A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2006

Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Financing Constraints, Irreversibility, and Investment Dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firms cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint that they can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, July 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2006

Supplemental Security Income Program, May 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2006

Credit Constraints, Firms' Precautionary Investment, and the Business Cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' precautionary investment behavior in response to the anticipation of future financing constraints. Firms increase their demand for liquid and safe investments in order to alleviate future borrowing constraints and decrease the probability of having to forego future profitable investment opportunities. This results in an increase in the share of short-term projects that produces a temporary increase in output, at the expense of lower long-run investment and future output. I show in a calibrated model that this behavior is at the source of a novel and powerful channel of shock transmission of productivity shocks that produces short-run dampening and long-run propagation. Furthermore, it can account for the observed business cycle patterns of the aggregate and firm-level composition of investment.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, September 2006

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program produced by the Department of Human Services

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, June 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, January 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, February 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2002

Monthly report from Iowa Department of Human Services on income.