civil rights. On November 9, 1938, the Supreme Court of the United States heard arguments in the Gaines v Canada case. The defense was unmoved by the rude treatment and made their presentation with professionalism and aplomb. Houston’s argument remained steadfast; not only was the state of Missouri’s statute concerning out-of-state tuition for blacks in violation of the 14th Amendment, but the very idea of segregation itself violated the Constitution. William Hogsett, the attorney for the University of Missouri, countered that the school was merely following state laws. The MU legal team was flustered as questions from the bench forced them to correct overstatements regarding Missouri’s “generosity to Negro students”. With crossed fingers and high hopes, the Gaines legal team rested their case and awaited the verdict. Meanwhile, Lloyd Gaines was still in Michigan. Lloyd held a W.P.A. job as a Civil Service Clerk and was in constant contact with his family and attorneys. His mood in his correspondence was hopeful and positive.

The Keyes to Reclaiming the Racial History Of the Roberts Court

This article advocates for a fundamental re-understanding about the way that the history of race is understood by the current Supreme Court. Represented by the racial rights opinions of Justice John Roberts that celebrate racial progress, the Supreme Court has equivocated and rendered obsolete the historical experiences of people of color in the United States. This jurisprudence has in turn reified the notion of color-blindness, consigning racial discrimination to a distant and discredited past that has little bearing to how race and inequality is experienced today. The racial history of the Roberts Court is centrally informed by the context and circumstances surrounding Brown v. Board of Education. For the Court, Brown symbolizes all that is wrong with the history of race in the United States - legal segregation, explicit racial discord, and vicious and random acts of violence. Though Roberts Court opinions suggest that some of those vestiges still exits, the bulk of its jurisprudence indicate the opposite. With Brown’s basic factual premises as its point of reference, the Court has consistently argued that the nation has made tremendous strides away from the condition of racial bigotry, intolerance, and inequity. The article accordingly argues that the Roberts Court reliance on Brown to understand racial progress is anachronistic. Especially as the nation’s focus for racial inequality turned national in scope, the same binaries in Brown that had long served to explain the history of race relations in the United States (such as Black-White, North-South, and Urban-Rural) were giving way to massive multicultural demographic and geographic transformations in the United States in the years and decades after World War II. All of the familiar tropes so clear in Brown and its progeny could no longer fully describe the current reality of shifting and transforming patterns of race relations in the United States. In order to reclaim the history of race from the Roberts Court, the article assesses a case that more accurately symbolizes the recent history and current status of race relations today: Keyes v. School District No. 1. This was the first Supreme Court case to confront how the binaries of cases like Brown proved of little probative value in addressing how and in what ways race and racial discrimination was changing in the United States. Thus, understanding Keyesand the history it reflects reveals much about how and in what ways the Roberts Court should rethink its conclusions regarding the history of race relations in the United States for the last 60 years.

Dignity and the Eighth Amendment: A New Approach to Challenging Solitary Confinement

The use of solitary confinement in U.S. prisons and jails has come under increasing scrutiny. Over the past few months, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy all but invited constitutional challenges to the use of solitary confinement, while President Obama asked, “Do we really think it makes sense to lock so many people alone in tiny cells for 23 hours a day for months, sometime for years at a time?” Even some of the most notorious prisons and jails, including California’s Pelican Bay State Prison and New York’s Rikers Island, are reforming their use of solitary confinement because of successful litigation and public outcry. Rovner suggests that in light of these developments and “the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on human dignity as a substantive value underlying and animating constitutional rights,” there is a strong case to make that long-term solitary confinement violates the constitutional right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

The First Century of Right to Arms Litigation

This Article examines state court cases involving the right to arms, during the first century following ratification of the Amendment in 1791. This is not the first article to survey some of those cases. This Article includes additional cases, and details the procedural postures and facts, not only the holdings. The Article closely examines how the Supreme Court integrated the nineteenth century arms cases into Heller and McDonald to shape modern Second Amendment law. Part I briefly explains two English cases which greatly influenced American legal understandings. Semayne’s Case is the foundation of “castle doctrine” — the right to home security which includes the right of armed self-defense in the home. Sir John Knight’s Case fortified the tradition of the right to bear arms, providing that the person must bear arms in a non-terrifying manner. Part II examines American antebellum cases; these are the cases to which Heller looked for guidance on the meaning of the Second Amendment. Part III looks at cases from Reconstruction and the early years of Jim Crow, through 1891. As with the antebellum cases, the large majority of post-war cases are from the Southeast, which during the nineteenth century was the region most ardent for gun control. The heart of gun control country was Tennessee and Arkansas; courts there resisted some infringements of the right to arms, but eventually gave up. Heller and McDonald did not look to the Jim Crow cases as constructive precedents on the Second Amendment.

Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment

Recently the Supreme Court has placed new limits on both the substance of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary that serves as the principal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. In this Article we briefly summarize these limitations and then argue that the curtailment of the exclusionary rule has the potential to ameliorate substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine. The limited reach of the modern exclusionary rule provides the Court with license to develop an expansive new substantive framework free of the specter of a correspondingly expansive remedial framework. One point on which nearly all jurists and commentators agree is that current Fourth Amendment doctrine is a mess. We argue that the Court’s exclusionary rule cases, while frustrating and ill-conceived if viewed in isolation, provide the Court with an opportunity to revisit problematic Fourth Amendment doctrine that was born under a very different remedial regime. Such an approach would allow the Court to adhere to its current view of the exclusionary rule as a remedy of last resort while creating a Fourth Amendment with teeth. The goal is a Fourth Amendment right that is more substantial and clearly defined, but a remedy that remains limited to egregious violations of clear substantive rules. The time is now to lift the Fourth Amendment fog.

Notes about cases heard as Justice of the Peace, 1784-1795

This small paper-bound notebook contains notes Winthrop made concerning the cases he heard between 1784 and 1795 as a Justice of the Peace for Middlesex County. These notes provide insight into the nature of crimes being committed in Cambridge in the post-Revolutionary period, as well as the names and occupations of those accused and their victims. The cases involved the following individuals, among others: Samuel Bridge, Benjamin Estabrook, Joseph Jeffords, Cato Bordman, John Kidder, Spenser Goddin, Jacob Cromwell, Benjamin Stratton, Mary Flood, Bender Temple, John Willett, Joseph Hartwell, Nathaniel Stratton, Amos Washburn, Francis Moore, Thomas Malone, Thomas Cook, and Amboy Brown. The cases involved a range of offenses, and occasionally Winthrop decided that a case exceeded his jurisdiction and forwarded it to the General Court or the Supreme Judicial Court.

The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).

The importance of International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order. Research Papers in Law, 1/2009

From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

Did the German court do Europe a favor? Bruegel Working Paper 2014/09, July 2014

The European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme was a politically-pragmatic tool to diffuse the euro-area crisis. But it did not deal with the fundamental incompleteness of the European monetary union. As such, it blurred the boundary between monetary and fiscal policy. The fuzziness of this boundary helped in the short-term but pushed political and economic risks to the future. Unless a credible commitment to enforcing losses on private creditors is instituted, these conundrums will persist. The German Federal Constitutional Court has helped by insisting that such a dialogue be conducted in order to achieve a more durable political and economic solution. A study of the European Union Court of Justice’s Pringle decision (Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, Case C-370/12, ECJ, 27 November 2012) suggests that the ECJ will also not rubber-stamp the OMT – and, if it does, the legal victory will not resolve the fundamental dilemmas.

The Greek elections and the third bailout programme: Why it could work this time round. CEPS Commentary, 21 September 2015

Following the decisive victory won by the Syriza party in Greece’s general election on September 20th, this commentary explores the key question of whether the third bailout programme can work, where the previous two programmes failed. Whereas most observers argue that the third one cannot work because it merely represents a continuation of an approach that has manifestly failed, the authors argue that a closer inspection of the conditions today give grounds for cautious optimism.

The Electoral Verdict and After: The Road Ahead for India. Asia Policy Brief 2014/04, June 2014

The convincing victory of the BJP in the 2014 Indian general elections came as a surprise to many. Most opinion polls, which had predicted a win for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that it leads, had not anticipated the scale of the party’s victory. The BJP alone won 282 seats and the NDA 336 out of 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. Two things stand out in the verdict. This is the first time in 30 years that a party won a majority on its own; this is also the worst-ever showing by India’s grand old party, the Indian National Congress, which won a mere 44 seats, 70 less than its previous all-time low in 1999.

The new Soviet legislature : Committee on Defense and State Security : report of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, second session.

"The attached report was prepared ... by Dr. Mark Lowenthal ..."--p. iv.