Prime Minister Fico’s Russian card. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER NUMBER 175/01.07.2015

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the position of Slovakia’s left-wing government towards Russia has been ambiguous. Bratislava has accepted the EU sanctions targeting Russia and the plan for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, however, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government has maintained close political relations with the Kremlin. It has called for the intensification of Slovak-Russian economic relations and has repeatedly criticised the sanctions, speaking in tandem with Russian propaganda in so doing. Slovakia’s Prime Minister is hoping that by playing the role of one of the leaders in the EU and NATO who are most willing to cooperate with Russia, he will gain economic benefits and win votes in next spring’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Despite numerous pro-Russian gestures, Slovakia has been limiting the number of areas in which Moscow could exert pressure on Bratislava. As it strives to become independent of Russia, Slovakia has ensured possible alternative fuel supplies for itself. Moreover, it has been gradually replacing Russian-made military equipment with equipment made in the West. The Slovak government does intend to develop the country’s cooperation with Russia, including in strategic areas involving supplies and transit of oil and gas, as well as supplies of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, it has been making efforts to gain easy access to an alternative source of supplies in each of these areas. Beset by crises, Russia has ever fewer economic cooperation opportunities to offer Slovakia, and Slovak businesses operating on the Russian market have to take into account the growing risk of insolvency of local contractors. To a great extent, therefore, Slovak-Russian relations have been reduced to rhetorical statements confirming the desire for closer cooperation, and to visions of joint projects accompanied by an ever shorter list of feasible cooperation initiatives.

Cameron’s ‘renegotiations’ (or Russian roulette) with the EU: An interim assessment. CEPS Working Document No. 413/September 2015

Since the May 2015 general election when the Tory Party gained an absolute majority in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Cameron has put his campaign into high gear to get a ‘new settlement’ with the EU and invested much personal diplomacy to try to advance his objective. “What does he really want?” is still heard from other EU leaders, yet his agenda is taking rough shape with calls for results under four headings: “competitiveness, sovereignty, social security and economic governance”. These are only code words, however, for a mixed bag of more specific desiderata, which overall seem to be moderate. Impossible demands have been quietly dropped. Some items will still be tricky to negotiate while others can be placed on the agenda for ongoing EU ‘reform’ that can be widely supported. The Brussels side of the affair thus seems manageable, but the wild cards at home in the UK remain or are becoming even wilder. The standard hazards of the referendum instrument are now exacerbated by the unknown quantity of the new Labour leadership alongside the aggressively Eurosceptic majority of Tory MPs and the great migration crisis, which is translating now into a negative factor for the EU in UK opinion polls. This ostensibly very democratic process is looking more and more like a deadly serious game of Russian roulette.

‘The oil friendship’: the state of and prospects for Russian-Chinese energy cooperation. OSW Commentary NUMBER 197|17.02.2016

The oil sector has been the major element of Russian-Chinese energy cooperation. The years 2013–2015 saw a significant increase in the volume of crude oil exported by Russia. In 2015, China became the main importer of Russian oil; Russia became the second largest supplier of oil to the Chinese market, after Saudi Arabia. From Beijing’s perspective, supplies of Russian oil are of strategic importance because the main supply routes are overland routes. Russia, for its part, is interested in boosting its export because of its deteriorating position on the European market, which hitherto has been considered a strategic market.

The altar and the throne alliance. The Russian Orthodox Church vs. the government in Russia. OSW STUDIES 54, 2016-01-04

The Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC), the largest religious community in Russia, plays an essential role in the process of the cultural and national self-identification of the Russian people. Being a socio-political institution with a centuries-long history, it possesses great symbolic capital and enjoys public respect, which has been used for political purposes. Since Vladimir Putin regained the presidency in 2012, in order to strengthen the political regime in Russia the Kremlin has begun to extensively draw upon conservative ideology and promote the traditional moral and social values which the Church is viewed as the guardian of. This has resulted in establishing closer relations between the secular government and the ROC, as well as in a greater engagement of ROC hierarchs and organisations in domestic and foreign policy issues. This situation exposes the ROC to criticism for being excessively involved in politics, and in the longer term, to the risks linked to potential destabilisation of the governmental system in Russia.

A challenge for liberal democracy: How to understand the Russian intervention in Ukraine. Bertelsmann Policy Brief, 16.10.2014

The Russian intervention in Ukraine has provoked a deep crisis which will likely last for years, with profound consequences not only for Ukraine, Russia and Eastern Europe, but also for the internal situation in the European Union. The current Russian aggression is frequently seen as a profound violation of international law, breaking the rules that are fundamental for relations in Europe. It is perceived as perhaps a step towards rebuilding imperial Russia or, at the very least, an attempt to keep Ukraine within Russia’s sphere of influence. However, one very important aspect is virtually neglected, namely, that Russia’s Ukraine venture may have a significant impact on the future of liberal democracy in Europe and beyond.

