971 resultados para Pareto analyysi
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OBJECTIVE - To assess the incidence of fatal pulmonary embolism (FPE), the accuracy of clinical diagnosis, and the profile of patients who suffered an FPE in a tertiary University Hospital. METHODS - Analysis of the records of 3,890 autopsies performed at the Department of General Pathology from January 1980 to December 1990. RESULTS - Among the 3,980 autopsies, 109 were cases of clinically suspected FPE; of these, 28 cases of FPE were confirmed. FPE accounted for 114 deaths, with clinical suspicion in 28 cases. The incidence of FPE was 2.86%. No difference in sex distribution was noted. Patients in the 6th decade of life were most affected. The following conditions were more commonly related to FPE: neoplasias (20%) and heart failure (18.5%). The conditions most commonly misdiagnosed as FPE were pulmonary edema (16%), pneumonia (15%) and myocardial infarction (10%). The clinical diagnosis of FPE showed a sensitivity of 25.6%, a specificity of 97.9%, and an accuracy of 95.6%. CONCLUSION - The diagnosis of pulmonary embolism made on clinical grounds still has considerable limitations.
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OBJECTIVE: Anatomical and functional assessment of the heart through Doppler and echocardiography in patients with cell anemia (SCA). METHODS: Twenty-five patients with SCA and ages ranging from 14 to 45 years were prospectively studied in a comparison with 25 healthy volunteers. All of them underwent clinical and laboratory evaluation and Doppler echocardiography as well.The measurements were converted into body surface indices. RESULTS: There were increases in all chamber diameters and left ventricle (LV) mass of the SCA patients. It was characterised an eccentric hypertrophy of the left ventricle. The preload was increased (left ventricle end-diastolic volume) and the afterload was decreased (diastolic blood pressure, peripheral vascular resistance and end-systolic parietal stress ESPS). The cardiac index was increased due to the stroke volume. The ejection fraction and the percentage of the systolic shortening , as well as the systolic time intervals of the LV were equivalent. The isovolumetric contraction period of the LV was increased. The mitral E-septum distance and the end-systolic volume index (ESVi) were increased. The ESPS/ESVi ratio,a loading independent parameter, was decreased in SCA, suggesting systolic dysfunction. No significant differences in the diastolic function or in the pulmonary pressure occurred. CONCLUSION: Chamber dilations, eccentric hypertrophy and systolic dysfunction confirm the evidence of the literature in characterizing a sickle cell anemia cardiomyopathy.
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Las relaciones intensidad de lluvia-duración-Recurrencia (i-d-T) y el patrón de distribución temporal de las lluvias, requeridos para estimar las "Crecientes de proyecto", empleadas para el proyecto de obras de ingeniería civil y planificación del uso del suelo, solo se pueden extraer de extensos registros de alta frecuencia, normalmente fajas pluviográficas, elemento en general no disponible en Argentina. En cambio, es habitual disponer de otro dato de lluvia provisto por pluviómetros: la lámina diaria total. En la provincia de Córdoba, existe información de relaciones i-d-T para siete estaciones pluviográficas, insuficientes para lograr una buena cobertura espacial de toda la Provincia. En este trabajo, se buscará regionalizar las ternas i-d-T para toda la provincia de Córdoba utilizando una técnica de regionalización la cuál contempla el uso de un modelo predictivo e información pluviométrica la cuál se caracteriza por su mayor densidad espacial. A tal fin se espera plasmar la información disponible en mapas digitales (grillas con resolución espacial acorde a los fines de proyecto) los cuales permitan caracterizar el comportamiento estadístico de la variable lluvia máxima diaria, a través de dos parámetros descriptivos como son la media y desvió estándar de los logaritmos de dichas series, incorporando a través de ellos características locales al modelo predictivo. Toda la información procesada y los mapas elaborados serán conformados en un Sistemas de Información Geográfica (SIG). El proceso metodológico empleado se puede resumir en siete actividades principales, a saber: a) selección de las estaciones pluviométricas disponibles en la provincia de Córdoba en base a la longitud de las series de registros, la verificación sobre las series de valores máximos de lluvias diarias de las hipótesis estadísticas básicas (independencia, estacionalidad y homogeneidad) y detección de datos atípicos. b) Determinación de los parámetros provenientes del análisis de estadística inferencial sobre las series de lluvias máximas diarias registradas en los puestos seleccionados y sobre los logaritmos de ellas. c) Ubicación especial de las distintas estaciones pluviométricas y sus parámetros estadísticos, d) Interpolación de la información puntual, generación de mapas de interpolación y análisis tendencial. e) implementación del Modelo predictivo para la regionalización de las curvas i-d-T. f) cuantificación de las incertidumbres provenientes de las distintas fuentes que permitan determinar el intervalo de confianza de los resultados obtenidos, para ello se espera plantear uno o más de los siguientes enfoques metodológicos, estadística clásica (análisis de primer orden), métodos bayeseanos, principio de pareto y/o principio de equifinalidad. g) Análisis y Validación de los resultados.
