VOLUMES RELIES du Cabinet des titres : recherches de noblesse, armoriaux, preuves, histoires généalogiques. Recueils généalogiques de « messire Jean, baron DE LAUNAY et du St-Empire, chevalier de l'ordre militaire de Christo, sr de Montigny et d'Asfelt, vicomte de Zelande » († 1687). XXXV « Copie d'un vieux livre ms. intituté : Recueil genealogicq des plus nobles et anciennes maisons et familles du pays d'Haynaut, faicte par Me François Vinchant, prestre... » (1661).

Contient : Copies de différentes pièces, des XVIe et XVIIe siècles, concernant Namur ; « Tournoy à fer esmolu tenu à Bruxelles, en l'an 1516 » ; Généalogies diverses

Illusory correlation in the remuneration of chief executive officers: It pays to play golf, and well

Illusory correlation refers to the use of information in decisions that is uncorrelated with the relevantcriterion. We document illusory correlation in CEO compensation decisions by demonstrating thatinformation, that is uncorrelated with corporate performance, is related to CEO compensation. We usepublicly available data from the USA for the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004 to examine the relationsbetween golf handicaps of CEOs and corporate performance, on the one hand, and CEO compensationand golf handicaps, on the other hand. Although we find no relation between handicap and corporateperformance, we do find a relation between handicap and CEO compensation. In short, golfers earnmore than non-golfers and pay increases with golfing ability. We relate these findings to the difficultiesof judging compensation for CEOs. To overcome this and possibly other illusory correlations inthese kinds of decisions, we recommend the use of explicit, mechanical decision rules.

On the receiver pays principle

This paper extends the theory of network competition betweentelecommunications operators by allowing receivers to derive a surplusfrom receiving calls (call externality) and to affect the volume ofcommunications by hanging up (receiver sovereignty). We investigate theextent to which receiver charges can lead to an internalization of thecalling externality. When the receiver charge and the termination(access) charge are both regulated, there exists an e±cient equilibrium.Effciency requires a termination discount. When reception charges aremarket determined, it is optimal for each operator to set the prices foremission and reception at their off-net costs. For an appropriately chosentermination charge, the symmetric equilibrium is again effcient. Lastly,we show that network-based price discrimination creates strong incentivesfor connectivity breakdowns, even between equal networks.