Pharmaceutical Generics, Vertical Product Differentiation, and Public Policy

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceutical markets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model can explain the observation that countries with stronger regulations have smaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences in observed regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higher proportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closely related model can account for the observed increase in prices by patent owners after entry of generic producers.

Local Roads Maintenance Workers’ Manual, June 2006

This manual describes best roadway maintenance practices for Iowa's local roads and streets, from the center line to shoulders, ditches, and drainage, with chapters on public relations, bridge maintenance, and snow and ice control. Each chapter contains safety tips, information(as appropriate) on managing quality control, and a list of references for further information.

A New Model for Designing a Product Line Using TURF Analysis

This paper introduces the approach of using TURF analysis to design a product line through a binary linear programming model. This improves the efficiency of the search for the solution to the problem compared to the algorithms that have been used to date. Furthermore, the proposed technique enables the model to be improved in order to overcome the main drawbacks presented by TURF analysis in practice.

Evolutionary games on complex networks : the emergence and maintenance of cooperation

Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.

Discounting Spotted Apples: Investigating Consumers’ Willingness to Accept Cosmetic Damage in an Organic Product, November 2006

Organic producers have limited methods of avoiding plant diseases that result in cosmetic damage to produce. Therefore, the appearance of organic produce is often less than perfect. We use an experimental auction to investigate how cosmetic damage affects consumers’ willingness to pay for organic apples. We find that 75% of the participants are willing to pay more for organic than for conventional apples given identical appearance. However, at the first sight of any imperfection in the appearance of the organic apples, this segment is significantly reduced. Furthermore, we find that there is a significant effect of interaction between cosmetic damage and product methods. Even though most consumers say they buy organic products to avoid pesticides, we find that cosmetic damage has a larger impact on the willingness to pay for organic apples than for conventional apples.

Study of Iowa's Current Road Use Tax Funds (RUTF) and Future Road Maintenance and Construction Needs, 2006

The 81st General Assembly of the Iowa Legislature, in Section 85 of House File 868, required the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) to conduct a study of current Road Use Tax Fund (RUTF)revenues, and projected roadway construction and maintenance needs.

Study of Iowa’s Current Road Use Tax Funds (RUTF) and Future Road Maintenance and Construction Needs, 2006

The 81st General Assembly of the Iowa legislature, in Section 85 of House File 868, required the Iowa Department of Transportation (Iowa DOT) to conduct a study of current Road Use Tax Fund (RUTF) revenues, and projected roadway construction and maintenance needs. With input from Iowa’s cities, counties and other interested groups, the Iowa DOT completed this report for submittal to the legislature.

Study of Iowa’s Current Road Use Tax Funds (RUTF) and Future Road Maintenance and Construction Needs, 2006

The 81st General Assembly of the Iowa legislature, in Section 85 of House File 868, required the Iowa Department of Transportation (Iowa DOT) to conduct a study of current Road Use Tax Fund (RUTF) revenues, and projected roadway construction and maintenance needs.

Network revenue management with product-specific no-shows

Revenue management practices often include overbooking capacity to account for customerswho make reservations but do not show up. In this paper, we consider the network revenuemanagement problem with no-shows and overbooking, where the show-up probabilities are specificto each product. No-show rates differ significantly by product (for instance, each itinerary andfare combination for an airline) as sale restrictions and the demand characteristics vary byproduct. However, models that consider no-show rates by each individual product are difficultto handle as the state-space in dynamic programming formulations (or the variable space inapproximations) increases significantly. In this paper, we propose a randomized linear program tojointly make the capacity control and overbooking decisions with product-specific no-shows. Weestablish that our formulation gives an upper bound on the optimal expected total profit andour upper bound is tighter than a deterministic linear programming upper bound that appearsin the existing literature. Furthermore, we show that our upper bound is asymptotically tightin a regime where the leg capacities and the expected demand is scaled linearly with the samerate. We also describe how the randomized linear program can be used to obtain a bid price controlpolicy. Computational experiments indicate that our approach is quite fast, able to scale to industrialproblems and can provide significant improvements over standard benchmarks.

Effective Shoulder Design and Maintenance, 2007

Granular shoulders are an important element of the transportation system and are constantly subjected to performance problems due to wind- and water-induced erosion, rutting, edge drop-off, and slope irregularities. Such problems can directly affect drivers’ safety and often require regular maintenance. The present research study was undertaken to investigate the factors contributing to these performance problems and to propose new ideas to design and maintain granular shoulders while keeping ownership costs low. This report includes observations made during a field reconnaissance study, findings from an effort to stabilize the granular and subgrade layer at six shoulder test sections, and the results of a laboratory box study where a shoulder section overlying a soft foundation layer was simulated. Based on the research described in this report, the following changes are proposed to the construction and maintenance methods for granular shoulders: • A minimum CBR value for the granular and subgrade layer should be selected to alleviate edge drop-off and rutting formation. • For those constructing new shoulder sections, the design charts provided in this report can be used as a rapid guide based on an allowable rut depth. The charts can also be used to predict the behavior of existing shoulders. • In the case of existing shoulder sections overlying soft foundations, the use of geogrid or fly ash stabilization proved to be an effective technique for mitigating shoulder rutting.

Improving Transition Outcomes: MyTransitionIowa.org Resource Mapping Product

Information about Improving Transition Outcomes statewide resource mapping product.

Salt subtraction in patients on maintenance hemodialysis. Efficacy and limitations.

In 6 hypertensive patients with terminal renal failure maintained on hemodialysis, the effects of 'salt subtraction' and of sequential ultrafiltrating were evaluated. Following each of 3 weekly hemodialysis sessions, salt subtraction was carried out by ultrafiltrating 1 liter and simultaneously infusing an equal volume of 5% dextrose. This resulted in a net sodium loss without hypovolemia. After a 2-week period of this procedure, the blood pressure prior to dialysis was lower (156/76 +/- 12/5 mm Hg) than after a comparable number of sequential ultrafiltration sessions (181/88 +/- 10/6 mm Hg; mean +/- SEM). This difference was not statistically significant. At the same time, body weight was comparable at 64.4 +/- 3 and 64.7 +/- 4 kg, respectively. Neither plasma renin activity nor plasma catecholamines responded with a clear increase to either procedure. The limited effect on blood pressure and the renin system of a marked sodium removal during salt subtraction suggests that sodium must still be present in excess in these patients. The procedure of salt subtraction appears safe and subjectively well tolerated, but it can probably not be used as the sole means of decreasing total body sodium without associating dietary measures to reduce sodium intake.

Product market deregulation and labor market outcomes

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulationand equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combininga Mortensen-Pissarides model with monopolistic competition in the goods marketand individual wage bargaining. Product market competition affects unemploymentvia two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect dueto a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. Acalibrated model compares a high-regulation European regime to a low-regulationAnglo-American one. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individualbargaining, no more than half a percentage point of European unemployment ratescan be attributed to entry regulation.