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Mathematik, Diss., 2015
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I analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertemporally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency is characterized. I give a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness and propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function.
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We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule that has played a central role in the analysis of the problem is the so-called uniform rule. Chun (2001) proves that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, separability, and continuity (with respect to the social endowment). We obtain an alternative characterization by using a weak replication-invariance condition, called duplication-invariance, instead of continuity. Furthermore, we prove that Pareto optimality, equal division lower bound, and separability imply no-envy. Using this result, we strengthen one of Chun's (2001) characterizations of the uniform rule by showing that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality, equal división lower bound, separability, and either continuity or duplication-invariance.
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For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.
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The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a powerful voice in public affairs. The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the last 60 years. We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the other tradition. In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and perhaps more piecemeal. We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of UK government policy-making.
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This paper addresses the issue on whether tax reforms consisten with lower public debt-to-GDP in the long-run can lead to a more efficient and equitable economy. To this end we solve a heterogeneous agent model comprised of a government, a representative capitalist and representative skilled and unskilled workers, under both rational expectations and adaptive learning. Our main ndings are that (i) reductions in capital taxation, while bene cial at the aggregate level, lead to increased inequality mainly due to the substitutability of un- skilled labour and capital; (ii) a fall in taxation for skilled labour is Pareto improving, which is largely explained by its complementarity with the other factor inputs; (iii) all agents would prefer increasing the tax rate on capital to increasing the tax rate on skilled and un- skilled labour since it leads to relatively lower welfare losses; and (iv) heterogeneity in initial beliefs under adaptive learning quantitatively matters for welfare.
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One of the striking aspects of recent sovereign debt restructurings is, conditional on default, delay length is positively correlated with the size of haircut. In this paper, we develop an incomplete information model of debt restructuring where the prospect of uncertain economic recovery and the signalling about sustainability concerns together generate multi-period delay. The results from our analysis show that there is a correlation between delay length and size of haircut. Such results are supported by evidence. We show that Pareto ranking of equilibria, conditional on default, can be altered once we take into account the ex ante incentive of sovereign debtor. We use our results to evaluate proposals advocated to ensure orderly resolution of sovereign debt crises.
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This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of Markov-perfect tax-spending policy in a neoclassical growth model with capitalists and workers. Focusing on the long run, our main fi ndings are: (i) it is optimal for a benevolent government, which cares equally about its citizens, to tax capital heavily and to subsidise labour; (ii) a Pareto improving means to reduce ine¢ ciently high capital taxation under discretion is for the government to place greater weight on the welfare of capitalists; (iii) capitalists and workers preferences, regarding the optimal amount of "capitalist bias", are not aligned implying a conflict of interests.
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In this paper, I look at the interaction between social learning and cooperative behavior. I model this using a social dilemma game with publicly observed sequential actions and asymmetric information about pay offs. I find that some informed agents in this model act, individually and without collusion, to conceal the privately optimal action. Because the privately optimal action is socially costly the behavior of informed agents can lead to a Pareto improvement in a social dilemma. In my model I show that it is possible to get cooperative behavior if information is restricted to a small but non-zero proportion of the population. Moreover, such cooperative behavior occurs in a finite setting where it is public knowledge which agent will act last. The proportion of cooperative agents within the population can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing the finite number of agents playing the game. Finally, I show that under a broad set of conditions that it is a Pareto improvement on a corner value, in the ex-ante welfare sense, for an interior proportion of the population to be informed.
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In this paper we examine the importance of imperfect competition in product and labour markets in determining the long-run welfare e¤ects of tax reforms assuming agent heterogeneneity in capital hold- ings. Each of these market failures, independently, results in welfare losses for at least a segment of the population, after a capital tax cut and a concurrent labour tax increase. However, when combined in a realistic calibration to the UK economy, they imply that a capital tax cut will be Pareto improving in the long run. Consistent with the the- ory of second-best, the two distortions in this context work to correct the negative distributional e¤ects of a capital tax cut that each one, on its own, creates.
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Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot coordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. To utilize the explanatory power of models with multiple equilibria it is first necessary to understand how an economy arrives to a particular equilibrium. In this paper we employ notions of learnability and self-enforceability to motivate and identify equilibria of particular interest. Central among these criteria are whether the equilibrium is learnable by private agents and jointly learnable by private agents and the policymaker. We use two New Keynesian policy models to identify the strategic interactions that give rise to multiple equilibria and to illustrate our methods for identifying equilibria of interest. Importantly, unless the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is learnable by private agents, we find little reason to expect coordination on that equilibrium.