Valuation equilibrium with crubs

This paper considers model worlds in which there are a continuum of individuaIs who form finite sized associations to undertake joint activities. We show that if there are a finite set of types and the commodity space contains lotteries, then the c1assicaI equilibrium results on convex economies can be reinterpreted to apply. Furthermore, in this lottery economy deterministic aIlocations (that is, degenerate lotteries) are generally not Pareto optimal, nor are they equilibria. In the interests of making the model seem more "natural," we show that the set of equilibria in a decentraIization in which individuaIs first gamble over vaIue transfers and then trade commodities in a deterministic competitive market economy are equivalent to those of our competi tive economy with a lottery commodity space.

Incomplete contracts and the problem of social harm

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative extemality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. We analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership). There are cases in which allocating any of these basic rights to the first mover-i.e., first-party rights-is dominated by second-party rights, and cases in which the reverse is true. A Coasian result (efficiency regardless of the rights allocation) only holds under a limited set of conditions. As corollaries of a theorem ranking the basic rights regimes, a number of results emerge contradicting conventional wisdom, including the relative inefficiency of concentrated land ownership and the relevance of the generator's identity. We conclude with a mechanism and a new rights regime that each yield the first best in all cases.

Judicial system performance and economic development

The role of judicial systems in determining economic perfonnance has gained increasingly attention in recent years. Nonetheless, the literature lacks a clearly articulated framework to examine how judicial systems influence the investment and production decisions of economic agents. This paper tries to till in this gap. It examines what constitutes a well-functioning judiciary, analyzes how dysfunctional judicial systems compromise economic growth, and reviews the relevant empirical literature. It concludes with some remarks about why, despite the widespread perception that well-functioning legal and judicial systems are key to the success of market-oriented reforms in developing and transition countries, judicial refonn has lagged so much behind other reforms.

Brazilian privatization : a decade of experience

In this paper we review the ten-year-old Brazilian experience with privatization. We start by describing the expansion in the last half century of the role played by state enterprises, and then the privatization effort in the Figueiredo and Sarney administrations. After that, we examine what haa changed with Collor and what the prospects for his privatization program are.

Os determinantes da duração do desemprego em São Paulo

This paper examines the determinants of unemployment duration in the metropolitan region of São Paulo in 1997. The descriptive statistics show that around 52% of the unemployment lived with their parents, that their average age was 27 and that 80% had between 4 and 11 years of schooling. Moreover, 85% of the 1997 unemployed left this status in the following three months, although on1y half of them effectively found a new job. The econometric results show that unemployment duration if lower for heads and for those that worked before. Moreover, duration is higher for the more educated, for those that lost their previous job, for the older and for those with longer tenure in the previous work. Finally, the hazard rate is increasing with the duration of unemployment up to the sixth month, dec1ining afterwards.