The consequences of the Western financial sanctions on the Russian economy. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 203/23.03.2016

Although they are not the deciding factor, the Western financial sanctions are nevertheless an important factor affecting the deteriorating economic situation in Russia. They have significantly undermined the opportunities which Russian companies have to attract foreign capital, thus contributing to the deterioration of their financial condition (which is particularly prominent in the case of energy firms subject to sanctions). Therefore, Russian businesses need more support from the state. However, this support is becoming more difficult due to the dramatic fall in oil prices – revenues from oil exports are the main source of budget revenue.

The twilight of the oil Eldorado. How the activity of Russian oil companies on the EU market has evolved. OSW Studies 55, April 2016

The European Union has traditionally been the most important outlet for Russian oil exports. At the same time, during the period 2011-2014 a systematic decline was observed in crude oil supplies to the EU, while at the same time the export of petroleum products increased. It is now difficult to say that Russia is following a coherent oil strategy vis-a-vis the EU. The current shape of Russian activity is more the result of the business interests of individual companies, rather than the result of activities coordinated by the state. Although in the short term (up to 2020), the negative trend in crude oil exports to the EU could be halted (as confirmed by the figures for 2015), the long-term prospects for Russia's position on the EU market are pessimistic. This is because the importance of factors unfavourable to Russia is rising, such as the decrease in consumption of oil in the EU, the increased competition among exporters to the EU market, and the deterioration of the climate of Russian/EU cooperation in the context of the anti-Russian sanctions, as well as unclear prospects for the development of the upstream sector in Russia.

Information Guide: European Union information from Russian sources

No abstract.

The Effects of Sanctions and Counter-Sanctions on EU-Russian Trade Flows. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2016

After Russia annexed Crimea in early 2014 and then intervened, manu militari, in the Eastern part of Ukraine, the European Union wanted to show its disapproval and put pressure on Russia to change its behaviour. A wide variety of measures were taken, including the imposition of individual restrictions, such as asset freezes and travel bans, but also the suspension of development loans from the EBRD. But the EU (together with the United States) also took, in July and September 2014, a set of broader measures: limited access to EU primary and secondary capital markets for targeted Russian financial institutions and energy and defence companies; export and import bans on trade in arms; an export ban for dual-use goods and reduction of Russia’s access to sensitive technologies and services linked to oil production.

Possible Approaches to Commercializing Applied University Research: a Russian Case Study

This paper discusses the environment around universities in Russia and possible approaches to analyzing and choosing the method for applied research results commercialization as well as selecting promising applied research areas in that environment. Conceptual foundations for decision making during the commercialization and roadmap/action plan creation processes are outlined. These can be useful to both universities for planning their activities aswell as for organizations that plan to cooperate with universities or that are interested in university generated research. This being said, obtained models and used evaluation parameters may be unique and may depend upon the particular project, university, region, and personal preferences of decision makers. Thus, consideration of these parameters and characteristics only has merit when making decisions in the dynamics of change of these parameters. For this purpose statistical information is needed that characterizes the competencies of the research organization (university) inquestion, needs of partner organizations, governmental and societal requirements, and science and technology prospects. After determining the promising research areas it’s time to look at particular projects, which in turn are also characterized by various parameters dependent upon their objectives. Considering the values of these parameters in their dynamics allows control of project parameters in the course of its execution. This in turn allows prediction of negative situations and alleviation of such by setting the target values of parameters and using best practices and standardization of management processes to achieve those values.

Tab. 3: Differentiation of eroded material in the Arctic Russian Seas

Volumes of Holocene (10 000 years) terrigenous sediments and annnal sediment supply in the Laptev Sea were evaluated from average thickness of the Holocene veneer. Volumes of deposits supplied from various sediment sourees and by different proeesses (abrasion of hinterland and island shores, river discharge, eolian input, drifting ice) were diseriminating of deposition in the eoastal zone, at river/sea barrier, and in the shelf basin itself. Accumulation by drifting iee and the role of local sea bottom erosion were also considered. Total amount of sediments transported from the Laptev Sea shelf to Amundsen and Nansen Basins of the Aretie Ocean was compared with other Russian Aretie seas.

Composition of airborne material from yellow snow fallen in the Russian North

Large amounts of dust responsible for bright colors of atmospheric precipitation in the temperate, subpolar and polar zones of the northern hemisphere have been rarely observed. In the twentieth century and in the beginning of the twenty first century in the Northern European Russia such events were not registered up to March 25-26, 2008. At that time in some parts of the Arkhangel'sk region, Komi Republic, and Nenets Autonomous Area atmospheric precipitation as sleet and rain responsible for sand- and saffron colors of ice crust formation on the snow surface was observed. During detailed mineralogical, geochemical, pollen, diatom and meteorological investigations it was established that semidesert and steppe regions of the Northwest Kazakhstan, Volgograd and Astrakhan' regions, and Kalmykia are the main sources of the yellow dust.